Material Disease: Agency and Illness in Early American Literature by Crilley, Mariah
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2019 
Material Disease: Agency and Illness in Early American Literature 
Mariah Crilley 
West Virginia University, mcrilley@mix.wvu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
 Part of the Literature in English, North America Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Crilley, Mariah, "Material Disease: Agency and Illness in Early American Literature" (2019). Graduate 
Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 3936. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/3936 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
 








to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences 
at West Virginia University 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 







Timothy Sweet, Ph.D., Chair 
Sari Altschuler, Ph.D. 
Cari Carpenter, Ph.D. 
Lowell Duckert, Ph.D. 




Department of English 
 
 






Keywords: Early American Literature, Disease, Medical Humanities, New Materialism, 
Ecocriticism 













Material Disease: Agency and Illness in Early American Literature argues that diseases shaped 
bodies of literature. Drawing on new materialism, disability studies, and the medical humanities, 
this dissertation argues that diseases were material and literary agents that transformed not only 
individual bodies and lives but also cultures, history, and even literature. In each chapter, I 
explore how one disease impacted a particular genre or paradigm: syphilis and the natural 
history, smallpox and the body politic, yellow fever and the novel, dysentery and sensibility, and 
malaria and narratives of Western expansion. By emphasizing disease’s material and literary 
agency, by conjoining the study of illness and disability with the study of the environment, this 
dissertation demonstrates how disease challenges fundamental beliefs about humanity, including 
sovereignty, autonomy, rationality, and intentionality. Yet this challenge is not entirely negative. 
Instead, it opens up a critical space for reimagining how humans relate to other humans and 
nonhumans, to how we experience, treat, and write about one of our most fundamental 
interactions with the nonhuman world—illness. In the age of the Anthropocene, and the global 
reckoning of human supremacy, it is absolutely vital that we reimagine and remap the 
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Introduction 
 “Your Foul Disease is too filthy and odious to have the nasty Symptoms of it 
mentioned,” Cotton Mather condemns in The Angel of Bethesda.1 “As for any Remedies,” he 
continues, “You are so Offensive to me, I’ll do nothing for you” (120). Mather may never use 
this disease’s modern name, but his references to the French Pox, Lues Venerea, “Whoremongers 
and Adulterers,” decaying noses, and seeping ulcers, all suggest that he was describing that 
allegedly American scourge—syphilis. In a medical compendium otherwise devoted to 
cataloging early American illnesses and cures—not to mention illustrating his own medical 
prowess after the notoriously bitter inoculation controversy—the prolific minister’s reticence is 
striking. Syphilis deserves no mention and certainly no mention of cure. Those suffering had 
only themselves and their sins to blame. To even describe “the symptoms that attend it, would be 
such a Nasty Discourse, that Civility to the Readers will Supercede it; and the Sheets of this 
Treatise now before him, Shall not be stained with so much Conspurcation [pollution]” (116). 
The simple act of description could stain the text and its reader. To keep his work and certainly 
himself pure, Mather abjures the subject completely.  
 Yet this “Nasty Discourse” not only persists for another seventeen paragraphs but 
eventually divulges all of the information so sanctimoniously forsworn: Mather delivers syphilis’ 
symptoms and even reveals three remedies (285).2 Fueled as he was by ministering to his flock 
                                                      
1 Mather, The Angel of Bethesda, 118, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
2 In this chapter, Mather describes the symptoms of yaws and gonorrhea, which were not yet 
differentiated from syphilis. Unlike many European colonials, he cites Royal Society member 
William Becket who claimed that syphilis was not a new disease: “in the English Nation more 
than Six Hundred years ago, it went under the Name of Brenning, or Burning, which signified 
what is now called A Clap” (117). It is for “the Running of the Reins,” or this “brenning,” that 
Mather provides three cures, albeit in a different “catch-all” chapter on “Lesser Inconveniences” 
(279).  
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and proving his erudition, Mather must have been torn: was syphilis evidence of justly-punished 
sin or pastoral need? Should he let the disease run its righteous course or perform his Christian 
duty by helping those in need? How could he write about such a polluting disease without 
polluting himself? Yet how could he not write about the disease in his comprehensive work on 
“the Common Maladies of Mankind” (1)? Mather’s oscillation between reticence and censure, 
censure and succor, reveals that his fear of “Conspurcation” had been realized. Yet syphilis did 
not simply stain or corrupt The Angel of Bethesda. Syphilis wrote it. 
 Material Disease: Agency and Illness in Early American Literature argues that diseases 
like syphilis wrote early American bodies and bodies of literature. As syphilis, smallpox, and 
malaria produced particular, identifiable, but also idiosyncratic symptoms in and across human 
bodies, they similarly produced particular, identifiable, and idiosyncratic symptoms in and across 
the early American paradigms and genres that described them, including the natural history, the 
body politic, and the novel. By emphasizing disease’s intertwined physiology and textuality, 
Material Disease proposes materiality as a central factor in early American life and literature and 
our study of them. “Materiality” clarifies the layered experiences of illness, accounting for the 
range of human and nonhuman agents that create both disease and texts. As such, this 
dissertation offers materiality as a more responsive and responsible foundation for ethical 
relations between humans, between humans and nonhumans, and between scholars and our early 
American materials. After all, the limiting and limited paradigm of humanity failed to prevent 
chattel slavery and colonization as much as it still fails to prevent racism and ableism. In our 
current moment of ecological and epidemiological crisis, it could not be more vital to outline 
alternative ways of relating to each other and the nonhuman world. 
 
 3 
Early American Matter(s) 
 Early America was a world of matter and of matter that mattered. The Atlantic world 
collected and collided an unprecedentedly diverse group of bodies and agencies: indigenous 
Americans, enslaved and free Africans, Europeans, creoles, agricultural products and 
commodities like wheat, apples, corn, and tobacco, imports and exports, including pigs, guns, 
furs, and timber that eventually supported modern capitalism, plants and specimens that provided 
the material foundation for modern science, and, of course, lists, reports, drawings, accounts, 
narratives, and medical compendiums like Mather’s that described and organized this material 
miscellany.  
What united these diverse bodies was their shared place. Mary Louise Pratt famously 
calls such colonial places “the contact zone,” a “social space” where cultures “meet, clash, and 
grapple with each other.”3 Colonial texts are not “discrete, coherently structured, monolingual 
edifices,” nor are they “anomalous or chaotic” (36). Rather, they are “heterogeneous,” collating 
their diverse social milieu into a single text. Kathleen Donegan, however, christens the very 
same space “the chaos zone,” arguing that colonial experiences “just as often inhibit cross-
cultural interaction as occasion it.”4 The chaos zone, therefore, is a space of “eruptive, endemic, 
and usually unresolved” disarray (35). Hurricanes, starvation, heat, and humidity meant that 
humans and their texts were rarely secure, certain, and ordered. Whereas the contact zone 
emphasizes how the heterogeneous forms a single text—and how the scholar can explain such 
heterogeneity—the chaos zone centers those moments that resist explanation and order. 
Moreover, the chaos zone implicitly emphasizes the nonhuman world. While Donegan does not 
                                                      
3 Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone,” 34, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
4 Donegan, Seasons of Misery, 35, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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focus on this distinction, her model recognizes that humans were not the only ones meeting, 
clashing, and grappling in the Americas. Nonhumans disordered lives, cultures, and texts at least 
as much as humans.5 
 One of the most important members of the chaos zone was disease. As Alfred W. Crosby, 
Jr. argued over half a century ago in The Columbian Exchange, American colonization facilitated 
an unprecedented exchange of microbes: the bacteria that spread syphilis, the smallpox virus, 
Aedes aegypti and Anopheles mosquitoes that transmitted the yellow fever virus and malarial 
parasites, and the bacteria and amoebas that produced dysentery. Even if indigenous Americans 
and Europeans did not “swap” syphilis and smallpox as neatly as Crosby argues, and even if his 
focus on biological history threatens to naturalize colonization—a serious danger taken up 
below—his core argument remains true. As Mather’s account of syphilis attests, diseases 
intimately shaped early American lives, cultures, and histories. They helped create the “eruptive, 
endemic, and usually unresolved disorder” that characterized the chaos zone, ending individual 
lives as well as entire communities, revising personal identities as well as cultures.6 
 Their most dramatic, most tragic, and certainly most theorized impact, however, was on 
indigenous Americans. From the Arawak in Hispaniola to the Wampanoag in New England, 
indigenous people suffered and died at devastating rates from smallpox, measles, influenza, and 
other European and African diseases. As Thomas Morton famously described, they were “not 
able to bury the dead,” and “their bones and skulls…seemed to mee a new found Golgatha.”7 
                                                      
5 In Plants and Empire, Londa Schiebinger revises Pratt’s model to include botanical exchanges, 
dubbing the colonial Atlantic a “biocontact zone.” Although Schiebinger’s model acknowledges 
nonhumans, Donegan’s emphasis on disorder offers a more useful paradigm and methodology 
for probing disease—a nonbotanical nonhuman. 
6 Donegan, Seasons of Misery, 35. 
7 Morton, New English Canaan, 23, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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Early colonists probably exaggerated indigenous deaths—especially those fiscally invested in a 
land expunged of native peoples. Morton, for example, claims that this “mortality…fortuned 
some few years before the English came” (22, emphasis mine). We should not take such self-
serving accounts at face value, but we also should not simplify or erase the very real effects of 
colonization, which included both concerted military and cultural efforts to eradicate native 
peoples and disease.  
Yet focusing on disease does not require rehearsing colonialist paradigms like the virgin 
soil thesis and the germ theory of history. Since at least the mid-twentieth century, scholars have 
used the “virgin soil” model to explain why so many indigenous Americans suffered and died 
from “old world” diseases while the colonists seemed to flourish. This model argues that 
indigenous people had no prior immunological experience with many endemic European 
diseases—because they had crossed the Bering Strait so long ago, because many diseases could 
not have survived that long and frigid route, because they did not domesticate animals, because 
some groups did not grow large enough or travelled too much to host viable epidemic disease. 
Whatever the reason, the virgin soil thesis asserts that indigenous Americans had neither 
experiential nor genetic protections against European and African illnesses. Reappraising the 
dated model, some have added that diseases may have grown more virulent through new animal 
reservoirs, antigenic shift, and genetic homogeneity.8 Indigenous people were not disease-free 
                                                      
8 Of the historians who focus on this topic, Alfred Crosby developed the virgin soil model in The 
Columbian Exchange, while William H. McNeill extended this paradigm in Plagues and 
Peoples. More recently, Gerald N. Grob has theorized on genetic homogeneity and antigenic 
shift in The Deadly Truth, 15-17. 
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before colonization, but the “virgin soil” model attempts to explain how and why they died in 
such unthinkable numbers after their encounters with Europeans.9 
 Still, many scholars reject the virgin soil model. Cristobal Silva argues that it 
misrepresents the creole immunological experience. After a generation away from Europe, 
settlers’ children were also increasingly susceptible to diseases like smallpox—hence, Boston’s 
infamous 1721 epidemic, returned to in chapter two.10 Likewise, William Cronon maintains that 
while genetics may have played a part, immunological realities were enabled and compounded 
by “social and economic disorganization” (86). Malnutrition, starvation, opportunistic infections, 
and despair all exacerbated the impact of “old world” disease, genetics, and immunity. 
 For many scholars, however, the critical danger of the virgin soil model is that it absolves 
Europeans of their role in indigenous disease burden and death.11 What Heather Schell calls “the 
germ theory of history”—exemplified by Crosby’s The Columbian Exchange and William H. 
McNeill’s Plagues and Peoples—transforms social, cultural, political, and, ultimately, human 
explanations of human history into naturalized biological mechanism.12 Paul Kelton argues that 
this paradigm relies on “historical accident”: “The colonizers exercised little agency in this 
catastrophe yet were its unwitting beneficiaries.”13 They let Europeans off the hook. It may not 
have been “crafted as an apology for the colonizers,” and may even retain some “utility,” but, 
Kelton maintains, the virgin soil model “hid[es] colonialism’s violence under a cloak of 
                                                      
9 Grob argues that dysentery and respiratory infections were especially rampant among pre-
Columbian indigenous people. The Deadly Truth, 17-22. 
10 Silva, Miraculous Plagues, chaps. 1 and 3. 
11 See, especially, Beyond Germs: Native Depopulation in North America, edited by Catherine 
M. Cameron, Paul Kelton, and Alan C. Swedlun, which argues that even the critical emphasis on 
disease is exaggerated and serves colonialist ends. 
12 See Schell, “The Sexist Gene.” 
13 Kelton, Cherokee Medicine, 7, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
 7 
biological determinism” (9). This critique seems absolutely necessary when McNeill asserts that 
“mutual support between micro- and macroparasitism”—disease and war—“is, assuredly, a 
normal ecological phenomenon.”14 According to these critics, the germ theory of history, 
including the virgin soil model, unintentionally but nonetheless effectively naturalizes 
colonization and indigenous depopulation by overemphasizing disease’s agency and thereby 
dehumanizing indigenous people. A study of early American disease—and especially of 
disease’s agency—must reckon with the ways in which those in power wield the attribution of 
agency as part of that power, assigning the vaulted category to humans, nonhumans, and even 
themselves unevenly and inconsistently. Early America represents a critical space to parse this 
problem not only because microbes and other agencies proliferated, but also because systems of 
power revolved around restrictive and mutable definitions of the human, of which humans 
mattered. 
 
Matters of Agency 
If my problem isn’t clear, I’ll put it as plainly as possible: how can I argue for disease’s 
agency without recapitulating the “germ theory of history”? Although they offer no 
straightforward solutions, new materialism, including agential realism and object-oriented 
ontology, provide insight into human and nonhuman agency and its intersection with bodies and 
cultures. As the chaos zone recognizes, nonhumans intimately affected early Americans’ daily 
lives, including their record of those daily lives. And, as anyone who lives with an illness knows, 
diseases intimately affect our lives, including our narration of them. By recognizing and 
theorizing disease’s impact on human life and culture—its agency—we need not recommit the 
                                                      
14 McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 45. 
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sins of our cultural and academic forefathers. Instead, we can more fully address lived 
experiences of illness and theorize an alternative ethics of relation and care.  
Agency is not intentional, causal, rational, or effective, nor is it unique to humanity. 
Agency is not something one has or doesn’t have. Rather, as Janet Bennett argues, agency is the 
simple but diffuse capacity to affect—to impact, inform, and transform other bodies. To Bennett, 
all matter is inherently affective, whether “animate” or not. Although humans may represent “a 
particularly rich and complex collection” of such vibrant, agential matter, our rational intentions 
are “always in competition and confederation with many other strivings.”15 As we’ve all 
experienced, intentions rarely net their desired results. This theory of vibrant matter and vital 
materialism is expressly political: if “the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter 
feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption” (ix), then 
reinvesting matter with agency might enable a more responsible demos. A true democracy, one 
with the power to combat climate change, would need to make space at the table for nonhuman 
agents.  
While Bennet does not solve the germ theory of history, she highlights the urgent 
necessity of redefining agency, of recognizing and theorizing how nonhumans shape our shared 
world. As early Americans fleeing yellow fever or suffering a bout of the ague knew, effective 
agency wasn’t limited to rational intentional beings. Diseases ended lives, challenged identities, 
decimated entire cultures, and changed history. They acted and continue to act. This doesn’t 
mean we can boil history or literature down to disease, but we should not and cannot erase 
disease either. 
                                                      
15 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 11, 32, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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If diseases act, then they act through the intersection of two distinct materialist theories: 
Karen Barad’s “intra-action” and Stacey Alaimo’s “trans-corporeality.” Using quantum physics, 
Barad argues, “individually determinate entities do not exist, measurements do not entail an 
interaction between separate entities; rather, determinate entities emerge from their intra-
action.”16 Whereas interaction describes the coordination of two distinct bodies, “intra”-action 
emphasizes the “fundamental inseparability” of all bodies and the necessity of an artificial “cut” 
to parse the many agencies at work in any given “thing.” Intra-action asserts that ontology cannot 
be reduced to “independent objects with discrete boundaries and properties”: no thing is 
inseparable from any other thing, even though we must separate them for ontological and 
epistemological clarity (139). Like Bennett, Barad envisions ethical implications: If “the very 
boundaries and constitution of the ‘human’ are continually being reconfigured,” then 
“[r]esponsibility—the ability to respond to the other—cannot be restricted to human-human 
encounters” (392). “We” must confront an expanded we. 
Like “intra-action,” Stacey Alaimo’s theory of “trans-corporeality” argues that “the 
human is always intermeshed with the more-than-human world” and, thus, “ultimately 
inseparable from ‘the environment.’”17 Yet while the prefix “trans” rejects corporeal borders as 
Barad’s intra-action does, it also emphasizes “movement across different sites,” recognizing “the 
often unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman creatures, ecological 
systems, chemical agents, and other actors” (2). “Trans” recognizes not just a difference between 
microbe and human but also the ethical responsibility of acknowledging such a distinction, 
particularly in the context of negative consequences like illness. Although Barad does not 
                                                      
16 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 128, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
17 Alaimo, Bodily Natures, 2, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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employ disease, it exemplifies her central argument: human bodies, agency, and especially 
knowledge are never truly separate or different from nonhuman agencies—though we must 
divorce them for clarity. Alaimo and trans-corporeality, however, reminds us that the 
relationship between self and environment is never purely theoretical. Trans-corporeality 
cautions intra-action to remember that an “expanded we” is not necessarily a good thing. 
Disease, therefore, is both intra-active and trans-corporeal. It is not that treponema 
pallidum does not exist without me, nor that I don’t exist without it, but that “syphilis” does not 
exist but for the intra-action of microbe and human. “Microbe” and “human” take shape as 
discrete categories through intra-actions called syphilis or yellow fever or dysentery. 
Differentiation, however, is not given; it must be enacted through a microscope, blood tests, 
cultural constructs, and history. Thus, syphilis or any other disease names both an intra-action 
and its differentiation, the conjunction of human and microbe as well as the cut between “me” 
and “not me” necessary for medical treatment and coherent subjectivity (not to mention ethical 
scholarship). If Bennett demonstrates disease’s agency by reframing it as a verb—disassociating 
it from purportedly unique human qualities—then Barad and Alaimo show how neither disease’s 
nor humanity’s agency is self-evident. They intra-act, intersect, co-produce, even co-create—for 
better or for worse. 
While neither Barad nor Alaimo solve the problem of the virgin soil model or the germ 
theory of history, an intra-active trans-corporeality posits a nuanced relationship between 
humans and nonhumans. Both the virgin soil thesis and germ history minimize the colonizer’s 
agency in disease and death, but an intra-active trans-corporeality and agential realism more 
broadly suggest that nonhuman and human agency are inextricable. By acknowledging and 
parsing this inseparability, we can address both how colonials wielded disease and its effects, 
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and how nonhumans and those believed to be non- or subhuman challenged and changed bodies, 
history, and literature. 
Disease’s agency, therefore, need not absolve the colonizer, nor does it necessarily 
dehumanize and objectify those believed to have had limited agency in the early modern 
period—women, people with disabilities, indigenous people, and Africans. Rather, as Mel Y. 
Chen argues, dehumanization and objectification, especially in the context of racism, rely on “a 
fragile humanity.”18 They rely on a limited and limiting concept of “the human”—as distinct 
from animals, plants, and inanimate objects—which has only ever been applied to select humans 
anyway. Closely analyzing the way racism mobilizes beliefs about the differences between 
humans and animals as well as things, Chen argues that both racists and progressives alike, 
invoking the “theoretical discourse” of dehumanization and objectification, “continue to 
disavow, if not simply ignore, the possibility of significant horizontal relations between humans, 
other animals, and other objects” (50). Instead, they maintain, we might build a more just and 
ethical world for both humans and nonhumans by acknowledging these “significant horizontal 
relations” (50). Though Chen does not examine early America, their argument seems vital at the 
moment when humans were colonized, enslaved, and subjugated at an unprecedented scale, 
when humans and nonhumans intra-acted to form race. Chen reminds us that the restrictive 
category of the human continues to animate racism, ableism, colonialism, and xenophobia. Thus, 
Chen and agential realism revise the categories of agency and humanity, arguing for an expanded 
definition of who and what shapes the world. 
Yet agential realism is not without its critics. In particular, object-oriented ontology 
(OOO) critiques new materialism’s emphasis on relations, connections, and assemblages. After 
                                                      
18 Chen, Animacies, 40, emphasis in original, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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all, Barad makes “intra-action” the fundamental unit of the universe, while Bennet focuses on 
democracy and agential assemblages. Similarly, Bruno Latour’s theories—central to many new 
materialist arguments—concentrate on networks and relations.19 Graham Harman defines OOO’s 
central critique of agential realism as “relationism”: “a thing’s existence consists solely in its 
relation with other things.”20 The sensual or perceptual qualities of an object are collapsed into 
the real and inaccessible object itself. Although we think we understand an object based on its 
relation to ourselves, Harman contends that the real object is “withdrawn.” Objects are not 
fundamentally inseparable, as Barad argues, but fundamentally inaccessible. 
Like agential realism, however, OOO also envisions its theory as ethical. In the age of the 
Anthropocene, of “hyperobjects” like global warming, and the end of the world, Timothy Morton 
argues that nonhumans are “out of control, withdrawn from total human access.”21 Humans 
“have not lost the sense of inner space” that used to define us. Rather, we’ve begun to realize that 
nonhumans have that “inner space” as well (172). Harman writes, “The only way to do justice to 
objects is to consider that their reality is free of all relations,” that things are uniquely and 
wondrously themselves.22 Ian Bogost explains further, “an object enters an ethical relation when 
it attempts to reconcile the sensual qualities of another object vis-à-vis the former’s withdrawn 
reality”—that is, when I attempt to grasp the object’s reality beyond its use-value to me, even 
though I know I can never really, fully, completely understand.23 OOO, therefore, asks us to be 
ethical by recognizing the radical individuation and inaccessibility of all objects and by still 
working to understand and account for them anyway. Although agential realism and OOO are 
                                                      
19 See, for example, Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social. 
20 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 12. 
21 Morton, Hyperobjects, 172, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
22 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 47. 
23 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 77-78. 
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frequently opposed, both—coming of age at the end of the world—are dedicated to caring for a 
world that is profoundly intimate and alien. 
 It is probably impossible to reconcile agential realism and OOO, but I’m going to take 
my ethical cue from OOO and try anyway. Disease illustrates the vital importance of attempting 
to unite the two—of attempting to account for relations and individuation, intimacy as well as 
alienation.24 Agential realism, especially intra-active trans-corporeality, helps to explain how 
disease is produced: syphilis is not a discrete, pre-existing entity that we can isolate in a lab, but 
the intra-action or co-production of many bodies and agencies, including microbes, humans, 
vectors, environments, hygiene, culture, history, etc. In turn, OOO remembers that “syphilis” 
names the sensual qualities of a withdrawn treponema pallidum—what we humans perceive of 
the microbe—not the real microbe nor the microbe’s reality. Both of these perspectives are 
critical for fathoming lived, early American experiences of disease, as I detail in the next section. 
Agential realism offers a critical paradigm for parsing the foundational relations between 
nonhumans and humans—biologically, culturally, and, as I argue, textually—while OOO 
reminds us that the disease above, below, or beyond our symptoms is withdrawn and 
inaccessible, eliding our understanding and narration.   
Reconciling disease’s relationality with its irreducibility is critical in the age of the 
Anthropocene, when global warming, globalization, medicalization, and suburbanization have 
allowed new diseases to emerge, old diseases to resurge, and epidemics to spread more rapidly 
                                                      
24 While none of these theorists fully address diseases, Morton touches on “miasma,” one of the 
ancient and early modern explanations for disease and epidemics, in Dark Ecology. He writes, 
miasma was “the first hyperobject we noticed”: “You can observe miasmic phenomena haunting 
the edges of your temporal tunnel vision. You see them as accidental, and you try to get rid of 
them” (50). Miasma represents an attempt to explain the inexplicable. Still, Morton’s use of 
miasma is to explain how the hyperobject works not disease. 
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and efficiently than ever before. As Latour argues, conventional critique—deconstructing, 
unveiling, and debunking—has “run out of steam,” having been mobilized against the most 
urgent concern of our time, climate change. Instead, the critic’s job should be composition, 
“searching for universality without believing that this universality is already there.”25 (474). 
Disease represents one of our most profound and intimate compositions with nonhumans, with 
our intra-active trans-corporeality and the extent to which we are “always already part of an 
active, often unpredictable material world.”26 We don’t desire smallpox or malaria or syphilis—
especially Mather. Intra-action and transcorporeality provide a space for “epistemological 
reflection and precautionary principles” rather than “affirmation” (Alaimo 144). We must build 
“a common world,” Latour argues, but we must also recognize “that this common world has to 
be built from utterly heterogeneous parts that will never make a whole, but at best a fragile, 
revisable, and diverse composite material,” including microbe and human, agential realism and 
OOO, and new materialism and the study of illness and disability (474). By taking disease as one 
of the human’s most important environmental experiences, I aim to show both how disease 
represents a distinct agency that shaped human lives, history, and writing, and how attending to 
this agency could reframe both our present environmental crisis and lived experience of illness 
and disability. 
 
Illness and Disability Matters 
Disease may be lively, but it is also deadly—painful, disruptive, terrifying, and lingering. 
Yet emphasizing disease’s lively agency does not necessarily contradict its deadliness, the lived 
                                                      
25 Latour, “An Attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto,” 474, hereafter cited parenthetically. See 
also “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?” 
26 Alaimo, Bodily Natures, 17, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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human experiences of illness. In fact, new materialism’s emphasis on relations and irreducibility 
provide a more nuanced paradigm for understanding illness as intimacy and alienation, self and 
other, and, thus, for the medical humanities and disability studies (DS). They provide a 
framework of the human who both is and is not their illness, who is radically related to and 
formed by other agencies, including microbes, physicians, family, those who share the same 
disease or a similar experience of pain or even pleasure, while also radically separate and 
singular. As much as we cannot know treponema pallidum, we also cannot fully understand 
another’s experience of syphilis. By bringing materialist theory to the medical humanities and 
DS, I do not mean to resurrect the medical model of disease or disability. Rather, I am arguing 
that such theories offer a more nuanced way to talk about materiality and embodiment, typically 
anathema to DS especially. Joining these fields together helps us to trace early American 
illness—always connected to the environment—and probe how paradigms of “normal” or 
“natural” humanity limit ethical treatment and care.  
Although DS and the medical humanities are distinct fields, both revolve around the 
medical model. In this model, both disease and disability require treatment and cure by trained 
medical professionals. The medical humanities are largely invested in improving medical 
treatment, highlighting, for example, the individual’s right to narrate their experience of illness 
and providing doctors with what Rita Charon calls the “narrative competence” to read these 
stories critically and empathetically.27 DS, however, rejects the medical model entirely. The 
                                                      
27 Some of the most notable references here are The Wounded Storyteller Arthur W. Frank, who 
argues that the physician’s narrative of disease subsumes and overpowers the individual’s 
experience of illness, their very life story. In turn, Rita Charon in Narrative Medicine argues that 
doctors can resist dominating patients by developing “singularity, humility, accountability, 
empathy…through intensive narrative training” (viii). Recently, Sari Altschuler has critiqued the 
medical humanities for its emphasis on “a well-meaning but vaguely conceived sense of 
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medical model of disability conflates the diversity of human bodies and minds with being ill—
with needing treatment, cure, and frequently eradication. While the medical humanities typically 
attempt to teach doctors empathy or help ill people reclaim their narrative power, disability 
studies develops a minority identity and politics based on the shared experience of 
discrimination.28 
 Rejecting medicalization, activists and theorists developed the social model of disability. 
In its simplest iteration, the social model claims that environments rather than impairments are 
disabling. Many scholars have critiqued and expanded a simplistic social model. Tobin Siebers 
argues for a more nuanced “theory of complex embodiment” that “views the economy between 
social representations and the body not as unidirectional as in the social model, or nonexistent as 
in the medical model, but as reciprocal,” while Alison Kafer offers a “political/relational model” 
that acknowledges that medical treatment and even cure can be part of a radical, social politics.29 
Likewise, Michael Schillmeier argues for embracing empirical philosophy in DS: “the relations 
between and within biomedical practices, physiological relations, etc.—say between bodies, 
senses, and things—(re-)assemble and (re-)enact the socialness of disability.”30 That is, the 
conventional social model of disability needlessly and dangerously severs the physical or 
biological from the social, when both are vital to understanding disabling practices and 
                                                      
empathy,” instead arguing that the humanities offer a rigorous epistemological toolkit. The 
Medical Imagination, 20.  
28 Susan Wendell complicates this division in “Unhealthy Disabled,” calling for “solidarity” 
between the two, typically divided groups, through “acknowledging” both “the existence of 
suffering that justice cannot eliminate” and “that illness is not only suffering” (31). While I agree 
with Wendell’s analysis, in the context of this argument, it is important to maintain the 
significant differences between disease and disability and the medical humanities and disability 
studies. 
29 Siebers, Disability Theory, 25; Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip. 
30 Schillmeier, Rethinking Disability, 103, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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experiences. While the “split” between disability and impairment “was meant as a strong 
political tool and conceptual remedy against oppression, exclusion and discrimination,” many 
disability scholars now emphasize the interaction, or intra-action, between real spaces, real 
cultures, and real bodies (Schillmeier 4). 
 To be clear, I am not emphasizing DS here to argue that the diseases I discuss were or are 
disabilities. Though some like syphilis produced chronic illness, social stigma, and even 
subjective recalibration—all definitions important to modern disability—it is important to 
maintain these distinct categories, to resist medicalizing impairments in a way that would 
misrepresent both early American and modern lived experiences. Nor am I arguing that diseases 
and illnesses are only socially constructed, though cultures undeniably shaped lived experiences, 
as I emphasize in the final chapter on the seasoning ague. Instead, I engage DS in the realm of 
disease as a reading practice that recognizes that human physical, cognitive, and emotional 
diversity transforms narratives. 
 Literary disability studies has focused on representations of disability, including how 
these representations overwhelmingly stigmatize real people with disabilities. Yet, in The Life of 
Stories, Michael Bérubé offers an alternative, outlining how cognitive disability transforms 
narratives and the very act of reading. He asserts, “There must be something about the reading of 
disability as reading that changes the way we read.”31 Bérubé argues that intellectual disability, 
whether identifiable in the DSM or not, challenges the fundamental values of narrative and 
humanity like temporality and self-awareness.  
In their special issue on early American literature and disability studies, Sari Altschuler 
and Cristobal Silva employ Bérubé’s argument, defining critical DS as a methodology rather 
                                                      
31 Bérubé, The Life of Stories, 52, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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than a diagnosis. Disability “pushes us to learn from the inchoate and the elusive,” to search “for 
the textual traces of imprecision, confusion, volatile consciousness, and disordered 
epistemology” that expose “the aesthetic impulse to rely on familiar approaches to telling history 
as a means of resolving textual disorders.”32 DS as reading practice rather than retrospective 
diagnosis examines those textual moments that fail to conform, that resist normalizing and 
naturalizing formal conventions. The “inchoate and elusive” produce valuable insights into 
systems of relation, knowledge, being, and especially narrative itself. 
 While I am not arguing that syphilis or smallpox or malaria are or should be considered 
disabilities, I am arguing that this methodology can and should be applied to disease. Silva and 
Altschuler warn against “importing the concept of disability into familiar medical topics like 
yellow fever, smallpox, and tuberculosis,” and instead “ask how disability studies orients us 
differently toward illness and disease in early America” (13). Among the many directions such 
an orientation could take, they suggest examining “how early American communities narratively 
encoded certain corporeal or cognitive conditions” (13). Like modern disability, diseases both 
took shape through narrative and shaped narrative. Though DS should never be severed from its 
social context and exigency, its methodology orients us to lived experiences of physical 
difference and human embodiment and offers a methodology for reading their narrative forms. 
As Bérubé contends that intellectual disability “can be a textual matter…even when there are no 
characters with intellectual disabilities to be found” (38), I argue that we can employ a DS 
methodology and attend to the concerns of DS, including temporary able-bodiedness, in the 
presence of disease—to consider not just how early Americans “encoded” the “corporeal” and 
“cognitive” experience of illness, but also how those diseases “narratively encoded” themselves.   
                                                      
32 Altschuler and Silva, “Early American Disability Studies,” 9, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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 As the intra-action of human and nonhuman, disease unites these social and material 
theories. On the one hand, DS and the medical humanities may seem antithetical to new 
materialism. The “human” remains a vital category for social and political justice, especially to 
people who have been dehumanized, objectified, and euthanized for centuries, while new 
materialism claim the restrictive and vaulted category of the human has led to our current 
environmental crisis. Yet, on the other hand, both navigate a similar problem: what is at stake 
when a limited definition of humanity guides ethics and politics? And what can be done to 
change it? DS could achieve its radical reformation by more closely attending to new 
materialism’s claims: the human is not a useful category when so many people fail to meet its 
expectations, when so many humans and nonhumans simply don’t count. In turn, new 
materialism should take seriously DS’ and the medical humanities’ insights: the lived 
experiences of intra-active trans-corporeality remain stigmatized, and the “human” may only be 
available to reject for those who already meet its high performance criterion. Still, new 
materialism provides a complex language to talk about materiality and embodiment that denies 
normative definitions of the human body and subject—one of DS’ most important goals. There 
are no easy answers here, and this isn’t an easy relationship, but probing the intersections of 
these two fields is vital for our study of early American disease and for our present moment of 
ecological and epidemiological disaster. 
 
Textual Matters 
 The treponema pallidum and human intra-act physiologically to generate syphilis, while 
syphilis and human cultures intra-act, generating stigma, shame, or even religious power, 
described in chapter one. Yet this intra-action extends even further: syphilis, human authors, and 
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human cultures intra-act to write. Cotton Mather and syphilis may not have met at the biological 
level, but we nonetheless glimpse syphilis’ presence—its writing—in those contradictory and 
hypocritical moments when Mather reveals the symptoms and cure he had so smugly repudiated. 
New formalism and ecocriticism offer a way to read textual disorder and discrepancy as 
moments when diseases impinge upon, shape, and write early American texts.  
In “History before Fact,” Jehlen argues that the “lapses and incoherencies…redundancies 
and paradoxes” that pervade American colonial literature witness history in the making. They 
represent debate in the historical record—“moments when alternatives coexist, when…futures 
are underdetermined and therefore genuinely undetermined33” Jehlen might read The Angel of 
Bethesda as part of the contested production of transatlantic science. Colonials were supposed to 
generate the raw materials to be refined by professionals at home, but Mather routinely resisted 
this division. 34 Thus, his confused chapter on syphilis might evidence this contentious debate. 
Like Jehlen, Donegan similarly contends that “disorder” is “endemic” to American settlement 
literature, yet she argues that it is “volatile consciousness textually preserved” (36). Whereas 
Jehlen emphasizes historical debate, Donegan emphasizes personal chaos. She emphasizes early 
settlement and does not include later figures like Mather, but her argument might imply that 
Mather’s inconsistency and hypocrisy reflect the psychologically harrowing experience of the 
Americas, including its new diseases. 
In turn, Ed White and Kelly Wisecup contend that such formal discrepancies witness not 
only European debates or psychology but indigenous and African perspectives as well. White 
                                                      
33 Jehlen, “History before Fact,” 692, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
34 In theory, Europeans theorized, while creoles collected and mailed. In practice, however, 
knowledge and knowledge making were diffuse and polycentric, as Susan Scott Parrish agues in 
American Curiosity.  
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argues that those moments that “escape systematicity” point toward “conflicting systemic 
interpretations,” or “counterethnographies” that include indigenous American ideas and 
perspectives.35 Like White, Kelly Wisecup argues that early texts’ “texture”—“‘any syntactic 
anomaly, semantic contradiction or logical inconsistency, as well as physical properties of the 
document’”—evidence the confluence of European, African, and indigenous paradigms of 
medical meaning.36 These and many other early American scholars suggest that formal hiccups 
and inconsistencies not only pervade colonial texts but actually define them. They are 
symptomatic of the colonial situation, the contact zone. 
Yet the contact zone was truly a chaos zone that also included nonhumans. When Jehlen 
claims that though “many forces, intentions, and effects combine, interact, parallel, or counter 
one another” in a narrative “they do not yet add up…to cause the reality that ultimately ensues,” 
she certainly means the varied human “intentions” of the colonial situation (692). She clarifies, 
“For what these underdetermined and therefore incoherent moments inscribe is not historical 
direction but human agency” (692). Though Jehlen undoubtedly is resisting history as teleology, 
and possibly even the “germ theory of history,” she also preempts the possibility of nonhuman 
“forces, intentions, and effects.” If these inconsistent moments are less about “outcome” than 
“interaction,” then this interaction, or intra-action, consists not only of diverse colonial peoples 
but also of diverse colonial nonhumans (692).  
In his meditation on the verb “represent,” Julian Yates argues that the act of 
representation is not limited to humans; nonhumans represent as well. The orange, for example, 
is a “thoroughly rhetorical entity,” “a representation of what the plant assumes that we sighted, 
                                                      
35 White, “Invisible Tagkanysough,” 765. 
36 Wisecup, Medical Encounters, qtd. in 11. 
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smelling, tasting animals might desire.”37 When a microbe like treponema pallidum infects a 
human, this intra-action rewrites the body, and some part of the microbe asserts and represents 
itself. Yet Yates extends his argument further: the literary inscription of an orange—ostensibly 
written by a human—can also “exist[] not as a moment of capture so much as a ceding of our 
writing systems to others” (127). He implies that only “certain writers and artists” can “cede” 
authorial power, but the experience of disease and infection suggests that such representation and 
writing may not be purposeful or directed (127). In this study, an author need not be infected 
with treponema pallidum or a plasmodium parasite for their work to be infected and written; 
rather, the nonhuman could overwhelm the human and the human’s writing, as Mather’s 
religious stigma suggests. 
Monique Allewaert and Michael Ziser have already begun the work of establishing a 
materialist study of early American literature. Whereas Allewaert uses the tropics and especially 
tropical slavery to posit an alternative genealogy of personhood, one unbeholden to 
Enlightenment ideals like autonomy and wholeness, Ziser argues for “a more-than-human 
literary-critical method.”38 He writes that, conventionally, “the nonhuman physical aspects of the 
American continent are assumed to appear in cultural productions only as  
occasions, backgrounds, or limits for the development of immaterial aesthetic, spiritual, or 
ideological discourses” (4). Thus, “art and literature may well imitate the natural world or be 
about it, but they are never of it in the strong, positive sense of emerging through its agency” (4). 
Instead, he argues, we should focus on the practices like agriculture that embedded a writer in the 
nonhuman world and “through which it is possible to hear more than just our own species’ 
                                                      
37 Yates, “Represent,” 132, 131, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
38 Ziser, Environmental Practice, 4, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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interests” (16). While Ziser focuses on environmental practices, and Allewaert on bodily 
disaggregation more broadly, both outline the importance of nonhuman materialities to early 
America and especially early American texts.39 
Building on the work of these assorted scholars, I argue that disease, health, and medical 
knowledge and practices united not only the disparate groups of humans in the Americas, as 
Wisecup has shown, but the nonhumans as well. We witness this intra-action of human and 
nonhuman disease and disease’s agency in textual discrepancies and disorder, especially in texts 
written by people with firsthand experience of disease or with close proximity to illness and 
suffering. As OOO reminds us, we cannot access the “real” illness—neither the microbe’s 
experience nor the person’s—but in these moments we hear an echo of something outside or 
beyond the text, the author, and the human. Although I would not presume to argue that it is only 
disease that represents and writes—other nonhumans intra-act as well, as Ziser demonstrates—I 
focus on texts that focus on disease, because, of all the intra-actions of humans and nonhumans 
in the Americas, disease was perhaps the most recorded, the most obviously constitutive of life, 
art, and culture. In order to study early America more inclusively, and to attend to our present 
crisis, we must develop a methodology for listening to these echoes and for responding to their 
partial knowledge ethically.  
In addition to probing for disorder, then, I also search for consistency, for similar 
disruptions across a range of texts. To revise Jane Tompkins, it is not that I “look[] for 
continuities rather than ruptures,” but that I look for continuities in ruptures.40 In particular, I 
draw on modern and early modern etiologies to argue that specific diseases wrote specific genres 
                                                      
39 See Allewaert, Ariel’s Ecology. I return to Allewaert more fully in chapter 3. 
40 Tompkins, Sensational Designs, xv. 
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specifically. For example, malaria’s material symptoms—cyclical fits, relapses, chimerical 
immunity—disrupted the teleological pull of the paradigm of seasoning and the genre most 
invested in this paradigm—narratives of Western expansion. Likewise, inoculated smallpox 
revised images of the body politic by revising the contours of individual bodies, paradoxically 
divorcing the human from its environment while inviting that very same environment within the 
person. By emphasizing continuity in disorder, I do not aim to demonstrate a single text’s bizarre 
representation of disease but to chart how nonhumans asserted themselves or elements of 
themselves across a range of texts and, thereby, shaped seminal early American literature, 
history, and life. 
 Yet the danger of this argument, especially in its emphasis on material symptoms, is 
“retrospective diagnosis.” It is fruitless to attempt strict diagnosis of disease; it’s impossible to 
know for certain which disease an early modern text describes, especially when “diseases” did 
not exist as such. Moreover, as Silva and Altschuler warn, albeit on disability, “diagnosis 
forecloses as much as it opens texts to criticism” (12). It threatens to reimpose the reign of the 
medical model, to cement professional medical knowledge as the only appropriate system for 
understanding disease. My use of modern and early modern etiology is not mean to reaffirm this 
paradigm, nor am I trying to describe “normative” symptoms—though I admit both are a sincere 
risk. Rather, I emphasize materiality and medical/scientific knowledge tentatively, recognizing 
as OOO reminds us that no system can fully explain disease and illness—even the symptoms of 
disease do not grant us access to either the microbe or the person living it. 
Although it might seem counterintuitive, my materialist argument and formalist 
methodology don’t require diagnosing specific texts with specific diseases. Instead, I argue in a 
more qualified way that diseases’ ontologies shaped our ways of knowing them, especially in the 
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texts that carefully describe them. When Mather claims syphilis will “stain” his text, he fears a 
disease that may corrupt, even write. Jehlen argues that formal inconsistencies represent a kind 
of textual recalcitrance, a moment when a narrative is “unable to fully transform its materials”: 
“The materials remain undigested or semidigested; they retain a quasi-independent and possibly 
rebellious life” (689). Though Jehlen’s “materials” are decidedly historical, her description 
echoes OOO, which emphasizes the withdrawn and inaccessible lives of things. Though all 
matter and all materials are independent and rebellious, diseases simultaneously rely upon and 
destroy human bodies and history, acting and subsisting for themselves. If the treponema 
pallidum intra-acts with human bodies to create syphilis, then it can also intra-act with textual 
bodies to write syphilis. Neither flawed execution nor rhetorical bravado, the eccentricities and 
downright inconsistencies of Mather’s chapter on syphilis evidence an “undigested” and 
“rebellious” agent refusing the silence and prejudice that Mather and his larger culture mandate. 
Neither medical theories nor personal narratives ever exhaust disease. To consider this agency, to 
acknowledge its presence in physical and textual bodies, is to work toward a more nuanced 
understanding of the event(s) of disease, to reference early American literature and history more 
materially and thus more complexly and to posit alternative means of relating to those unruly 
nonhumans, intra-acting agents, and withdrawn hyperobjects that have become unavoidable in 
our environmental and epidemiological crisis. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
 This argument, therefore, is organized by disease and genre: syphilis and natural history, 
smallpox and the body politic, yellow fever and the novel, dysentery and sensibility, and malaria 
and narratives of Western expansion. Each of these chapters includes a range of texts, spanning 
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place and time. Though they may seem disconnected or only arbitrarily related, this 
disconnection is actually vital to my argument. Spanning the Caribbean, mainland America, the 
Pacific, and even centuries worth of time, I emphasize patterns in textual disorder to show that 
diseases represent themselves in particular ways. This distance and breadth are necessary to 
demonstrate a pattern of disorder that goes beyond a single author like Mather, a single epidemic 
site, or a single culture. At times, this dissertation seems chronological: the earliest texts appear 
in the first chapter on syphilis, while the latest are in the final chapter on malaria. Yet my 
argument is not chronological, detailing how representations of disease changed over time. 
Rather, what unites these disparate texts, is their disease, genre or paradigm, and the particulars 
of their formal discrepancies.  
The first chapter analyzes syphilis’ impact on the natural history—the new world’s 
paradigmatic disease and the new world’s paradigmatic genre. Reading Hans Sloane’s A Voyage 
to the Islands of Madeira, Barbados, Nieves, S. Christopher and Jamaica, John Lawson’s A New 
Voyage to Carolina, and James Cook’s Journals, this chapter traverses the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries as well as the Caribbean and the Pacific to argue that syphilis’ 
incomprehensibility—its lifelong yet disconnected symptoms, uncertain origin, and quixotic 
cure—undermined the genre most devoted to comprehending the Americas. Under the thumb of 
the Royal Society, natural histories increasingly ascribed to special rules for style and content. 
Yet syphilis itself ruptures the natural historical rules, disclosing both syphilis’ intra-active 
agency and the limits of natural historical control: our narratives can never fully account for 
syphilis, neither a microbe’s motivations and desires, nor a human’s lived experiences. 
Ultimately, syphilis reminds us that this impossibility is imminently ethical. Whereas the natural 
history and certainly modern medicine assumes a knowable and controllable experience of 
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syphilis, the disease itself posits the unknown and the uncontrollable as a more ethical 
orientation to the layered, intra-active, and multivalent experiences of disease. 
 The next chapter shifts to the other best-known colonial disease—smallpox—expanding 
on how disease itself writes. While the first emphasized disease’s impact on a particular genre, 
this chapter addresses how smallpox and, especially, inoculated smallpox revised one of the 
predominant models of early modern political theory, the body politic. In particular, inoculated 
smallpox simultaneously enabled and resisted a paradigm of a bounded and bordered body 
politic. The first section of this chapter develops how inoculation transformed real human bodies 
and metaphors about human bodies through Cotton Mather’s animalcular theory, which 
paradoxically imagined the body as an impregnable fortress walled off from its environment by 
soliciting intra-action between human and nonhuman infectious matter. The second section of 
this chapter, then, tests how this inoculated smallpox transformed the body politic by closely 
examining another early American site, Charlestown, South Carolina, 1758-1761, and the letters 
and diaries of prominent Carolinians, including Dr. Alexander Garden and Eliza Lucas Pinckney. 
Here, white South Carolinians attempted to use inoculation as a metaphor to excise and ostracize 
Africans and indigenous peoples from their body politic, but the epidemic’s material 
circumstances actively subverted a racialized division of interior and exterior. If we are to revise 
those metaphors that frame how we live bodily difference, as well as how bodily difference 
structures the body politic, then we must extend our physical, historical, and literary borders to 
include the intra-active, trans-corporeal agency of disease. 
 The following chapter argues that the concurrence of pandemic yellow fever, the Haitian 
Revolution, and the rise of the American novel at the end of the eighteenth century was not 
coincidental but coevolutionary. In particular, defiant agents like yellow fever and black rebels 
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ruptured the gothic and didactic conventions of Charles Brockden Brown’s yellow fever novels, 
Arthur Mervyn and Ormond, as well as Leonora Sansay’s primary canon, Secret History and 
Laura. As nonhuman and purportedly non- or subhuman agents, they challenged the relationship 
between white humanity and agency and, even more precisely, between intentionality and 
efficacy. They exposed the myth of clear causes and calculable effects, undermining the very 
premise of plot, character, and gothic and didactic denouements. Though the modern novel is 
conventionally associated with white, bourgeois, colonial, human subjectivity, these early novels 
reveal the experience of illness to be the experience of the nonhuman—of disease itself and, as 
disability studies reminds us, of being culturally constructed as non- or subhuman. By focusing 
on disease in the form most closely aligned with modern humanity, we can begin to unravel how 
humanity maligns both human and nonhuman variation. 
The fourth chapter argues that dysentery rotted the paradigm and literature of sensibility. 
Early American writers, including Abigail Adams, West Indian poet and physician James 
Grainger, and Virginian plantation owner, Landon Carter, deployed sensibility to mitigate their 
personal suffering and reaffirm their own sensitivity and virtue. Yet dysentery consistently 
disturbed these goals and exposed their hypocrisy. It putrefied human embodiment and, thus, 
relations based on a particularly limited definition of human embodiment and feeling. Instead, 
the disease emphasized nonhuman relations and affinities, positing an ethics of shared 
materiality rather than shared humanity. After all, shared humanity did not and does not ensure 
the just treatment of enslaved, disabled, and aging or otherwise “rotting” people. Instead, 
dysentery posits ethical relations based on shared, mutating materiality, a radical alternative both 
to eighteenth-century sensibility and to the modern discourse of humanity that animates 
disability studies and the medical humanities. 
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Finally, the last chapter examines how malaria undermined the paradigm of seasoning 
and, thus, narratives of Western imperialism. By the nineteenth century, the seasoning 
represented a rite of passage, a routine stage in the exorable march of western expansion and 
colonial progress. As surely as settlers would survive illness, they would colonize the land. Yet 
no one was every fully seasoned by malaria. Fevers and chills could cycle for months at the 
slightest provocation, relapses could recur for years, and complete immunity was biologically 
impossible. Malaria’s antiteleological symptoms, therefore, resisted the teleological pull of 
seasoning and imperialism in Elizabeth House Trist’s Travel Diary, Timothy Flint’s 
Recollections of the Last Ten Years, and Caroline Kirkland’s Western oeuvre, including A New 
Home—Who’ll Follow?, Forest Life, and Western Sketches. Ultimately, malaria rejected the 
certainty that all disease could and would be conquered and, thus, that the West itself could and 
would be conquered. 
Each of these chapters ultimately argues that disease transformed bodies and bodies of 
literature. By emphasizing disease’s material and literary agency, by conjoining the study of 
illness and disability with the study of the environment, this dissertation demonstrates how 
disease challenges fundamental beliefs about humanity, including sovereignty, autonomy, 
rationality, and intentionality. And, in so doing, disease also reimagines how humans relate to 
other humans and nonhumans, to how we experience, treat, and write about one of our most 
fundamental intra-actions—illness. In the age of the Anthropocene, it is absolutely vital that we 




Chapter One: Syphilis “Itself” and the Natural History: The Ethical Limits of Human 
Certainty and Mastery 
Nearly four centuries after syphilis first ravaged Europe at the siege of Naples, and nearly 
three centuries after Girolamo Fracastoro coined the very word “syphilis,” a physician named 
Jonathan Hutchinson described the infamous venereal disease as an “imitator.” It mimicked 
psoriasis, smallpox, measles, epilepsy, and blindness, but lacked any identifiably unique 
symptoms of its own. It was “mixed up,” and its “development” was “seldom quite regular” and 
frequently “rapid.”1 Although few symptoms are particular to one disease only, an accurate 
diagnosis requires a clear progression of identifiable symptoms over time, what Kathryn 
Montgomery Hunter calls “narrative emplotment.”2 Even four centuries after its European debut, 
therefore, syphilis remained a diagnostic quagmire. Hutchinson concedes, “Whenever the 
evolution of a disease is irregular, and the use of definite nomenclature thus rendered difficult, 
we may suspect that the malady is syphilitic” (541). In short, if it wasn’t anything else, it might 
be syphilis. That the disease remained so unknowable and uncontrollable so long after its initial 
description suggests that something about the disease itself was unknowable and uncontrollable. 
In the absence of clear and chronological symptoms, syphilis lacked both content and narrative. 
Or, rather, it resisted both content and narrative. Syphilis resisted early modern attempts to name, 
explain, codify, and cure it and the genre most devoted to such pursuits—the natural history. 
Before the nineteenth century, before medicine and science were professionalized, natural 
historians labored to reveal the hidden workings of the nonhuman world, carefully observing and 
transcribing plants, places, animals, and diseases into Linnaean taxonomies, topographical maps, 
                                                      
1 Hutchinson, “An Address on Syphilis as an Imitator,” 541, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
2 Hunter, Doctor’s Stories, 45. 
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precise images, and dedicated tomes. Both a genre and an epistemology, the natural history 
evolved in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in tandem with American 
colonization. New world matter provided the material fodder for emerging fields like science and 
medicine as well as global imperialism and modern capitalism. Essentially, the genre and its 
practitioner believed that the nonhuman world could be fully understood with close observation, 
acumen, and patience—that, as Michel Foucault claimed, humans could “reduce the distance 
between” things and language “so as to bring language as close as possible to the observing gaze, 
and the things observed as close as possible to words.”3 Through careful rhetorical choices, the 
natural history could eschew mere representation and replicate the thing itself.  
Syphilis itself, however, was “mixed up.” Physicians, historians, and lay people alike 
debated its name, origin, and nosology. Called the great pox, French pox, Spanish pox, lues 
venerea, and other epithets like Cotton Mather’s “foul disease,” syphilis sometimes served to 
name an enemy and at other times proved too dangerous to even name at all.4 In part, these 
variations derive from a greater unknown—origin. While many early writers located syphilis’ 
genesis in the New World, imported to Europe by Christopher Columbus and his crew, others 
refused to believe that any disease could be completely “new,” citing references to the same or a 
similar disease the Old Testament and Hippocratic texts.5 Ultimately, these debates signaled the 
                                                      
3 Foucault, The Order of Things, 132. 
4 For example, Marie E. McAllister argues in “Stories of the Origins of Syphilis in Eighteenth-
Century England” that tales of syphilis’ origins reflected cultural prejudices, ranging from 
national stigma to racism, misogyny, and anti-Semitism. Nationalist origin tales were especially 
popular before the eighteenth century but were supplanted by racist ones by the end of the 
eighteenth century. In “The New and the Old: The Spread of Syphilis (1494-1530),” Anna Foa 
similarly argues that though early origin stories demonized other Europeans, many eventually 
shifted the blame to non-Christians, including natives in the West Indies and Jews in Europe. 
5 Some writers argued that nothing like syphilis had existed in Europe before contact with the 
New World. They believed that American natives transmitted it to Columbus and his crew, who 
infected other Spaniards, who, in turn, transmitted the disease to Europeans at Charles VIII’s 
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difficulty of defining syphilis itself, of identifying precisely what “it” was. Syphilis seemed like a 
variation on a familiar venereal disease, gonorrhea, but it also acted like another purportedly 
American ailment, yaws. It could have been a combination, dictated and exacerbated by the local 
climate, or it could have been something new entirely.6 In the early era of American 
colonization, syphilis was not simply “mixed up” and “irregular,” but without name, history, and 
definition—the central components of the natural history.  
Syphilis “itself” remains mysterious. The bacterium Treponema pallidum is sexually 
transmitted, beginning with a chancre, an ulcer in the genitals, fever, swollen glands, rashes, and 
other ulcers in the mouth and genitals. These symptoms usually resolve in a few weeks, but the 
bacterium remains in the body for decades if untreated, producing internal ulcers and eventually 
                                                      
Siege of Naples (1494-1495). See, for example, Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo’s Natural History 
of the West Indies and Girolamo Fracastoro’s Syphilis. For the historiographical debate on the 
Columbian origin hypothesis, a narrative that remains contested, see Alfred Crosby’s “The Early 
History of Syphilis: A Reappraisal” and Richard Holcomb’s Who Gave the World Syphilis? as 
representative examples of the two extremes of this debate—that syphilis was a New World 
disease and that syphilis existed in the Old World before American contact, respectively. For a 
thorough overview of the particulars of this debate, see Brenda Baker and George Aremlagos’ 
“The Origin and Antiquity of Syphilis.” Yet, a 2016 study claims to have found a pre-Columbian 
skeleton with evidence of a thoracic aortic aneurysm, which links the man’s death to syphilis 
and, thus, syphilis to the Americas. See. Mario M. Castro, et al., “Thoracic Aneurysm in a Pre-
Columbian (210 BC) Inhabitant of Northern Chile: Implications for the Origins of Syphilis.” 
6 The climate was an important factor for health in early modern Europe and grew even more 
important as Europeans encountered the extreme climates of the Americas. Georges-Louis 
Leclerc, Comte du Buffon, famously argued in his Natural History that the American 
environment produced small, impotent, and degenerated animals. Although Leclerc would walk 
back this claim, Cornelius de Pauw would expand the discourse of climactic degeneration by 
extending its effects to humans in Las Recherces Philosophiques sur les Américains. See 
Antonello Gerbi’s thorough overview of the debate on American degeneration, The Dispute of 
the New World: The History of a Polemic, 1750-1900. On the climate and syphilis, Jean Astruc 
argued that the hot and humid climate promoted promiscuity, which in turn produced venereal 
diseases (see De Morbus Veneris and Kelly Wisecup’s analysis in Medical Encounters, 173-
180). Others, like Nicolas de Monardes in Historia Medicinal and Ulrich von Hutton in De 
Morbo Gallico, argued that the New World climate produced herbals like guaiacum and 
sassafras to treat syphilis—yet another piece of evidence for New World origin. See Charles 
Manning and Merrill Moore’s “Sassafras and Syphilis.” 
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leading to visual and auditory impairments, strokes, paresis, and dementia. On the one hand, we 
do understand syphilis’ etiology and symptoms. Moreover, it can be cured with antibiotics—at 
least for now.7 On the other hand, much is still unknown: its relationship to other treponemic 
diseases like pinta, yaws, and bejel is unclear8; its origin remains contested; its violent, epidemic 
entrance into Europe is not fully understood; its symptoms have changed radically over the last 
four centuries.9 Though modern science certainly understands many of the disease’s biological 
mechanisms, it is a mistake to think that we understand it completely. Some part of it remains 
withdrawn, is inaccessible to modern science as well as to the natural history. 
                                                      
7 Antibiotic resistance is proving a problem, and the rates of syphilis are increasing. Penicillin 
remains effective, but “second line” antibiotics are proving ineffective. See Lola V. Stamm’s 
“Global Challenge of Antibiotic-Resistant Treponema pallidum.”  
8 Scientists are still undecided on the exact relationship between treponemic diseases, include 
pinta, yaws, bejel, and syphilis. Contracting one confers immunity to the rest, which certainly 
suggests a close, but perhaps not identical relationship (as cowpox conferred immunity to 
smallpox). They could be one species with different strains, like influenza; they could differ 
because of climate and means of transmission; or, they could simply be closely related bacteria 
that evolved separately over time. Pinta seems to be the oldest of the four diseases and the 
mildest, producing a skin infection that is transmitted by regular body contact, particularly 
between children. Yaws, however, is a chronic skin infection that can degrade bones and joints 
over time. As the global climate cooled, and humans began to wear clothes and casual skin 
contact became less frequent, scientists think that the treponeme bacterium receded to the 
warmest and moistest parts of the body: the mouth and the genitals. Bejel, a nonvenereal form of 
syphilis, produces similar symptoms, but it is transmitted orally. See Baker and Armelagos, “The 
Origin and Antiquity of Syphilis”; Crawford, Deadly Companions, 124-30; Karlen, Man and 
Microbes, 52-53, 57, and 121-28. 
9 Early modern syphilis seems to have been more virulent. The venereal disease that ravaged 
Europe after Columbus’ journey to America was far deadlier, far more quickly than the both the 
ordinary clap and modern syphilis. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, as Girolamo 
Fracastoro noted in 1530, the disease had already tempered into the slightly less horrific 
incarnation known to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Syphilis. The virulence of the 
post-Naples disease has led some scholars to argue that it was not syphilis at all, or not syphilis 
only but rather a mutation of yaws or perhaps the plague. See note 8. Furthermore, some 
scientists have suggested that syphilis mutated again between the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The creative genius associated with progressive syphilis was not documented until the 
nineteenth century. See Hare, “The Origin and Spread of Dementia Paralytica.” 
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Yet even as syphilis withdraws, it renders the contours of its agency visible—if only to 
demonstrate the limits of human knowledge and mastery. Syphilis “itself” infects and intra-acts 
with natural histories like Hans Sloane’s Voyage to Jamaica (1689), John Lawson’s A New 
Voyage to Carolina (1709), and James Cook’s Journals (1768-1779). It undermines the genre’s 
mechanisms of control and veracity, including faithful observation, plain language, clear 
“emplotment,” witnessing, and the figure of the author himself. In particular, the phrase “syphilis 
itself,” appearing in each of these texts, exposes the gap between the natural history’s purpose—
to represent the thing “itself”—and the thing “itself” that escapes representation. Syphilis 
withdraws from and revises the natural history, undermining its rhetorical conventions and 
ideological goals. These disruptions disclose both syphilis’ intra-active agency and the limits of 
natural historical control: our narratives can never fully account for syphilis, neither a microbe’s 
motivations and desires, nor a human’s lived experiences. Syphilis reminds us that this 
impossibility is not historical—a product of early modern ignorance—but imminently ethical. 
Whereas the natural history and certainly modern medicine assumes a knowable and controllable 
experience of syphilis, the disease itself posits the unknown and the uncontrollable as a more 
ethical orientation to the layered, intra-active, and multivalent experiences of disease. 
 Importantly, of the three texts analyzed here, none actually use the word “syphilis.” 
Sloane and Lawson employ “pox,” while Cook uses “venereal distemper.” Moreover, syphilis 
was not yet differentiated from gonorrhea or yaws.10 All of this would seem to undermine a new 
materialist argument. Yet new materialism doesn’t require “retrospective diagnosis”—as 
Cristobal Silva and Sari Altschuler warn against. Rather, this chapter argues that syphilis’ 
                                                      
10 For more on medical differentiation, see Tampa et al.’s “Brief History of Syphilis” in the 
Journal of Medicine and Life. 
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ontology—the great imitator, whose symptoms have evolved radically since the fifteenth century 
and vary over an individual’s life—shaped its epistemology. When Sloane, Lawson, and Cook 
use ambiguous terms like “pox” and “venereal distemper,” they may or may not be referring to 
what we now call syphilis—and that’s exactly the point. Syphilis itself evades intelligibility and 
even naming, resisting and revising that genre most dedicated to comprehensive knowledge, 
static representation, and eternal names. 
 
Representing the Thing Itself: The Natural History and the Royal Society 
Founded in 1660, the Royal Society pioneered a new kind of science. It rejected the 
scholastic model, which required an extensive, classical education, conversation with ancient 
texts, numerous citations, and little to no “direct experience” with the natural world. 11 Instead, as 
Thomas Sprat asserted in his 1702 History, the Royal Society sought “to make faithful Records, 
of all the Works of Nature,” observing, experimenting, and writing on almost any “natural” 
subject.12 Such observation and record would ultimately benefit all “humane life” and 
“Mankind” (2). 
In this nascent empiricism, an experiment, such as Robert Boyle’s famous air pump, 
would be carefully conducted, attentively observed, faithfully recorded, and diligently 
disseminated to members. The validity of a discrete experiment—and of the experimental 
method itself—hinged on credible witnesses that could authenticate the projects. These witnesses 
                                                      
11 For more on scholasticism and the Royal Society’s development, see Peter Dear’s Totius in 
Verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society and Steven Shapin’s “Pump and 
Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology.” On how “experience” influenced both early 
colonial writing and the development of the scientific revolution, see Jim Egan, Authorizing 
Experience, especially chapter 2. 
12 Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London, 61, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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need not be “eye” witnesses; rather, as Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer argue, the Royal 
Society codified “virtual witnessing” through their Transactions, “obviat[ing] the necessity for 
either direct witness or replication.”13 Readers could authenticate experiments and create matters 
of fact without actually seeing the experiment or reproducing it through a “literary technology” 
that strived to make words represent things themselves. Through the act of reading, they could 
function as eyewitnesses—that is, if the writing adhered to the Royal Society’s literary protocols. 
Because the reading of these reports was critical to establishing truth, their writing was 
carefully regulated. The Royal Society’s initial statute on the matter is clear in this intention, if 
vague on its implementation: “In all Reports of Experiments to be brought into the Society, the 
matter of fact shall be barely stated, without any prefaces, apologies, or rhetorical flourishes.”14 
Sprat expands, “they have indeavour’d, to separate the knowledge of Nature, from the colours of 
Rhetorick, the devices of Fancy, or the delightful deceit of Fables” (62). He explains, “the luxury 
and redundance of Speech” can “give the mind a motion too changeable, and betwitching to 
consist with right practice” (111, 112). In other words, colorful language and ornamentation 
threatened the veracity that the experimental method required. In fact, Sprat finds himself so 
“warm’d with this just anger” describing these rhetorical flourishes that he himself devolves into 
elaborate fancy describing this “most profest enemy” (112, 113). This emphasis on simplicity 
was at least in part a response to the citational ornamentation of the era, what Boyle calls “acute 
Sentences, fine Expressions, or other Embellishments borrow’d from eminent writers.”15 
However, this goal of simplicity also represented a desire to undo the linguistic chaos of Babel, 
                                                      
13 Shapin and Schaffer, The Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 60, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
14 “Statutes of the Royal Society Enacted in 1663,” in A History of the Royal Society, 527.  
15 Boyle, Certain Physiological Essays, 38. 
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to make words and things align in a natural, universal language, and, thereby, to move ever 
closer to divine truth, to the thing itself. 16  
Despite the repeated call for simplicity, there seems to have been no concrete rules for 
achieving the “barely stated,” only rebukes of elaboration, ornamentation, rhetoric, luxury, and 
eloquence. Sprat concludes,  
They have therefore been most rigorous in putting in execution, the only Remedy, that 
can be found for this extravagance and that has been, a constant resolution, to reject all 
the amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the primitive 
purity, and shortness when men deliver’d so many things, almost in an equal number of 
words. They have extracted from their members, a close, naked, natural way of speaking; 
positive expressions, clear senses; a native easiness: bringing all things as near the 
Mathematical plainness as they can: and preferring the language of Artizans, 
Countrymen, and Merchants, before that, of Wits, or Scholars. (113) 
Notably, Sprat emphasizes “the primitive purity of language,” when “words” and “things” were 
equal. Though he more clearly identifies what this kind of writing should resemble, he offers no 
clear path for an aspiring plain-speaking truth-seeker to follow. 
 While the rules may have been unclear, analysis of the Royal Society’s published reports 
offers a picture of what writing features the society valued. In his discourse analysis of the Royal 
Society Transactions from 1675-1975, Dwight Atkinson identifies prominent rhetorical 
characteristics of early Society writing. Because the experimental method required “immediate 
                                                      
16 For more on the relationship between Babel, writing, and the Royal Society, see John Wilkins, 
“An Essay Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language” (1668). See also Susan 
Scott Parrish, “William Byrd II and the Crossed Languages of Science, Satire, and Empire in 
British America.” 
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experience,” early writing was “author-centered,” usually written in first person, the past tense, 
and with active verbs. It also emphasized “affective states and psychological processes of the 
author.”17 Other linguistic markers include: identification of witnesses, who are used to 
authenticate an experiment or observation; modesty and humility; a collection of miscellaneous 
observations and/or experiments without a unifying thread; politeness to other members and the 
recipients of the report. Atkinson concludes that these markers demonstrate the importance of 
gentility and genteel modes of interaction to the nascent organization. Schaffer and Shapin add 
that accounts of failed experiments also characterized early Society reports, which not only 
“allayed anxieties in those neophyte experimentalists,” but also “assured the reader that the 
relator was not willfully suppressing inconvenient evidence, that he was in fact being faithful to 
reality” (64). Because the end goal was truth, writers should be confident only in matters of fact 
and circuitous on everything else (67). While the modern premise of scientific “objectivity” did 
not flourish until the nineteenth century, natural philosophy and natural history were governed by 
what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison call “truth-to-nature,” the belief that the naturalist 
played a critical role in selecting, comparing, and generalizing hidden truths and principles about 
nature.18  
 Up until now, I have been describing natural philosophy rather than natural history, but 
the two disciplines were intertwined, supported by the Royal Society and its literary protocol. In 
his essay, General Heads for the Natural History, Boyle describes the natural history as “the 
only sure Foundation of Natural Philosophy.”19 While natural philosophy emphasized laboratory 
experiments like Boyle’s air pumps, the natural history involved the close study of flora, fauna, 
                                                      
17 Atkinson, “The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1675-1975,” 339. 
18 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, chap. 2. 
19 Boyle, General Heads for the Natural History, 1. 
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waterways, and geographical formations. Yet because so many natural histories described far-off 
locales and unimaginable animals, lands, and climates, and because the genre served the new 
empiricism, following the Royal Society’s literary rules remained important.20 Unlike the 
nineteenth-century scientist, both the natural philosopher and the natural historian recognized 
that “mediation” was required to transmit “scientific facts,” particularly those scientific facts of 
foreign places (Dalton and Galison 59). To ensure “truth-to-nature,” both natural philosopher and 
natural historian employed literary protocol to standardize how idiosyncratic observations were 
transmitted across the globe. 
 Just as modern science is not as ideologically pure as we once believed, neither was 
natural history. As many scholars have shown, the genre and its practitioners were agents of 
colonization and imperialism. Richard Frohock argues that the seventeenth century’s conquerors 
and the eighteenth century’s “imperial scientists” form a single genealogy: “the scientist seemed 
to extend empire without bloody conflict…[and] inherited the conqueror’s privilege, distinction, 
and importance to nation.”21 Similarly, Mary Louise Pratt contends that it is “simultaneously 
innocent and imperial,” purporting “to do virtually nothing in or to the world” but represent it, 
while also making it available for conquest.22 Natural history not only offered a “utopian, 
innocent vision of European global authority,” but actively complemented that imperialist 
authority (Pratt 39). The natural historian’s “truth-to nature,” therefore, was truth-to-wealth, to-
empire, to-conquest, to-bondage.  
                                                      
20 In fact, Percy G. Adams argues that these literary protocols had antecedents in travel writers 
like Martin Frobisher and Thomas Hariot. See Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel, 
chap, 10. 
21 Frohock, Heroes of Empire, 82. 
22 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 33, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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 Still, even this imperial science was routinely undermined. As Susan Scott Parrish has 
shown, white American creoles were expected to mine flora, fauna, and data and send it to 
metropolitan centers in Europe to be refined by more learned men. In practice, however, 
indigenous Americans and Africans subverted the transatlantic production of natural historical 
knowledge. They collected specimens and theorized, sometimes revealing the natural world and 
at other times withholding it. 23  Similarly, white creoles, including both men and women like Dr. 
Alexander Garden and Eliza Lucas Pinckney, discussed in the next chapter, insisted that they 
could do more than collect, pack, and mail. They too could analyze, deduce, and expostulate. 
Likewise, Kelly Wisecup has shown how medicine and medical knowledge were especially open 
to diverse input in the Americas.24 While the natural history served imperialist ends, these ends 
were never straightforward nor reliable. 
 Ultimately, the natural history attempted to understand the world as it truly was—to close 
the gap between things and language and thereby construct real knowledge. Coinciding with 
imperial colonization, the genre served the empire, collecting and describing places, peoples, 
plants, and animals not only in order to understand them but also to enable profit, expansion, and 
settlement. Indigenous people, Africans, women, and creole Americans, however, all 
complicated the relationship between natural history and imperialism, expanding who could 
make sense of the nonhuman world. Though officially restricted, the natural history’s interests, 
                                                      
23 Parrish, American Curiosity. See also Britt Rusert, Fugitive Science, which analyzes how 
African Americans contributed to science and natural history in many genres and venues. 
24 Wisecup, Medical Encounters. Though the natural history and medicine were not necessarily 
the same, they overlapped significantly in the eighteenth century. Many men practiced medicine 
in order to support their true natural historical interests. See Pratik Chakrabarti’s Materials and 
Medicine for more on the relationship between American and Indian colonization and medical 
practice. 
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features, and rhetorical techniques filtered into the wider Atlantic culture.25 Yet it was not only 
humans who challenged the authority required to fathom and control the nonhuman world; 
nonhumans like syphilis subverted the natural history as well. 
 
Hans Sloane’s Voyage to Jamaica: Syphilis Itself Eludes and Revises the Natural History
 One of the earliest natural histories of the new world—written by a future President of 
the Royal Society—Voyage to Jamaica is part travel narrative, part specimen description, part 
“manners and customs” proto-anthropology, part geographic survey, and part medical anthology. 
In short, it is the emerging natural history, including descriptions and drawings of plants and 
animals, observations on climate and geography, case studies of illness, and a firsthand account 
of his own travels. Though Voyage to Jamaica poses as straightforward “truth-to-nature,” the 
transcription of things themselves, Sloane’s discussion of syphilis shatters this illusion, rupturing 
the Royal Society’s rhetorical standards. These formal and stylistic inconsistencies signal 
syphilis’ presence, its textual intra-action. When Sloane employs the phrase, “the Lues 
Venerea…spread it self,” he not only fails to close the gap between words and things as the 
natural history desired but also highlights the natural history’s limits: it could never fully 
transcribe, codify, and understand illness—neither the disease itself nor the person’s experience.  
Elected to the Royal Society just a few years before he set off to Jamaica, Sloane was 
dedicated to the natural history, to what Pratt calls the “systematizing of nature” and “a European 
knowledge-building project.”26 In his preface, Sloane asserts the Royal Society’s values: “the 
                                                      
25 For studies on the natural history’s wide influence, see, for example, Pamela Regis, Describing 
Early America; Beth Fowkes Tobin, Colonizing Nature; and, especially, Christopher Iannini, 
Fatal Revolutions 
26 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 38. 
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Knowledge of Natural-History, being observations of Matters of Fact, is more certain than most 
Others, and in my Slender Opinion, less subject to Mistakes than Reasonings, Hypotheses, and 
Deductions are.”27 Rejecting the “Reasoning, Hypotheses, and Deductions” that had dominated 
European epistemology for centuries, Sloane conflates the natural history with “Matters of 
Fact”—“truth-to-nature,” things themselves, and “certain” knowledge. He argues that the natural 
history, as a genre and a broader epistemology, is the only method for truly knowing the new 
world, for understanding and transmitting it (rather than a representation of it) across the 
Atlantic.28  
 Sloane’s most important goal, therefore, was to describe nature accurately, to transform 
words into things themselves. Yet, in a new context—literally a “new world”— Sloane 
struggles.29 He shifts genres, repeats himself, and employs multiple volumes and an unwieldy 
index. According to Christopher Iannini, Sloane struggled to represent “things” because chattel 
slavery radically reimagined what a “thing” was. A slave was “at once property and person, 
commodity and laborer, object of study and bearer of knowledge,” challenging the very 
definition of “thing” and, thus, also challenging the Royal Society rules for representing 
“things.”30 To Iannini, Sloane’s rhetorical failure exposes the deeply unsettling relationship 
between slavery and the natural history it supported; it reveals the textually embedded disconnect 
between a culture that knew slaves to collect specimens, perform music, practice medicine, and 
                                                      
27 Sloane, Voyage to Jamaica, unpaginated preface, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
28 Sloane also claims that observations of the natural world “afford great Matter of Admiring the 
Power, Wisdom and Providence of Almighty God” (unpaginated preface). Christopher Iannini 
reads this passage and, in fact, Sloane’s entire text as a kind of formal clash between the 
emblematic method and an emerging empiricism. See Fatal Revolutions, chap. 1. 
29 See Wayne Franklin’s Discoverers, Explorers, Settlers on the way discovery, exploration, and 
settlement of the Americas challenged both language and representation. 
30 Iannini, Fatal Revolutions, 37. 
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mourn loved ones (all signs of humanity), and yet kept them as property and things nonetheless. 
Sloane’s inability to conform to the Royal Society’s rules demonstrates the problem of 
representation when an institution like slavery blurred the lines between subject and object—a 
line increasingly important to the natural historical and empirical method.31  
 Although slavery undoubtedly affected Sloane’s text, this reading elides another of 
Sloane’s textual peculiarities: the case studies. At the end of his introduction to volume one, 
following his observations on climate and geography, Sloane closes with a section entitled, “Of 
the Diseases I observed in Jamaica, and the Method by which I used to cure them” (xc). Here, he 
compiles his experiences as a medical doctor in the West Indies into a series of incidences or 
case studies. Organized according to individual people and illnesses, this section typically uses 
little more than a paragraph to describe an ill person’s name, symptoms, treatments, and 
outcome. In the margin, a brief summary of the case (e.g., “Of a Tertian” or “Of a Colick”) 
references the illness, presumably to facilitate a quick search as in an index. Sloane’s case 
studies, therefore, seem to act both as an academic catalog of West Indian diseases in the way his 
collection of plant life does, and as a kind of practical medical guide for doctors searching for a 
diagnosis or cure. Although medicine would eventually be differentiated from other sciences, 
many colonial writers included medical information, including descriptions of diseases and 
especially of herbal remedies, in their natural histories. In fact, these herbal remedies, recorded 
and collated in natural histories, powered early colonization in the West Indies before crops like 
                                                      
31 Though science had not codified objects as passive and inanimate yet, it did privilege the 
knowledge and experience of the scientist-author and, thus, the human subject. See Atkinson and 
Dalton and Galison, chapter two. 
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sugar were cultivated. 32 Like his references to “observations” and “matters of fact,” Sloane’s 
case studies demonstrate his commitment to the natural history and the new empirical method. 
 As in the rest of his natural history, Sloane’s case studies attempt to demonstrate their 
matter-of-factness by following the right rules of discourse. The case study, case narrative, or 
case history has ancient origins, but it gained popularity in Sloane’s era through the work of 
Thomas Sydenham, the “English Hippocrates,” who rejected the theoretical or scholastic 
approach to medicine in favor of close attention to individual patients—just as the Royal Society 
rejected classical citations for immediate experience.33 Case studies were circulated among 
physicians to collate and corroborate treatments or speculations on disease. One doctor only had 
so many patients, could only experiment with a new technique on a finite number of people, so 
circulating case studies allowed a network of doctors to pool resources, patients, and 
observations to make better, more informed choices in their practices.34 As Londa Schiebinger 
outlines, the case study’s features “included a description of the patient, an account of his or her 
past patterns in sleep, diet, and exercise, description of therapies, their effects and outcomes—
‘complete cure,’ ‘relief,’ or death.”35 Because doctors relied on these cases for accurate 
information to treat patients and save lives, they grew “uniform in style” (Schiebinger 160). 
Similarly, Kathryn Montgomery Hunter argues that the modern case study employs a strict 
                                                      
32 James Grainger’s The Sugar Cane and Richard Ligon’s A True and Exact History of the Island 
of Barbados represent two more examples of colonial natural histories that privilege medical 
information. I return to Grainger in chapter four. See Londa Schiebinger’s Plants and Empire for 
how natural histories used medicinal knowledge, particularly of herbal remedies, to fuel 
colonization and wealth accumulation. 
33 For more on Sydenham and his importance to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century medicine 
see Peter Anstey’s “The Creation of the English Hippocrates.” 
34 Additionally, a doctor could only experiment on himself so many times. See Londa 
Schiebinger’s “Human Experimentation in the Eighteenth Century: Natural Boundaries and 
Valid Testing” for the importance of self-experimentation to medicine. 
35 Schiebinger, Plants and Empire, 160, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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formula so it can transform “incomplete and subjectively reported information” into science (51). 
The formula represents “a practical response to medicine’s radical uncertainty,” to “a science 
whose laboratory is the living person” (106). Both modern and early modern case studies, 
therefore, attempted to translate the individual experience of illness into the thing itself through 
strict literary protocol. 
Although Sloane was writing before this formula was concretized, his commitment to the 
Royal Society and its methods of discourse suggest that even his early case studies were shaped 
by impulses to transparency and uniformity, to what he calls “observations of Matters of Fact.” 
As Sydenham and his descendants would, Sloane opens with the patient’s name, symptoms, 
former treatments, diagnosis, new treatments, and outcome, whether health or death. He 
transforms his patients’ individual experiences into objective generalizations—e.g., “Of a 
Cholera Morbus” not “Of Captain Nowel” (xc)—so that prospective travelers and doctors could 
access accurate, general information quickly. Sloane evinces his commitment to the new 
language of natural history, which in turn legitimated his authority to discourse on science and 
medicine. 
 Yet Sloane’s case studies are inconsistent. In particular, his case studies on syphilis 
(though he does not use that name) fail to conform to this style, undermining his ability to 
transcribe faithfully and, thus, authenticate himself—in short, to do natural history. Every other 
case delivers, at the very least, the ill person’s first name. Presumably, Sloane includes the names 
of his patients to write empirically, to relate “Matters of Fact” by identifying witnesses; these 
names verify his case studies, in turn lending him the credibility and authority the natural history 
required.36 Yet no case of syphilis receives a name. Even yaws (ciii) and gonorrhea (cxli), which 
                                                      
36 See Atkinson for the importance of witness naming to early Royal Society reports. 
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were similar and as yet undifferentiated diseases, received names.37 In the studies of those with 
“the pox,” however, Sloane replaces names with blank spaces—“One ---- ---- who had a 
Gonorrhea often” (here, gonorrhea is used as a symptom of syphilis rather than gonorrhea 
proper; gonorrhea proper is described as “Of a gonorrhea” in the margins), and “One ---- ----, 
aged about Fifty” (xciii, ci). On the one hand, these blank spaces may aim to protect the 
sufferers’ identities, to mitigate the scorn and shame of venereal disease, especially if they were 
well-known white planters. On the other hand, these empty spaces undermine the truth-telling, 
empirical function of witness-naming that the case studies conventionally establish. While 
Sloane carefully constructs these cases to emphasize his skill—anyone who dies dies through 
their own fault not his—these syphilitic cases subvert generic convention and, therefore, 
Sloane’s credibility and authority. By failing to divulge the truth, he undermines his text’s “truth-
to-nature,” the natural history’s primary objective. 
Though Sloane’s case studies evince a desperate desire to control syphilis, they routinely 
demonstrate the opposite. In one account, an unnamed man seeks Sloane’s aid, complaining of 
abdominal pain. Though Sloane prescribes “such things as usually avail in such Cases,” the 
typical treatments fail, and the man grows worse. From this and the patient’s pain in urination, 
Sloane realizes he has misdiagnosed the man and begins to suspect “the Pox to be the chief of his 
complicated Diseases, and questioning him very hard about the Matter, he at length confess’d it” 
(ci). While Sloane eventually discovers the truth (through an interrogation), this delay ultimately 
leads to the man’s death.38 In another case, Sloane argues that a woman with syphilis had died 
                                                      
37 See note 10 on medical differentiation.  
38 If Hunter locates the origin of the modern case study in the seventeenth century, then perhaps 
here we also find the root of medical paternalism, the “doctor knows best” mentality glimpsed in 
Sloane’s interrogation. For a brief overview of literature on such paternalism, see Brian 
McKinstry, “Paternalism and the Doctor-Patient Relationship in General Practice.” Though 
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from being poisoned by her slave, “either designedly to do her good” or “maliciously” (cxxi). 
Still, he questions her death—"of what, or how,” she died, “I know not” (cxxi).39 In the case 
studies of syphilis, Sloane shifts between a kind of bravado—through his great skill, he draws 
the true story from the man—and impotence—he dies anyway. And, though he blames the 
woman’s slave for her death, he admits that he might be wrong. Royal Society reports were 
supposed to be circumspect on anything uncertain, but here Sloane vacillates between 
circumspection and matter-of-factness. That is, as Sloane fails to cure these cases of syphilis, he 
also fails to control their textual representations. 
Though he tries to blame the man’s death on his own false story, and the woman’s death 
on her slave, he only demonstrates the limits of own natural history—its failure to invoke the 
many stories that coalesce to form each case. He cannot explain why the man lies nor what the 
slave woman’s motivations could have been, just as he cannot articulate syphilis’ rationale or 
desires. Thus, these case studies demonstrate the impossibility of fully narrating syphilis, 
whether the person’s or the microbe’s experiences. In this context, those blank spaces evoke the 
many absences and failures of his natural history, of all that it could not collect, generalize, 
understand, and accomplish: the patients’ feelings and experiences, physical and textual 
authority over illness, and, especially, a clear understanding of the disease itself. Their 
emptiness, therefore, signals the genre’s inability to master syphilis. 
It is not that Sloane could not ascribe to natural historical conventions. After all, he 
would lead the Royal Society from 1727-1741. Rather, syphilis “itself” infects, intra-acts, and 
                                                      
Sloane does not specify whether this patient is free or enslaved, if he were enslaved, his reticence 
could have derived from black fear of (and resistance to) white medicine and doctoring. See 
Sharla M. Fett, Working Cures, 142-58. 
39 On white fear of slave poisoning and on poisoning as black resistance, see Peter Wood, Black 
Majority, chap. 11; Fett, Working Cures, 159-67; and Parrish, American Curiosity, 273-79.  
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revises his case studies—in turn, undermining and revising the natural history’s faith that things 
“themselves” could be represented. In the preface, Sloane recounts the now familiar story of 
syphilis’ entrance into Europe: 
Columbus, likewise brought into Europe in his Ship, and First Voyage, from these places, 
the Pox, which spread so quickly all over Europe, that Antonio Benivenius, who was at 
that time a great and famous Practiser in Physick at Florence…tells us, that the Lues 
Venerea then beginning in Spain, had spread itself through Italy, and France, and that in 
the Year 1496, it had possess’d many People in all the Provinces of Europe. (ii) 
As the passage continues, however, Sloane cites another source, Dodonaeus, that describes 
accounts of a similar disease from 1270, 1305, and 1419—far before Columbus sailed across the 
Atlantic (ii). Still, Sloane concludes,  
I am of Opinion notwithstanding what these have said, and some other less material 
Passages in ancient Writers and Histories, and what Joanne sab Arderne has written 
about Anno 1360. And likewise what Stow says of the Laws of the publick Stews in 
Southwark, that this was a Distemper altogether new in Europe, Africa, and Asia, before 
it was brought from the West-Indies. (ii-iii) 
Even as Sloane supports the Columbian origin story, he cites three sources that disagree with his 
conclusion and absolutely no sources that support him. In fact, his assertion—“I am of Opinion 
notwithstanding what these have said…that this was a Distemper altogether new in Europe”—is 
quite literally split in half by these contradictory sources. As Myra Jehlen argues, this 
inconsistency may highlight the fraught seams of history in process, of the attempt to understand 
what seemed like a new disease. In fact, this history is still being processed; modern scholars 
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continue to debate syphilis’ origin.40 Sloane’s complex syntax and contradictory sources erode 
the certainty, credibility, and objective posture that the Royal Society and the natural history 
required, and which he himself attempted to employ. The phrase “spread itself,” however, posits 
an alternative historical agent—neither lustful sailors and soldiers nor Sloane but syphilis itself. 
 Syphilis “it self” complicates this passage textually and ideologically, undermining the 
importance of the human perceiver and transcriber to natural history. On the one hand, this 
pronoun acts intensively, adding emphasis to the subject-actor syphilis. On the other hand, it also 
acts reflexively, constructing syphilis as both the subject and object of the verb “spread”; syphilis 
is spreading syphilis. In his study of reflexivity, Edward T. Jeremiah describes the “peculiar 
effect” of the reflexive pronoun. It is meant to refer to its antecedent, but it frequently creates a 
“conceptual separation of the two,” splitting the subject into pieces, creating “another level of the 
subject” that “forever eludes objectification.”41 The reflexive pronoun, therefore, ruptures the 
very concept of the singular, self-contained, human subject. In the case of “syphilis it self,” 
however, it also ruptures the concept of the singular, knowable, and controllable object, hinting 
at the withdrawn and inaccessible syphilis. While the classic scientific divide between human 
subjects and nonhuman objects would not be formalized until the nineteenth century, the natural 
history relied on “the keenest and most experienced observer” and recorder to perceive clearly 
and transcribe faithfully (Daston and Galison 59). In this passage, then, syphilis eludes the 
natural history in at least two ways: the reflexive pronoun highlights an aspect of syphilis that 
“eludes objectification,” that withdraws from the natural history’s classifying eye and tongue. 
                                                      
40 See note 5 on the continuing debate on origin. 
41 Jeremiah, The Emergence of Reflexivity in Greek Language and Thought, 31. 
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Moreover, “spread it self” emphasizes an agency unchecked and unhindered by human 
subjectivity and control, including that of the natural historian. 
While there are many reasons why Sloane may have chosen to minimize his agency and 
maximize syphilis’, none fully explain this passage’s strangeness. He could be trying to assuage 
the guilt of colonial transmission. If the disease moves “itself,” the author and other European 
travelers can skirt blame for syphilis’ transmission. In other words, Sloane may purposefully 
forfeit narrative control in order to promote colonialism’s ends without taking on the burden of 
its means.42 By attributing agency to syphilis, he avoids his own, as in the germ theory of history. 
Or, Sloane may be working to mitigate the stigma of syphilis. Conjoined with the blank spaces in 
the case studies, the phrase “syphilis itself” could function to insulate vulnerable people from 
cultural disapprobation, social stigma, and antipathy.  
Yet to fully disburden colonial guilt or combat shame, syphilis would need to be the 
subject-actor consistently. This passage, however, only haphazardly applies subjectivity, shifting 
between many human and nonhuman actors. Whereas Jehlen might argue that such discrepancies 
bear witness to an uncertain history, Michael Ziser reminds us that nonhumans shaped history 
and literature as well. Sloane’s Jamaica was not just a “contact zone,” where “subjects previously 
separated by geographic and historical disjunctures…now intersect[ed],” but a chaos zone where 
nonhumans like syphilis impacted both bodies and texts.43 Vacillating between agents, between 
subjects and objects, between revelation and elision, this passage reveals an agency unmoored 
from human subjectivity, from the natural scientist and his careful observation and record. 
                                                      
42 For more on how natural historians fashioned innocence out of colonial violence, see Pratt, 
Imperial Eyes.  
43 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 7. 
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Syphilis ruptured early modern natural historical writing not because objects were 
inherently inanimate and passive, as in contemporary science writing, but because the author 
played such a central role in observing, describing, and narrating newly-discovered knowledge. 
As Atkinson notes, early Royal Society writing was “author-centered,” with frequent use of first-
person pronouns and active verbs. This author-centered approach relied on the cultural figure of 
the gentleman, who was “‘free’ and independent—a disinterested social actor,” and, therefore, 
credible and honest (362). Rhetorically, “they hoped to gain for themselves…special claims to 
authority, disinterestedness, and moral rectitude” (362); therefore, positioning oneself as the 
subject or actor of an observation or treatment “significantly warranted” the report (363). When 
this passage effaces Sloane as the writer and warrantor, when his sources and syntax contradict 
him, and when those blank spaces undermine his credibility, we glimpse syphilis. We glimpse 
how syphilis’ ontological uncertainty ruptured the genre most dedicated to certainty and the 
rhetorical style necessary to validate and manufacture that certainty. 
 Natural histories were supposed to close the distance between words and things; 
Sloane’s case studies—his contributions to a nascent medical science—were supposed to 
observe faithfully and state plainly. Yet his natural history fails to meet these generic and 
ideological expectations. His textual inconsistencies—the blank spaces that evoke an unnamed, 
silenced history of human experience, the contradictory sources and confusing syntax, the phrase 
“spread itself”—reveal a real, albeit inaccessible, syphilis at work, intra-acting with 
physiological and textual bodies. Syphilis exposed the natural history’s limits: it could never 
name, codify, and transcribe syphilis “itself”—neither the varied human experiences nor the 
microbe’s. Eluding the genre, syphilis revised it. 
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John Lawson’s “No Nose Doctor”: Syphilis Itself Resists Colonial Science 
 After Hans Sloane returned to England and rose to prominence in the Royal Society, he 
inherited a collection of a plant specimens gathered by another new world naturalist, John 
Lawson. Far less is known about Lawson than Sloane, and far more connect them than this 
inheritance: both composed natural histories that syphilis “itself” challenged. While syphilis 
withdrew from Sloane’s classifying eye and pen, it “crowded itself” into Lawson’s A New 
Voyage to North Carolina (1709), rupturing the natural history’s “emplotment.” Instead of 
withdrawing, syphilis reveals alternative, indigenous, and empowering perspectives on itself. it 
not only undermines Lawson’s credibility—as it does in Sloane’s Voyage—but also challenges 
the imperialism that natural history as a genre and ideology served.  
 Lawson’s natural history differs from Sloane’s in at least two ways. First, it is more 
explicitly promotional. Its catalogs and descriptions of flora, fauna, disease, and Native 
Americans function to facilitate colonization and settlement. Though Sloane’s did as well, this 
goal is more explicit in Lawson’s work, especially considering he remained, lived, and died in 
the Americas whereas Sloane only sojourned in Jamaica for a little over a year. Second, the 
travel portion of his natural history is far more extensive than Sloane’s. While the travel narrative 
and natural history were not synonymous, they were stylistically similar and frequently 
overlapped44 Still, there were differences. In particular, Tobin argues that the natural history “is 
characterized by its ‘objective’ point of view, by its use of the list of topics to organize its 
contents, and by its historylessness and protoanthropological approach to human subjects, all of 
which have the effect of positing static, timeless cultures and unchanging natural 
                                                      
44 See Adams, Travel Literature, chapter 10, on the stylistic relationship between travel literature 
and the natural history. 
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environments.”45 In turn, though the travel narrative “contain[s] similar subject matter,” its 
“organizing principle” is “the traveler’s movement from place to place, which, along with 
chronology, provides the travel account with a narrative frame” (57). Tobin overstates the natural 
history’s commitment to “objectivity,” but both genres did value accurate description and an apt 
observer. Yet the travel narrative required a particular plot—a clear, logical movement through 
time and space, one that Lawson’s failed to deliver. 
One of the most unique and contradictory facets of A New Voyage is the space and the 
plotting it affords indigenous narratives. While the natural history conventionally did include 
descriptions of indigenous people, beliefs, and practices, Lawson locates these tales in the travel 
narrative, where they frequently unsettle his natural history’s impulse to “innocent” 
imperialism.46 For the most part, however, Lawson denigrates indigenous Americans and their 
narratives in order to justify American colonization. In one complex set of passages, he describes 
Sewee depopulation. At first, he outlines the effects of European diseases like smallpox. Though 
the Sewees “have been formerly a very large Nation,” they are “very much decreas’d since the 
English hath seated their land.”47 The Sewee’s experience is not unique, however, and “all other 
Nations of Indians are observ’d to Partake of the same Fate, where the Europeans come” (17). 
Yet he quickly shifts course, offering an alternative explanation. Determined to pursue trade with 
Europe directly and circumvent rapacious colonial middlemen, the Sewee reinforced their 
canoes, packed their wares, and sett off in the direction the European ships had traveled. Soon, 
however, “there rose a Tempest, which it’s suppos’d carry’d one Part of these Indian Merchants, 
by Way of the other World, whilst the others were taken up at Sea by an English Ship, and sold 
                                                      
45 Tobin, Colonizing Nature, 57, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
46 See note 42 on “innocent” imperialism. 
47 Lawson, A New Voyage to Carolina, 17, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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for Slaves to the Islands” (19). Lawson decides, “The Indians, I am now speaking of, were not 
content with the common Enemies” like smallpox “that lessen and destroy their Country-men, 
but invented an infallible Stratagem to purge their Tribe, and reduce their Multitude into far less 
Numbers” (18). Though Lawson recognizes the Europeans’ toll on native peoples, his here 
plotting upstages smallpox and assuages colonial blame by ending on a tale of punished greed 
and hubris—ultimately the Sewee are to blame for their own deaths. 48 The Sewee tale interrupts 
Lawson’s travel narratives, his literal movement through time and space, in order to reorder and 
justify American colonization. 
 Lawson further tries to justify colonization by figuring disease as transactional, as an 
unfortunate but unavoidable result of trade between the Old and New Worlds: the Europeans 
exchange smallpox for syphilis. Like Sloane, Lawson describes the Colombian origin of syphilis, 
but he embellishes the story through a comic tone and series of economic puns: 
We being well enough assured that the Pox had its first Rise (known to us) in this new 
World, it being caught of the Indian Women, by the Spanish soldiers that followed 
Columbus in one of his Expeditions to America; who after their Arrival in Old Spain, 
were hastened to the Relief of Naples, at that Time besieged by the French. Provisions 
growing scarce, the useless People were turned out of the City, to lessen the Mouths; 
                                                      
48 As Cristobal Silva argues, early settlers justified colonization by obscuring or reimagining 
smallpox’s timeline. They did not bring smallpox; rather, smallpox proved the righteousness of 
English colonization and rule. See Miraculous Plagues, chap. 1. For more on how colonists used 
disease to construct Native Americans as physically and constitutionally unfit to the American 
environment and thereby sanctioned colonial rule, see Joyce Chaplin, Subject Matter, chap. 5. 
Lawson’s antipathy towards cold water derives from a humoral model of disease, in which cold 
water endangered the important cleansing act of perspiration (hot water also endangered the 
body by opening the pores too much). For more on humoralism and disease in the New World, 
see Parrish, American Curiosity, chap. 2. See Kathleen M. Brown, Foul Bodies on early modern 
beliefs about water and health. 
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amongst these, the Curtesans were one part, who had frequently embraced the Spaniards, 
being well fraught with Riches by their new Discovery. The Leager Ladies had no sooner 
lost their Spanish Dons, but found themselves as well entertained by the French, whose 
Camp they traded in, giving the Mounsieurs as large a Share of the pocky Soils within 
their own Lines, as the Spaniards had, who took the Pains to bring it in their Breeches as 
far from America…The Siege was raised; the French and Spaniards retreating to 
Flanders, which was a Parade of all Nations; by which Means, this filthy Distemper 
crowded itself into most Nations of the known world. (25-26) 
At its core, this passage delivers the conventional narrative: Spaniards bring syphilis from the 
West Indies to Naples, where it takes root and expands across Europe. Yet Lawson transforms 
this routine story into a comedy that cashes in on economic and physiological puns. Syphilis 
spreads through sexual transactions, whether between Native American women or European 
courtesans. The “Riches” the Spanish import to finance such trade include not only gold spoils 
but “pocky Soils,” while the “Pains” they take to bring gold “in their Breeches” is quite literal. 
Whereas the Sewee narrative uses greed to erase the relationship between European disease and 
depopulation, the Columbian origin narrative uses humor to rationalize, defang, and ultimately 
tame the relationship between greed and, syphilis. Its comic tone renders syphilis, greed, and, 
thus, colonization a farce rather than a tragedy, undercutting the horror of American colonization 
by painting the burden of disease as equal. 
 The last sentence, however, abruptly shifts tone, undermining the narrative’s relationship 
between humor and control. It summarizes the disease’s dissemination starkly: “by which means, 
this filthy Distemper crowded itself in most Nations of the known world.” Like Sloane’s similar 
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phrase, “crowded itself” highlights syphilis’ reflexive agency.49 Yet, unlike the relatively 
innocuous verb “spread,” “crowded” implies a much pernicious agency that not only advanced 
across the globe but also actively colonized it. Lawson’s version of the Columbian origin story, 
therefore, condenses a relationship between trade, colonization, and disease. More importantly, 
this story reverses colonization’s direction: Europeans colonized the Americas in pursuit of 
material wealth, but syphilis used those very same trade routes to colonize them.50 Though 
Lawson ridicules the Sewee for believing that they could travel to Europe, the drastic shift in 
tone at the end of this transactional passage reveals that some Americans—albeit, not humans—
had survived the journey. It suggests that neither the natural history nor the imperialism it 
supported could codify, classify, or ultimately control syphilis. 
Yet this is not the only narrative of syphilis. In fact, Lawson places the conventional 
Columbian origin story within an alternative, Santee paradigm. Unlike the Sewee narrative, this 
paradigm refuses to justify colonization, resisting the natural history’s imperialism. Only a few 
nights into his journey, Lawson meets “the King of the Santee Nation” and the group’s “chief 
Doctor” (25). The doctor, Lawson writes, “had the Misfortune to lose his Nose by the Pox” (25). 
This comment leads to a description of syphilis, the Columbian tale discussed above, and 
eventually the man’s own narrative: 
                                                      
49 Though Lawson clearly identifies some of the human actors of these transactions, notably, 
none are English. Lawson here contributes to the “black legend” of Spanish colonization, which 
deflected all colonial atrocities onto the Spanish. By absenting the English in this passage, 
Lawson attempts to absolve both their blame for syphilis’ dissemination and colonization more 
broadly. For more on the black legend, see Charles Gibson, The Black Legend. For how other 
Europeans, including the English, leveraged the black legend to legitimate their colonization, see 
Margaret R. Greer, Walter D. Mignolo, and Maureen Quilligan, Rereading the Black Legend. 
50 See note 4 on how syphilis was envisioned as retribution for colonization and slavery. 
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our Doctor, who in the time of his Affliction with drew himself (with one that labour’d 
under the same Distemper) into the Woods…After these two had performed their Cures 
at no easier Rate than the Expence of both their Noses, coming again amongst their old 
Acquaintance so disfigur’d, the Indians admir’d to see them metamorphos’d after that 
manner; enquir’d of them where they had been all that Time and what were become of 
their Noses? They made Answer, That they had been conversing with the white Man 
above (meaning God Almighty) how they were kindly entertained by that Great Being; 
he being much pleased with their Ways, and had promised to make their Capacities equal 
with the white People in making Guns, Ammunition, &c. in Retalliation of which, they 
had given him their Noses. (26-27) 
In this story, two indigenous men choose to forfeit their noses through a pact with the Christian 
God. In exchange, God promises to give them the knowledge and power to manufacture guns 
and engage in European warfare. As in the Columbian narrative, syphilis figures as a product of 
trade, but syphilis coordinates with indigenous Americans to avenge colonialism. Though 
Lawson frames this story as an absurdity, asserting “the Indians” are “an easy, credulous People, 
and most notoriously cheated by their Priests and conjurers” (27), he nonetheless reveals an 
alternative paradigm of syphilis. On the one hand, by exposing Native peoples as gullible, 
Lawson bolsters his and a more general European authority. On the other hand, this tale 
empowers the Santee. Whereas the Sewee narrative faults indigenous people for their own 
genocide, the story of the “no nose doctor” envisions syphilis as empowering, a co-conspirator in 
the fight against colonization. 
In particular, syphilis’ most visible, unavoidable, marked symptom—the absent nose—is 
a source of wonder and power rather than a “Misfortune.” Though Lawson claims the men are 
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“disfigur’d,” the Santee instead “admir’d to see them metamorphos’d” (26). In their seminal 
study, Narrative Prosthesis, Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell argue that disability frequently 
functions to catalyze narrative, propelling a plot or defining a character. Whereas Snyder and 
Mitchell emphasize how physical difference requires narration to understand, narrate, and 
ultimately normalize it, here, it is not necessarily the absent nose that requires explaining but the 
man’s prominent cultural position. He is not stigmatized and ostracized as he would be in 
Europe; rather, he’s afforded a prominent cultural position, dressing in fine clothes and 
convening with white colonials like Lawson as a second to the “King.” And, it is this relationship 
between disease, visible disability, and power that Lawson feels the need to explain. The “no 
nose doctor” may not have liberated people from European imperialism, but he and his narrative 
resisted the natural historian’s imperialism. He is empowered by what he lacks; physical 
difference becomes the source of his power rather than its flaw. That is, syphilis need not 
colonize. It could conspire, collude, and create, resisting colonization as well as colonizing 
rhetoric. 
 As before, the emplotment of these two syphilis stories is important: the empowering 
Santee narrative contains the Columbian tale, rather than vice versa. Lawson first introduces the 
“no nose doctor,” then he outlines the Columbian tale. Finally, he ends with the noses-for-guns 
story. In other words, the Santee narrative of syphilis contains the European one. A frame should 
function to control or authenticate the knowledge it contains. For example, a Royal Society 
scientist might deliver a Native or African account of a disease or plant, but his authenticating 
persona and rhetoric would frame this explanation. While such non-European knowledge could 
bolster his credibility and authority, it only did so if it was carefully controlled through the 
correct literary protocol. Lawson, therefore, should frame and contain the Santee narrative, but 
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his plotting constructs the opposite: the indigenous story frames the European one. He might nest 
the Columbian tale within the Santee narrative to minimize colonization’s negative effects, 
intentionally resolving ambiguity and anxiety with a humorous tale about gullible indigenous 
Americans. On the other hand, each of the stories discussed here—the Sewee quest, smallpox’s 
impact, the Columbian origin, and the no nose doctor—are framed by the travel narrative portion 
of Lawson’s history. The layering of stories within stories, especially indigenous stories, 
subverts the chronology of the travelogue, taking the reader further and further away from the 
primary action. These stories may logically develop from Lawson’s travel, but they also detract 
from his movement, credibility, and, thus, the form itself. Like Sloane’s missing names, 
contradictory sources, convoluted syntax, and reflexive pronoun, this discordant emplotment and 
ineffective frame suspend the natural history’s imperial ability to master and control syphilis 
“itself.” 
 Syphilis, therefore, colonizes Lawson’s natural history, crowding itself into the text. This 
crowding undermines his attempts at textual control, especially his frame and plotting, and 
reverses colonization’s direction, attacking European bodies, lands, and markets. Lawson 
includes these narratives—the aborted Sewee trip, the Columbian origin, and the Santee doctor—
to authenticate his natural history and thereby justify colonization. Yet these stories subvert his 
purposes, suggesting that neither natural history nor imperialism can effectively master and 
control Americans’ representations of themselves, whether those Americans are human or not. In 
particular, the Santee no-nose doctor reveals an alternative paradigm for understanding disease—
one of the natural history’s primary functions. As the Santee proclaim, the relationship between 
humans and nonhuman disease need not be colonial or imperial, need not necessarily require 
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mastering it through natural historical form and ideology. Instead, the experience of illness could 
be one of coordination, conspiracy, and resistance. 
 
James Cook’s Journals: Syphilis Itself Develops an Ethics 
The natural history can never fully narrate, never fully control syphilis. No genre can. 
Even the Santee’s paradigm does not exhaust the disease or the experiences of illness. Still, in 
the early modern era, the natural history tried the hardest to pin syphilis to the page like an insect 
or plant specimen sent to Linnaeus. Captain James Cook was not a natural historian, nowhere 
near as learned as Sloane nor as practiced as Lawson. Nonetheless, Cook increasingly employs 
the genre over the course of his three voyages and journals to the South Seas. In particular, he 
uses the form and ideology to manage both his own and his nation’s colonial legacy, especially 
their legacy of spreading venereal disease.  
Whereas Sloane and Lawson chronicle syphilis in the Atlantic world, Cook’s journals 
range the Pacific, chronicling regions as distant as New Zealand and Alaska. Atlantic colonials 
could locate syphilis’ origins in the region (if somewhat speciously), but Pacific colonials like 
Cook truly believed that they were responsible for importing syphilis to new regions and 
populations. As part of a Royal Expedition, moreover, Cook understood that his and his crew’s 
interactions would “serve[] as parables of Europe’s scientific, civilizing mission,” a reflection 
and a portent of England’s relationship with the Pacific world.51 Cook, therefore, attempts to 
regulate his sailors’ sexual behavior and the record of that behavior. Yet both real and textual 
regulations fail. Instead of mastering syphilis and his own self-representation, Cook’s journals 
settle into an unease that reminds us not only that we cannot fully understand syphilis but also 
                                                      
51 Clayton, “Captain Cook and the Spaces of Contact at Nootka Sound,” 114. 
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that this unease represents an ethical response to the limits of human knowledge, imagination, 
and mastery. Syphilis represents what Timothy Morton might call a “strange stranger”: “The 
more we know them, the stranger they become.”52 The natural history attempts to domesticate 
the strange stranger, but syphilis posits an alternative epistemology and ethics: unease or dis-
ease.53 
Cook’s bibliographical history is complex. He wrote his first journal (1768-1771) for his 
naval superiors, but the Admiralty gave it to John Hawkesworth to edit and publish. 
Hawkesworth, however, added and subtracted freely from the original, combining it with Joseph 
Banks’s account to create a popular but embellished publication.54 After learning of 
Hawkesworth’s cavalier construction in 1775 when he returned from his second voyage (1772-
1775), Cook sought an editor, John Douglas, to produce a more accurate and polished rendering 
of his most recent travels. The pair published A Voyage Towards the South Pole and Round the 
World (1777), which transformed the log and journal that Cook kept while in the Pacific into a 
more cohesive narrative.55 
As Cook exerted more control over his narrative, he began to actively model his persona, 
syntax, and structure on the natural history. In Colonizing Nature, Beth Fawkes Tobin argues 
that the difference between the second voyage’s original log and journal and the published 
account was not merely stylistic; rather, Cook and Douglas embraced “literary, natural history, 
                                                      
52 Morton, The Ecological Thought, 41. 
53 S. Scott Graham uses the term “dis-ease” to describe the way the modern pharmaceutical 
industry has medicalized “normal,” human experiences, crafting “dis-ease” into “disease.” I use 
the term to identify how syphilis’ inaccessible reality discomfits the natural history genre and 
posits that discomfort as an ethical response to the limits of human knowledge. 
54 Joseph Banks served as the natural historian on Cook’s first voyage. Like Sloane, he would 
eventually preside over the Royal Society. See his Endeavour Journal. 
55 Phillip Edwards, Introduction to The Journals of Captain James Cook, x-xi. 
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and aestheticizing practices that would transform his ‘mere’ record into a learned and culturally 
sophisticated product” (145). Natural historians, like his own—Joseph Banks and George and 
Johann Forster—were usually learned gentlemen, but Cook was a military man from middling, if 
not low, rank. Because natural history was not natural to Cook, Douglas encouraged stylistic 
changes engineered to manufacture the proper form and rhetoric. According to Tobin, they, 
therefore, “removed the processes by which he apprehended the unknown, and in particular he 
excised references to his body and its engagement with the process of knowing” (145). Although 
“this distancing strategy was in keeping with the dislocating techniques of Enlightenment 
experimental science,” it also “undermined” that crucial authenticating function of natural 
histories: the eyewitness (Tobin 167). While I disagree with Tobin’s assertion that the natural 
history strove to eliminate the presence of the writer—as Daston and Galison have shown, the 
person of the scientist was vital in discerning nature’s truths before the nineteenth century—
Cook’s journals do increasingly employ natural historical conventions over time, shifting away 
from the log format of his first journal. Tobin suggests that these changes made A Voyage less 
visceral and exciting for the reader, but they also enabled Cook to master his own narrative and 
representation through natural historical conventions. 
Though Cook died before publishing his final journal, even its unpublished, unedited 
form suggests that he was aiming to produce a text akin to the polished natural history, A Voyage 
Round the South Pole.56 In particular, this final journal reads less like the Captain’s log of his 
                                                      
56 Cook famously died in 1779 at the hands of native Hawai’ians on his third and final voyage. 
Exactly what happened leading up to the murder remains unclear. Marshall Sahlins has argued 
that the indigenous people took Cook to be a god, Lono, who was ritually murdered every year 
(that Cook’s body and bones were afforded particularly special treatment seems to support this 
argument). See Islands of History, chap. 4, and How “Natives” Think: About Captain Cook, For 
Example, chaps. 1 and 2. In The Apotheosis of Captain Cook, especially chap. 5, Gananath 
Obeyesekere contends that it was the English who made Cook into a god; this colonial 
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first and more like a book. It eschews ship’s time, distance, and winds—formal linchpins in the 
first two—and instead uses civil time and a retrospective, summative point of view. That is, he 
was composing even his initial drafts with publication in mind. Still, despite this care and 
attention, his original journals would not be published until James Beaglehole edited them in the 
mid-twentieth century. Even then, Beaglehole had to choose between multiples drafts and 
versions of each voyage, except the last. Though extant texts may never reflect Cook’s 
intentions—and any arguments must be necessarily tentative—he clearly imagined the natural 
history as the form to not only narrate but, more importantly, master his experiences.  
The natural history especially served his desire to discipline unruly bodies. While Tobin 
argues that Cook’s second and third journals “excise” his body, each of his journals is 
preoccupied with bodies, health, and disease. In fact, Cook was famous for making the health of 
his crew a priority.57 Though many Captains delegated matters of health to their doctors or 
surgeons, Cook played an active role in his sailors’ well-being, expending significant resources 
on that scourge of the seas: scurvy.58 He understood that this occupational disease could destroy 
his crew and threaten the entire voyage. After arriving in Tahiti early during his first voyage, 
Cook takes time to remark upon the ship’s general health. He writes, “we had but a very few men 
                                                      
framework had existed among Europeans since at least Cortes. Yet others, like James Watt, have 
suggested that Cook’s death may have been precipitated by a vitamin B deficiency, which could 
have led to the uncharacteristically erratic behavior that preceded his death and colored his final 
relations with his crew and the Hawai’ians. 
57 See Watt, “Medical Aspects and Consequences of Cook’s Voyages.” 
58 Scurvy is a disease of malnutrition caused by low or nonexistent vitamin C absorption. Its 
symptoms include weakness, lethargy, gum disease (including red, bleeding gums, spotted or 
pimpled tongues, and, eventually, loss of teeth), bone deformities, delusions, emotional 
extremes, and death, among others. Scurvy was a common and deadly disease during the 
exploration age. For more on the relationship between the disease and colonization, see Jonathan 
Lamb, Scurvy: The Disease of Discovery. 
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upon the Sick list.”59 Rather than luck, Cook cites his preemptive, prescribed diet of “sour krout, 
Portable Soup and Malt” for preserving the crew (38). Proactively searching for evidence of the 
scorbutic, Cook mandated that any man with “the least symptoms of Scurvy upon him” receive 
even more of these rations (38).60 Though scurvy represented a common yet serious illness, Cook 
is clear and confident in his preventative measures. Most importantly, he is successful: “by this 
Means and the care a Vigilance of MR Munkhous the Surgeon this disease was prevented from 
getting a footing in the ship” (38). While Cook could not have cured all cases of scurvy, he 
clearly believed that with the proper supplies, support, and implementation he could control 
disease and keep his crew healthy and safe.61 Moreover, his attention to scurvy demonstrated his 
ability to observe, identify, theorize, act, and record—all values of the natural history. 
If scurvy proved manageable, however, syphilis proved utterly uncontrollable. And, if 
scurvy highlighted Cook’s natural historical conventions, then syphilis ruptured them.62 In the 
                                                      
59 Cook, The Journals of Captain James Cook, vol. 1, 38, hereafter cited parenthetically. Though 
Hawkesworth published a highly edited version of the first voyage, I use Beaglehole’s edition 
throughout this chapter. Though Beaglehole also compiled multiple copies of the journal, his 
edition does not include Banks’s language as Hawkesworth’s does. 
60 See Watt,’ “Medical Aspects and Consequences of Cook’s Voyages,” 146-47. Cook, Watts 
argues, sought not only to replenish vitamin C but to conserve it: “Cook’s policy of short sea 
passages and frequent calls for fresh food rich in the vitamin ensured saturation of the body 
pools…Cook also reduced the rate of vitamin C utilization by providing his men with dry, warm 
clothes and putting them into three watches, thus significantly reducing stress, which increased 
requirements” (146). 
61 While the sour kraut contained vitamin C, malt did not and, thus, could not have cured scurvy. 
It could, however, cure vitamin B deficiency, which presents with similar symptoms as scurvy. 
Watt bemoans the fact that Cook emphasized malt to the exclusion of lemon juice, arguing that 
because Cook had such a reputation for health, his endorsement of malt impeded research into 
lemon juice and cost many lives. Yet even “true” natural historians like Joseph Banks were 
unsure about lemon; though Banks “flew to the lemon juice” when sour kraut failed to abate his 
symptoms, remarking on the “surprising” speed and efficacy of the cure, he nonetheless 
abandons this treatment and its scientific repercussions (n.pg.). See Watt, “Medical Aspects and 
Consequences” and The Endeavour Journal of Sir Joseph Banks.  
62 Watt argues that by the third voyage the crew certainly was spreading and infecting natives 
with gonorrhea, given its short incubation period, but also was probably spreading 
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first voyage, after some of his men develop symptoms of venereal disease, he reflects, “I had 
taken the greatest pains to discover if any of our Ships Company had the disorder upon him for 
above a month before our arrival here and ordered the Surgeon to examine every many the least 
suspected” (56). In this passage, Cook envisions himself as a proactive agent against syphilis, 
scouring his crew for the minutest evidence of infection. Over the course of his three voyages, 
Cook would try to limit the time his men spent on land, forbid women from entering the ship, 
and lash men who knowingly spread the disease—all with the intention of preventing syphilis’ 
dissemination. Clearly, Cook understands that his voyage and his crew were responsible for 
spreading venereal disease. By framing himself as an observant Captain that imposed strict 
physical regulation, Cook attempts to deploy the same natural historical protocol against syphilis 
as he did against scurvy. In so doing, he aims to protect not only indigenous peoples from 
infection but also his voyage’s legacy and the entire imperial project. 
Yet venereal disease still spread. While in the first voyage Cook could still hope that 
another European crew was responsible for introducing syphilis to the South Seas, by the end of 
the third voyage, it was clear that his crew were active agents in its spread. Failing to regulate the 
material disease, Cook attempted to control it textually: 
they [indigenous Tahitians] likewise say that these Ship[s] brought the Venerial 
distemper to this Island where it is now as common as in any part of the world and which 
the people bear with as little concern as if they had been accustomed to it for ages past. 
We had not been here many days before some of our people got this disease and as no 
                                                      
lymphogranuloma venereum, chancroid, and syphilis. In fact, many members of the third voyage 
were being re-infected by venereal diseases either they or their countrymen had left during the 
previous two voyages (Watt 149-53). At the time, all of these diseases were called simply 
“venereal distemper,” the phrase Cook uses throughout his voyages.  
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such thing happen’d to any of the Dolphins people while she was here that I ever heard 
off, I had reason (notwithstanding the improbability of the thing) to think that we had 
brought it along with us which gave me no small uneasiness and did all in my power to 
prevent its progress, but all I could do was to little purpose for I may safely say that I was 
not assisted by any one person in ye ship, and was oblige’d to have the most part of the 
Ships Compney a Shore every day to work upon the Fort and a strong guard every night 
and the Women were so very liberal with their favours, or else Nails, Shirts, &ca were 
temptations that they could not withstand, that this distemper very soon spread it self over 
the greatest part of the Ships Compney but now I have the satisfaction to find that the 
Natives all agree that we did not bring it here.63  
Here, Cook tries to understand how syphilis was introduced to Tahiti. Strikingly, this passage is 
only three sentences, the second of which both shoulders and displaces blame. Though this 
sentence begins with proof of the Tahitians’ explanation (the crew catches syphilis after being on 
the Island), it immediately undermines this causal relationship by citing the Dolphin, whose crew 
never contracts the disease. Cook, therefore, is forced to suspect his sailors as the source, a 
thought that makes him “uneasy.” He had tried “all in [his] power” to prevent this, but, he lists, 
none helped him, and he needed men ashore to build the fort, and, after all, the women were 
especially “liberal” in their sexual “favours.”64 At the end of this anxious sentence, Cook 
concludes in a counter-intuitively confident assertion that he has “the satisfaction to find that the 
                                                      
63 Cook, The Journals of Captain James Cook, vol. 3, 55-56, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
64 Joseph Banks also described the “free liberty of love” in the South Seas in his Journal (n.pg.).  
Though Banks and Cook were shocked by native women’s sexual liberty, many of these women 
sought relations with Europeans to improve their status and the status of any potential offspring. 
For more on the sexual interactions and exchanges in these voyages and of South Sea Islanders 
more generally, see Margaret Jolly, “Desire, Difference and Disease.” 
 67 
Natives all agree that we did not bring it here.” Though the Tahitians may “all agree,” Cook’s 
own narrative, even this single sentence, does not. He claims that he has “the satisfaction” to 
have cleared himself and his crew of spreading syphilis and to have resolutely deduced syphilis’ 
origin as a good natural history should. Yet, while the Royal Society urged circumspection on 
the unknown, this overwrought, circuitous sentence only emphasizes the limits of Cook’s 
knowledge and mastery. This passage’s unease runs deeper than colonial guilt, even deeper than 
European prejudice. Syphilis’ uncertain origin and uncertain spread—syphilis “itself”—dis-eases 
this passage. 
Syphilis dis-eases the relationship between the natural history and “satisfaction.” That is, 
it unsettles the genre’s ideological commitment to satisfactory and satisfying knowledge. Cook 
initially claims to be satisfied by this story, to be sated by syphilis’ narrative resolution: “now I 
have the satisfaction to find that the Natives all agree that we did not bring it here” (56). Yet he 
quickly revises this argument, admitting, “However this is little satisfaction to them who must 
suffer by it in a very great degree and may in time spread itself over all the Islands in the South 
Seas, to the eternal reproach of those who first brought it among them” (56). Knowledge of the 
disease’s origin does not make the experience of illness any better; knowledge doesn’t 
necessarily lead to a better world. In this revision, Cook unwittingly unravels the core tenet of 
natural history—that the careful collection of the world would eventually lead to perfect 
knowledge and, thus, a perfect world. 
Moreover, “spread itself” is also revised here. The first iteration moves through the 
European crew, while the second moves through Pacific islands. Undoubtedly, Cook is 
attempting to distance himself from the disease, especially when he damns those “who first 
brought it” to the Pacific—a “who” that evidently doesn’t include him. The second use, however, 
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replaces humans with locations, distancing Cook and the text from the human consequences of 
disease and colonization. In other words, it is natural historical, affecting the distance between 
observer and observed that the form’s conventions engendered required. Whereas the second 
“satisfaction” undermines the genre, the second “spread itself” seems to support it. Still, both of 
these contradictory realities exist in Cook’s natural history—in the same sentence even. It is in 
this contradiction and oscillation that syphilis asserts itself, unsettling and dis-easing the genre. 
In unsettling the genre, syphilis posits dis-ease—the discomfiting recognition of the 
limits of human knowledge, control, and imagination—as an ethical response to the experience 
of illness. He writes, 
As there were some venereal complaints on board both the Ships, in order to prevent its 
being communicated to these people, gave orders that no Women, on any account, were 
to be admited on board the Ships, I also forbid all manner of connection with them, and 
order’d that none who had the venereal upon them should go out of the Ships. But 
whether these regulations had the desired effect or no time can only discover. It is no 
more than what I did when I first visited the Friendly Islands yet I afterwards found it did 
not succeed, and I am much afraid this will always be the case where it is neccesarry to 
have a number of people on shore; The opportunities and inducements to an intercourse 
between the sex, are there too many to be guarded against. It is also a doubt with me, that 
the most skillful of the Faculty can tell whether every man who has had it even is so far 
cured as not to communicate it further, I think I could mention some instances to the 
contrary. It is likewise well known that amongst a number of men, there will be found 
some who will endeavor to conceal this disorder, and there are some again who care not 
to whom they communicate it… (532) 
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In this passage from his final, fateful voyage, Cook admits the obstacles to preventing syphilis’ 
transmission: the impossibility of ending contact between the sexes, the admitted limits of 
medical knowledge, and the deviant men who purposefully spread the disease.  
Though Cook certainly cites these obstacles in an attempt to mitigate blame and guilt, his 
retrospective perspective and dejected tone remind readers that these regulations were bound to 
fail—that neither natural historical nor medical regulations control syphilis. Even “the most 
skillful of the Faculty” struggle “to tell whether every man who has had it even is so far cured.” 
This point does not absolve Cook or imperialism more broadly for their role in syphilis’ 
transmission to the Pacific. Rather, it highlights the limits of the natural history to secure mastery 
over syphilis and over colonial history and literature. Syphilis ruptures the natural history and its 
“utopian, innocent vision of European global authority” (Pratt 39). It exposes the relationship 
between natural history and imperialism: faith in European mastery of the human and nonhuman 
world. 
 Instead of mastery, syphilis posits uncertainty—unknown origin, etiology, symptoms, 
and cure. In the context of the natural history and modern science, uncertainty is not necessarily 
negative, but it is temporary. What is unknown someday will be known. In Cook’s journals, 
however, syphilis reminds us that uncertainty is not only inevitable but ethical—anti-imperial 
even. Syphilis highlights the limits of human knowledge as well as the relationship between such 
knowledge and imperialism, pointing toward but never revealing all that we cannot know. 
 
Conclusion 
 When syphilis slips Cotton Mather’s authorial intentions, seeping into other chapters to 
reveal symptoms and treatments, the disease writes itself. Mather denounces syphilis and its 
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victims, claiming “Your Foul Disease is too filthy and odious to have the nasty symptoms of it 
mentioned,” and “As for any Remedies…you are so Offensive to me, I’ll do nothing for you.”65 
Mather’s refusal to divulge symptoms and cures represents a radical break from the rest of The 
Angel of Bethesda, especially in a text so devoted to description, collation, and control. Yet, by 
medical compendium’s close, Mather discloses both. Though the reflexive pronoun may not 
appear in The Angel of Bethesda, these textual inconsistencies are also symptoms of dis-ease, of 
our inability to fully account for syphilis’ intra-action. Mather fears that syphilis will “stain” his 
text, and it does. 
Syphilis undermined the natural history’s rhetorical conventions, rupturing its ideological 
assumptions in the process. Though the natural history attempted to close the gap between words 
and things themselves, syphilis itself both withdraws from representation as in Sloane’s blank 
spaces and missing names and represents alternatives to colonization like Lawson’s no-nose 
doctor. Moreover, syphilis itself subverts the paradigm of mastery that guides Cook and 
undergirds natural historical imperialism. Each of these writers probably desired a syphilis itself, 
an agential disease that absolved them of their own agency, an early modern germ theory of 
history. Yet, even if they had purposefully imbued the disease with agency, they should be able 
to control its representation. Between missing names, confusing syntax, contradictory sources, 
alternative narratives, and shifting tone, syphilis intra-acts not simply with the natural history but 
to form the genre, instilling uncertainty and even anti-imperialism at its core. It transforms 
representation of the thing itself into the partial thing itself. Though I do not return to the 
reflexive pronoun in each of the following chapters, the paradigm of disease itself nonetheless 
guides the remainder of this argument. 
                                                      
65 Mather, The Angel of Bethesda, 118, 120. 
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Ultimately, the pronoun “itself” undermines “it.” As much as we cannot know 
Treponema pallidum, even with modern science, we cannot understand the lived experience of 
syphilis. What represents a “Misfortune” to some, as Lawson’s Voyage reminds us, might 
represent a pact with God or resistance to colonization to others. Syphilis dis-eases the natural 
history’s certainty, its faith that it can and will fully know the human and nonhuman world, but 






Chapter Two: An Inoculated Body Politic: Inoculation as Metaphor and Agent  
When John Winthrop described the Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony as “the most 
perfect and best proportioned body in the world…without spott or wrinkle,” he drew on a long-
standing tradition of understanding political and social collectives through the individual, 
physical human body—the body politic.1 Medieval political philosophers, seeking to reconcile 
divinity with corporeality, argued that the King had two bodies: a natural or physical body and 
the divine body, which superseded the mortal coil and included the entire state. By the 
seventeenth century, however, as Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan famously imagines, the King 
represented the head of the body politic, collecting and controlling the many unruly bodies that 
composed the state. Extending and distending the borders of the body politic, American 
colonization threatened this tenuous cohesion and thereby threatened the head’s power and 
regulation. Moreover, the individual colonist’s American experiences, including disease, famine, 
disaster, and abandonment, frequently alienated them from both English identity and the English 
body politic.2 
 It should not be surprising that our metaphors are framed by our bodies, that we 
understand political collectives through our most fundamental lens for perceiving and ordering 
the world.3 Yet it also should not be surprising that this relationship is reciprocal: our metaphors 
also shape our bodies. For example, the way we describe disease affects lived experience; 
                                                      
1 Winthrop, “A Modell of Christian Charitie,” 40, emphasis in original. 
2 On the King’s corporeal and divine bodies, see Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies. For 
more on the relationship between American colonization and the body politic, see Jim Egan, 
Authorizing Experience and Kathleen Donegan, Seasons of Misery. 
3 For the seminal work on bodies and metaphors, see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Metaphors We Live By. 
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metaphors can cure and kill.4 Similarly, literary critics and historians have shown how changing 
medical knowledge and biological experiences of illness transformed how real communities of 
people identified themselves and others.5 This chapter extends the relationship between the 
human body and metaphor even further, arguing that microbes like the variola virus also shaped 
experiences of illness, the metaphors drawn from them, and the communities those metaphors 
warranted. 
 The variola virus, or smallpox, was one of the most important agents in the history of the 
Americas. It devastated Native American populations, seeming to divinely-sanction American 
colonization—to the New England Puritans at least.6 Yet the virus that caused smallpox was not 
singular. Scientists believe that sometime during the eighteenth century the virus diverged into 
its two modern strains, Variola major and Variola minor. Some have argued that human 
migration to the Americas pressured the disease to moderate, while others have suggested that it 
was inoculation and vaccination that moderated it. Regardless of which evolved the disease, it 
seems clear that human actions shaped the microbe. My argument, however, probes the inverse: 
how microbes like the variola virus shaped humans, human collectives, and the metaphor they 
used to understand that collective—the body politic.7 
                                                      
4 “Metaphors can kill,” Lakoff asserts in the opening line of his essay “Metaphor and War,” 
arguing that language and metaphors power real-world consequences. On how metaphors can 
stigmatize illnesses like cancer and AIDS and, thus, adversely affect access to treatment and 
outcomes, see Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors. 
5 See, for example, Cristobal Silva, Miraculous Plagues, and Priscilla Wald, Contagious. While 
Wald analyzes late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century American culture, and Silva examines 
colonial New England, both show how illness shaped ideas about American communities. 
6 See Silva, Miraculous Plagues, chap. 1 on the way disease shaped justification narratives. See 
also pp. 5-7 in the introduction for critical debate on the relationship between smallpox, 
indigenous Americans, depopulation, and colonization. 
7 For the standard history of smallpox’s evolution and eradication, see Crawford, Deadly 
Companions, 106-11, and Arno Karlen, Man and Microbes, 38, 48-49, and 109. For new 
developments in our understanding of the disease’s evolution, see Duggan, et al., “Seventeenth 
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 In particular, inoculated smallpox simultaneously enabled and resisted a paradigm of a 
bounded and bordered body politic. Although inoculation had been used in China and throughout 
the Muslim world for centuries, it did not become widespread in Europe and the Americas until 
the eighteenth century.8 The procedure itself varied, but it always required placing infectious 
material into an uninfected person’s body. In the West, this was usually accomplished through an 
incision in the skin. By absorbing the disease through an abnormal avenue—the skin rather than 
the lungs—inoculation moderated smallpox, producing a minor skin irritation rather than a 
dangerous systemic infection. Inoculation clarifies Karen Barad’s theory of intra-action, 
demonstrating how the collision and collusion of bodies could be made to reify the difference 
between those bodies. On the one hand, inoculation made smallpox and human inseparable, 
literally forging immunity in tandem. On the other hand, its function was to mediate and control 
this inseparability, to divide the human body into inside and outside, self and other. In this way, 
inoculation enabled a body politic with complex, even contradictory borders. While Europeans 
and colonial Americans undoubtedly employed inoculation to shore up their individual and 
collective identities, inoculated smallpox escaped their social and literary control. Its 
materiality—the way it paradoxically reified and dissolved borders—made it an uncertain 
medical technology and an uncertain metaphor. 
 The first section of this chapter develops how inoculation transformed real human bodies 
and metaphors about human bodies, while the second analyzes how these transformations shaped 
the metaphor of the body politic with real consequences. Beginning with Cotton Mather’s The 
                                                      
Century Variola Virus Reveals the Recent History of Smallpox,” and C. Thèves, et al., “The 
Rediscovery of Smallpox.” For an analysis of both of these studies, see also Joel O. Wertham’s 
“Viral Evolution.” 
8 See Donald R. Hopkins, The Greatest Killer for nonwestern references, understandings, and 
treatments of smallpox. 
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Angel of Bethesda, the first section focuses less on the thoroughly criticized 1721 Boston 
inoculation controversy and more on one of Mather’s rationales for supporting inoculation so 
ardently, even after a grenade was thrown through his window: animalcules. Mather’s proto-
microbial theory transformed the human body into a “citadel”—a fortress with a clear internality 
that required the policing of external invaders. He employs “the citadel” to explain how 
inoculation worked, but inoculated smallpox confounded this metaphor as much as it enabled it, 
confusing the line between internal and external, self and other. Inoculated smallpox rewrote the 
human body and the metaphorical potential of that body, simultaneously powering and 
challenging Mather’s usage. 
The second section of this chapter, then, tests how this inoculated smallpox transformed 
the body politic by closely examining another early American site, Charlestown, South Carolina. 
Between 1758-1761 elite white Carolinians attempted to deploy inoculation as a metaphor to 
delineate the border between themselves and nonwhite others, to order and control their colony’s 
chaos. In their letters and diaries, coastal slaveholders like Dr. Alexander Garden and Eliza 
Lucas Pinckney describe a colony on the verge of collapse, threatened from within by enslaved 
Africans and African Americans and from without by Cherokees. Although South Carolina was 
also endangered by fractures among whites, they wielded inoculation as a metaphor to elide their 
own differences and cohere as a province by externalizing nonwhites and delineating and 
policing the colony’s borders. Smallpox and inoculation, however, permeated and resisted 
borders, whether of colonial territories or individual bodies, of white metaphors or racist 
intentions, challenging their own use as metaphors. In particular, the material circumstances of 
this epidemic, including its uncommon course and inoculation’s failures and restrictions, actively 
subverted a racialized division of interior and exterior, highlighting fissures among whites and 
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the extent to which nonwhite enemies were “internally” produced through white policies and 
actions.  
It is a central insight of disability studies that metaphors and literature shape lived 
experiences of disability and illness, but this chapter aims to show how nonhumans also shaped 
those metaphors that shaped lived experiences. While white metaphors undeniably wrought 
material consequences, smallpox and inoculation demonstrated that the power of metaphor was 
not restricted to white peoples, that Cherokees, enslaved Africans, that even microbes and 
medical innovations shaped the material and metaphorical contours of the colony. They 
demonstrated that those without power, even without state-sanctioned humanity or personhood, 
could and did transform the contours of early American lives, history, and literature. If we are to 
revise those metaphors that frame how we live bodily difference, as well as how bodily 
difference structures the body politic, then we must extend our physical, historical, and literary 
borders to include the intra-active, trans-corporeal agency of disease. 
 
Inoculated Bodies: Animalcules and the Citadel in Mather’s The Angel of Bethesda 
In the early eighteenth century, nearly all medical practitioners, whether formally trained 
or not, ascribed to some variation of humoralism, which maintained that a person’s physical and 
emotional predisposition could be influenced through diet, exercise, evacuation, and the 
environment. Illnesses were caused by internal imbalances of the humors and treated by diet, 
purges, and bloodletting. New diseases like syphilis, specifics like cinchona, and epidemics of 
the plague and smallpox all failed to depose the humoral paradigm’s reign. Yet, when Mather 
peered through a microscope—or, more likely, read the reports of others who had peered through 
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microscopes—he discovered that “Every Part of Matter is Peopled.”9 Little animals or 
“animalcules” invisibly inhabited every surface and minute pore. These “unseen Armies of 
Numberless Living Things,” Mather argues, are the divinely-sent source of all diseases, 
including smallpox (47).10 As Richard Harrison Shryock argues, Mather’s animalcular theory 
may not have been inherently “unique”; what was “unusual” was “that he applied the hypothesis 
to a new field—to what would now be termed immunology.”11 That is, Mather innovated 
animalcular theory by applying it to inoculation, by using it to understand how inoculated 
smallpox could produce a weaker incarnation of the disease and still ensure lifelong protection. 
He did so through the metaphor of the citadel, which figured the human body as a fortress with 
clear, if porous borders. Mather’s citadel, however, not only explains inoculation’s mechanics 
but, more importantly, derives from those very same mechanics. Inoculated smallpox 
transformed the material body, which in turn transformed its metaphorical potential. But while 
Mather attempted to use the citadel to delineate clear borders between inside and outside, 
inoculated smallpox simultaneously enabled and confounded the difference between self and 
other. 
Mather introduces animalcular theory in his seventh chapter, after a careful explanation 
of disease’s providential origin but before his catalog of specific diseases. Grounding his 
argument in work by luminaries like Antonie van Leeuwenhoek and innovations like the 
                                                      
9 Cotton Mather, The Angel of Bethesda, 43, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
10 Mather was the first to espouse such a proto-germ theory in the Americas, but his theory was 
built on the seed theories of Paracelsus and Van Helmont. See Jones, Introduction to The Angel, 
xi. Moreover, Richard Harrison Shryock argues in Medicine in America that Mather based his 
animalcular theory on the works of Athanasius Kircher, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, and 
Benjamin Martin. On the relationship between the microscope and animalcular theory, see 
Catherine Wilson, Invisible World, chap 5. 
11 Shryock, Medicine in America, 253, 254. 
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microscope, Mather describes these proto-microbes as minute, innumerable, and penetrating—
the nearly invisible source of all disease, the physical corollary and vehicle of God’s judgment.12 
He writes, 
Every Part of Matter is Peopled. Every Green Leaf swarms with Inhabitants. The 
Surfaces of Animals are covered with other Animals. Yea, the most Solid Bodies, even 
Marble itself, have innumerable Cells, which are crouded with imperceptible Inmates... 
The Animals that are much more than Thousands of times Less than the finest Grain of 
Sand, have their Motions; and so, their Muscles, their Tendons, their Fibres, their Blood, 
and the Eggs wherein their Propagation is carried on. The Eggs of these Insects (and why 
not the living Insects too!) may insinuate themselves by the Air, and with our Ailments, 
yea, thro’ the Pores of our skin; and soon get into the Juices of our Bodies. (43) 
Mather describes these animalcules as tiny and infinite, populating every possible “surface,” 
whether leaf or person. Yet they do not simply sit on these surfaces but “insinuate themselves” 
into various bodies. As in the last chapter, the reflexive pronoun signals the animalcules’ agency. 
Moreover, their insinuation reveals the human body’s porosity. While humoralism also posited a 
porous body, Mather’s animalcular theory envisioned discrete, external beings rather than 
internal imbalances as the source of disease. 13 Taken together, this agency and porosity explain 
                                                      
12 Silva argues that “animalcular theory was meaningful” to Mather “only insofar as it provided 
an opportunity to use science and medicine as evidentiary frameworks for theological 
conclusions” (Miraculous Plagues 159). While we cannot overestimate the importance of 
theology to all of Mather’s beliefs, we also should not underestimate his investment in science 
and medicine. In addition to the preparationist doctrine that Louise A. Breen and Robert Tindol 
analyze, the animalcular theory of disease dissemination also helps to explain Mather’s 
passionate defense of inoculation. 
13 Mather also maintained that disease derived from imbalances of the Nishmath-Chajim—the 
“Spirit…of a Middle Nature” that enabled communication between “the Rational Soul, and the 
Corporeal Mass” (Angel 177)—but he also argued that invasive agents like animalcules could 
provoke that imbalance. See “Nishmath-Chajim. The Probable Seat of All Diseases, and a 
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how living things penetrated the human body “thro’ the Pores of our skin,” noting and bypassing 
the body’s purported border, and created disease.  
Mather returns to animalcular theory in his chapter on smallpox, arguing, “It begins now 
to be vehemently suspected that the Small-Pox may be more of a animalculated Business than 
we have been generally aware of. The Millions of ------ [sic] which the Microscopes discover in 
the Pustules have confirmed the Suspicion” (201). Elsewhere, however, he attributes the disease 
to a more conventional scapegoat, miasma. In a description of smallpox taken in the natural way, 
he contends, “The venomous Miasms (Lett That Word serve at the present) of the Small Pox, 
entering in to the Body, in the Way of Inspiration, are immediately taken into the Blood of the 
Lungs: And, I pray, how many Pulses pass before the very Heart is pierced with them?” (111). 
Miasma, the effluvium of rotting matter or swamp air, and animalcules may not have been an 
antithetical explanation for disease; perhaps the little animals were transmitted through 
miasma.14 Yet “miasma” had a far more ancient pedigree and entrenched culture than 
animalcules. In fact, Mather may employ this word for that very lineage, to warrant the radical 
and controversial procedure of inoculation.  
More importantly, Mather emphasizes materiality rather than semantics. This miasmatic 
smallpox functions similarly to an animalculated smallpox: it is an external agent that infiltrates 
a porous and vulnerable human body. Mather compounds this similarity when he retreats from 
                                                      
General Cure for Them, Further Discovered” in The Angel, chap. 5. For more on the Nishmath-
Chajim, see Margaret Humphreys,“Vindicating the Minister’s Medical Role.” 
14 Miasmatic theory holds that certain environmental conditions, including swamps, rotting 
vegetable matter, and decomposing bodies, produced toxic gases that could poison humans and 
create epidemics. This theory was especially important in Philadelphia’s 1793 yellow fever 
crisis, with climatists or localists arguing that the environment had produced the disease. See 
Apel’s Feverish Bodies, Enlightened Minds, chaps. 1-3, on the intersection of miasma theory and 
yellow fever. 
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his use of “Miasms,” claiming parenthetically, “Lett That Word Serve at the present” (111).  
Here, Mather suggests that the word is an inaccurate, if serviceable placeholder to describe 
smallpox’s etiology. In the context of his chapter on animalcular theory and a direct mention in 
his chapter on smallpox, Mather’s use of “Miasms” does not necessarily undermine his argument 
for an animalculated smallpox or an animalcular theory of disease but instead might represent a 
rhetorical choice to make his argument more persuasive, signal the limits of language, or, most 
simply, indicate his own uncertainty over such a radical ontological and epistemological shift. 
Thus, Mather introduces the citadel metaphor to describe inoculated smallpox—to justify 
its use by explaining how it worked. He writes,  
What if we should find out a Way, that the Contagion of the Small-Pox, may not (by the 
Salival Juices, as tis commonly thought,) enter the Stomach, and make a furious and fatal 
Combustion in the Phlegmatic and Biliose Matter there, nor enter the Lungs more 
immediately, as with many perhaps it may; but enter by the Outworks of the Citadel, and 
carry off what it has to sieze with very gentle Symptoms, and when it reaches the 
Stomach in that Way yet be presently conquered with an easy Emetic there? (106-7) 
Mather asks, “what if” smallpox could enter the human body differently; “what if” those 
miasmas or animalcules could be induced to permeate “the Outworks of the Citadel” rather than 
the stomach or lungs, critical seats of human health? In this formula, the human body is a fortress 
that guards its perimeter against external enemies like smallpox through inoculation. 
 Mather’s citadel was not necessarily unique. As Susan Sontag describes, "The fortress 
image has a long prescientific genealogy, with illness itself as a metaphor for mortality, for 
human frailty and vulnerability.”15 In this “prescientific” use, Michael C. Schoenfeldt argues, the 
                                                      
15 Sontag, AIDS and its Metaphors, 96. 
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fortress or castle symbolized health, which was “an edifice perpetually being constructed, and in 
need of continual maintenance.”16 Typically, he contends, “the self is imagined as a castle 
fortified against its own insurrectionary forces”—sinful impulses, psychological quagmires, and 
humoral imbalances (99). Building on this entrenched, humoral image, Mather claims a familiar 
language and credibility for his unfamiliar and incredible medical innovation. Yet he shifts this 
metaphor’s focus from “insurrectionary” or internal enemies to external invaders.17 The body is 
not a “castle of health” at war with itself but an “Invaded Party” at war with an external, 
animalcular “Enemy” (112). By framing this radical innovation on the familiar metaphor as a 
question—“what if…?”—Mather attempts to mitigate his controversial take on the body, 
animalcules, and inoculation. Ultimately, he uses the metaphor and the metaphor-as-question to 
explain inoculation’s material mechanisms and make a case for its widespread use. 
 The citadel, however, is not simply a metaphor for what inoculation does to the body—a 
rhetorical choice that Mather makes. Rather, inoculation remade the human body and, thus, 
remade the body’s metaphorical potential. He returns to the citadel when he explains the 
difference between natural and inoculated smallpox, highlighting not just how the two forms of 
the disease differed, but also how inoculated smallpox radically transformed the human body. In 
natural smallpox, he argues, “the Enemy at once gott into the very Center of the Citadel: And the 
Invaded Party must be very Strong indeed, if it can struggle with him, and after all Entirely 
Expel and Conquer him” (112). Mather emphasizes animalcular theory’s division of 
inside/outside: external invaders strike at “the very Center.” In inoculated smallpox, however, 
                                                      
16 Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 66, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
17 While many scholars in the medical humanities locate martial metaphors of disease in the 
modern, post-microbial era—see, for example, Sontag, AIDS and its Metaphors, Anne Hunsaker 
Hawkins, Reconstructing Illness, and Emily Martin—Mather reveals a much earlier genealogy 
for this usage. 
 82 
“Approaches are made only by the Outworks of the Citadel, and at a Considerable Distance from 
the Center of it” (112). While the “Enemy, tis true, getts in so far as to make Some Spoil…the 
Vital Powers are kept so clear from his Assaults, that they can manage the Combats bravely”  
(112). Natural smallpox vitiates the human body by attacking the “Vital Powers” like the 
stomach and lungs (the ultimate inside), whereas inoculated smallpox produces a few symptoms 
but proves easily conquered because it enters by the “Outworks of the Citadel,” the skin. Though 
Mather did not understand precisely how inoculation worked, this metaphor works surprisingly 
well to explain the procedure’s essential mechanics: inoculated smallpox produces a localized 
skin infection, which the immune system can neutralize easily, whereas natural, airborne 
smallpox produces a systemic infection that proves much more difficult for the body to “fight.” 
The citadel metaphor, therefore, is more than an historical legacy, a response to a psychological 
threat, or a rhetorical device; it is the result of the way that inoculation materially transformed 
the human body. To put it differently, inoculated smallpox enabled, even revised and rewrote the 
familiar “castle of health.” 
 Yet while inoculated smallpox warranted and even created the citadel paradigm, it also 
undermined it. Inoculation warranted the citadel metaphor because it allowed the human body to 
fortify itself against invasive smallpox; it became a citadel because it could no longer be invaded. 
At the same time, inoculation undermined an enclosed, impenetrable fortress-body because its 
isolation was a byproduct of its invasion; the human body became self-enclosed only after 
granting smallpox access to its interiority, by recognizing that the body is never really isolated. 
As Bernd Herzogenrath argues, “Mather sees the body as being enveloped by a permeable skin,” 
which was “porous and infinitely folded…a ‘meeting site’ of inside and outside.”18 Unlike 
                                                      
18 Herzogenrath, An American Body|Politic, 155, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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Herzogenrath, I am not arguing that this complicated metaphor reveals Mather’s philosophy of 
the body. Rather, it is an animalculated, inoculated smallpox that drives this complexity, that 
created the material vehicle for Mather’s metaphor while also exceeding his control. That is, it is 
not Mather who collapses “inside” and “outside” but inoculated smallpox. 
Transforming metaphors for the body, inoculation also transformed metaphors based on 
the body—the body politic. According to Jonathan Gil Harris, medical discourse and the figure 
of the body politic were mutually constitutive. Humoralism, for example, asked citizens to look 
inward for sources of “social illness,” while the ontological model of infectious disease 
externalized disorder, mapping it onto the “foreign” and “invasive” bodies of social outcasts. By 
locating disorder in “external, infiltrating threat[s],” the body politic could elide “genuinely 
disruptive problems generated within” it, “as a result of which the locus of social conflict is 
symbolically (if not actually) displaced from inside the body to its boundaries and vulnerable 
apertures.”19 Inoculation derived not only from such an ontological paradigm but also from “the 
poisonous pharmacy,” which asserted that poison could combat poison (50)—a tiny amount of 
infectious matter could ward against the natural disease as a small number of dangerous outsiders 
could protect the collective from the larger group, one faction of outsiders could be used to fight 
another, or outsiders could function as a foil to prescribe appropriate insider behavior (145). In 
Harris’s model, inoculation enacted a body politic attuned to its borders, to who and what was 
inside and outside, literally and imaginatively. 
While The Angel of Bethesda never explicitly names the “body politic,” the citadel 
metaphor nonetheless recalls a medieval collective joined through shared physical space and 
                                                      
 
19 Harris, Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic, 13, emphasis in original, hereafter cited 
parenthetically. 
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borders. In his Political Fables, Mather meditates on insiders and outsiders, warning that those 
who might balk at a royally-appointed governor endanger the entire colony by mistaking the 
English for outsiders. In-fighting, “snapping and snarling at one another,” would allow true 
enemies like the French “wolves” to attack.20 On the one hand, Political Fables, circulated three 
decades before The Angel, anticipates inoculated smallpox’s premise: true danger derives from 
without rather than within the body politic. On the other hand, this fable foreshadows inoculated 
smallpox’s central paradox: what happens when the distinction between inside and outside, self 
and other, relies on the dissolution of that distinction? Herzogenrath argues that Mather believed 
that the body and, thus, the body politic could “organize and regulate” themselves (146). As 
such, he locates Mather in a “revolutionary tradition” (146). Yet, as Cristobal Silva and Kelly 
Wisecup have shown, Mather’s support for inoculation was attuned medicine’s epistemological 
borders; he carefully invoked and insulated his argument from its source, his slave Onesimus.21 
Moreover, as Silva observes, “inoculation meant thinking about illness as a personal rather than 
national affliction,” which undermined civil authority and social cohesion.22 So, while Mather 
may never use the phrase “body politic” in the context of inoculation, his abiding interest in 
politics along with his concern for borders all suggest that he perceived the relationship between 
single and collective bodies along a central axis. More importantly, as I have been arguing, 
Mather’s intentions here are less important than what inoculated smallpox itself made possible: a 
permeable yet bounded and bordered body and body politic. 
By virtue of its animalculation, therefore, inoculated smallpox materially changed human 
bodies; these transformed bodies necessitated new metaphors like the citadel; and these 
                                                      
20 Mather, Selections, 332. 
21 See Silva, Miraculous Plagues, chap. 4, and Wisecup, Medical Encounters, chap. 3. 
22 Silva, Miraculous Plagues, 147. 
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physically and figuratively altered bodies consequently reshaped metaphors that were grounded 
in them, including the body politic. The “castle of health” may have been a familiar image, but 
Mather’s animalcular theory transformed it into a permeable body at war with external invaders 
rather than itself. In her study of international relations, the metaphor of the body politic, and 
microbes, Stefanie R. Fishel argues that the paradigm of war elides “‘the adaptive role’” that 
microbes played and continue to play in the creation of the immune system and humanity itself.23 
Another word for “adaptive” might be “creative” or “intra-active.” Mather employs animalcular 
theory and the citadel metaphor to explain how inoculation worked, but inoculated smallpox 
built the literal and metaphorical borders that it simultaneously confounded. Inoculated smallpox 
and the metaphor it makes possible reminds us that what was “external” is always also 
“internal,” and that what is inside is always potentially outside. 
 
An Inoculated Body Politic: South Carolina, 1758-1761 
Almost forty years after Boston’s inoculation controversy and Mather’s animalcular 
explanation of inoculation, South Carolina braced itself for the apocalyptic collision of three 
distinct catastrophes: a war, a rebellion, and an epidemic. The Cherokees were combatting settler 
encroachments and colonial aggression. Exploiting the distraction, enslaved and free Africans 
resisted their oppression and began a rebellion. At the same time, smallpox raged after an 
absence of over two decades. If these dangers were not enough, tensions among white South 
Carolinians were also high. The British distrusted the French-Acadian refugees; the backcountry 
resented the coast; Carolinians begrudged Virginians and Georgians; and, finally, colonists 
                                                      
23 Fishel, The Microbial State, qtd. in 87. 
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doubted, even began to oppose the British empire and colonial rule.24 The combined forces of 
war, rebellion, and epidemic should have shattered the colony along these deep and significant 
fault lines, but instead white South Carolinians united through inoculation, a material metaphor 
that elided white divisions by casting the colony as a cohesive and coherent body endangered by 
dangerous, invasive outsiders.25 Yet, even as white Carolinians harnessed the imaginative power 
of the epidemic and inoculation, the material agencies that undergirded their metaphors 
undermined them.  
By shifting from Mather and Boston 1721 to writers like Dr. Alexander Garden, Eliza 
Lucas Pinckney, James Adair, and Revered Archibald Simpson in South Carolina, 1758-1761, I 
do not mean to argue that these later writers were influenced by Mather’s writing or theories. 
Rather, I am arguing that inoculated smallpox’s particular materiality, which complicated 
borders and boundaries, shaped its own representation and the metaphor of the body politic 
similarly across multiple sites, including Mather’s The Angel of Bethesda and white Carolinians’ 
letters, diaries, and texts. That is, I trace not Mather’s literary genealogy but inoculated 
smallpox’s. This focus enables a dual vision: we can perceive how elite white Carolinians 
mobilized a metaphorical inoculation, and we can glimpse how inoculated smallpox itself 
challenged those uses, demonstrating how those exiled from the body politic including 
                                                      
24 James H. Merrell criticizes the terms “backcountry” and “backwoods” in “Second Thoughts,” 
arguing that they privileged and continue to privilege the perspectives of white colonists at the 
expense of indigenous peoples’ insights and rights. Still, these phrases are integral to this essay, 
which emphasizes how such language imaginatively incorporated Cherokee lands into South 
Carolina’s “body” politic. 
25 For thorough studies of South Carolina’s turmoil during this period see: David H. Corkran, 
The Cherokee Frontier; Tom Hatley, The Dividing Paths, part 3; Fred Anderson, Crucible of 
War, chap. 47; John Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63; Tyler 
Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, chaps. 5 and 6; Daniel J. Tortora, Carolina in 
Crisis. 
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Cherokees and enslaved peoples could and did transform the contours of early American lives, 
history, and literature. 
 
Converging Threats 
By 1758 South Carolina was composed of the coastal city, Charles Town, the plantation 
Lowcountry, and an ever-expanding backcountry. While enslaved black people greatly 
outnumbered whites in Charles Town and the Lowcountry, sometimes by three to one, the 
backcountry was primarily white.26 Cherokee Country hugged these back settlements and white 
colonists, ranging from the Appalachian Mountains to the Carolina piedmont. 10,000 people and 
2,500-3,000 warriors lived there.27 Between 1758-1761 South Carolina’s territorial uncertainty 
exploded into war, its disproportionate demography swelled into rebellion, and fissures between 
coastal elites and backcountry settlers and the colony and the homeland threatened to destabilize 
the colony from within—all while a smallpox epidemic flourished. It certainly seemed, as Dr. 
Alexander Garden, a wealthy physician and naturalist, cried, “never was there a province more 
abused”—to white Carolinians at least.28 
The Anglo-Cherokee War (1758-1761) began for many reasons: unregulated trade, settler 
encroachments, horse stealing, the fallout of the Seven Years’ War, including the 
misunderstanding and mismanagement of Anglo-Cherokee relations, and the assassinations of 
Cherokee warriors.29 As these Cherokees were returning home from their role as British allies 
                                                      
26 Peter McCandless, Slavery, Disease, and Suffering in the Southern Lowcountry, 11. 
27 Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, 3. 
28 Alexander Garden to John Ellis, April 12, 1760, A Selection of the Correspondence, 1:484. For 
more on Garden’s biography, see Edmund Berkeley and Dorothy Smith Berkeley, Doctor 
Alexander Garden of Charles Town. 
29 See note 25 on the Anglo-Cherokee War. For more on the Seven Years’ War’s impact on 
Anglo-Cherokee relations, specifically, see Paul Kelton, “The British and Indian War.” 
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during the war, Virginia settlers attacked and murdered them. According to trader and proto-
ethnographer James Adair, the Cherokees “earnestly applied to Virginia for satisfaction, without 
receiving any; in like manner to North-Carolina; and afterwards to South-Carolina, with the same 
bad success.”30 Only after these entreaties had failed did they avenge their murdered kin 
according to custom, and, even then, they precisely targeted their victims.31 Though two separate 
delegations set out to Charles Town to negotiate a peace at the end of 1759, Governor William 
Henry Lyttelton responded by taking these Cherokees hostage, mustering a militia, and marching 
to Cherokee Country to demand satisfaction. He received a few accused killers, releasing some 
of his hostages in turn, and returned to Charles Town where he was met “with a wild ridiculous 
parade” and “crowned with laurels.”32 Eliza Lucas Pinckney, a wealthy slave-owner now known 
for her indigo production, believed that Lyttelton’s actions had put white South Carolinians 
"upon a better footing with” the Cherokees “than we have been many years.”33  
Pinckney’s faith, however, was misguided. Lyttelton did not return with peace but with 
war. According to Garden, the Cherokees “had played a game with the Governor, too well 
                                                      
30 James Adair, The History of the American Indians, ed. Kathryn E. Holland Braund, 263. For 
more on Adair’s biography, see Braund, “James Adair,” The History, 1-53. 
31 The law of “blood vengeance” required that the Cherokees avenge murder with murder. If the 
murderer fled or was foreign, then any person from their clan or nation could be substituted. See 
Oliphant, Peace and War, 5-7. See also John Phillip Reid, A Law of Blood, chap. 9. In 1759, 
specifically, the kin of the murdered men “sent out a large company of warriors, against those 
Germans...to bring in an equal number of their scalps, to their own murdered relations.” Adair, 
The History, 264. Boulware argues that this ethnic and regional precision mirrors the importance 
of town and region, in addition to kinship, to Cherokee identity. Moreover, it indicates how 
limited, careful, and politically savvy the Cherokees were at this time. See Boulware, 
Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, 105. 
32 Adair, The History, 267, hereafter cited parenthetically; Garden to Ellis, March 13, 1760, A 
Selection of the Correspondence, 1:473. 
33 Eliza Lucas Pinckney to Vigorous Edwards, March 12, 1760, in The Letterbook of Eliza Lucas 
Pinckney, 1739-1762, ed. Elise Pinckney, 141. For more on Pinckney, see Harriott Horry 
Ravenel, Eliza Pinckney. On her indigo production, see, for example, David L. Coon, “Eliza 
Lucas Pinckney and the Reintroduction of Indigo Culture in South Carolina.” 
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planned and concerted for him to see through.” They “followed him close at the heels, and laid 
waste the whole back settlements with fire and sword.”34 Reverend Archibald Simpson, a slave-
owning preacher in Beaufort, similarly described the Cherokees “burning, murdering, ravaging 
all before them,” and whites fleeing “in the most deplorable state of complicated misery & 
distress.”35 Actually, the Cherokees were responding to the brutal and cowardly murders of the 
remaining hostages at Fort Prince George. 36 What Simpson and many other whites felt was 
senseless violence was the Cherokees’ response to white “savagery,” to a series of injustices that 
included ignoring border treaties, manipulating trade, murdering innocent people, and enslaving 
a peace delegation. Thus, the war escalated until General Jeffrey Amherst sent two separate 
missions, under Archibald Montgomery and James Grant, to subdue the Cherokees. Where 
Montgomery faltered, Grant destroyed the Lower, Middle, and Out Settlements.37 Despite this 
damage, the war ended on relatively favorable terms for the Cherokees, who lost some hunting 
grounds but avoided executions and maintained their sovereignty.38 
Yet the Anglo-Cherokee War was not the only peril South Carolina faced. Slave rebellion 
also threatened the colony. By the time the war loomed, South Carolina’s population was almost 
evenly split between black and white.39 This ratio was probably heartening; whites had actively 
                                                      
34 Garden to Ellis, March 13, 1760, A Selection of Correspondence, 1:474. 
35 Archibald Simpson, February 3, 1760, in The South Carolina Diary, ed. Peter N. Moore, 149. 
On Simpson, see Peter N. Moore, “Archibald Simpson and the Care of Souls in Lowcountry 
South Carolina.” 
36 A “white savage…cut through a plank, over their heads” and shot them dead. Adair, The 
History, 267. 
37 On these campaigns, see Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, chaps. 15 and 16, and Oliphant, 
Peace and War, chap. 4. 
38 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 468; Oliphant, Peace and War, 186. Despite this agreement 
and the Proclamation of 1763, settler encroachments and land cessions increased in the pre-
Revolutionary period. See Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation, chap. 7. 
39 McCandless, Slavery, Disease, and Suffering, 11. 
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attempted to balance the colony’s hues in the wake of the Stono Rebellion. In 1739 a number of 
enslaved people had waited until their masters were at church, raided arms, and began to march 
to St. Augustine, Florida, where the Spanish were offering freedom to escaped slaves. They 
killed between twenty and twenty-five whites in the pursuit of freedom. Although this rebellion 
was eventually suppressed, and many participants were executed, some evaded authorities for 
months and even years, while others may have slipped back into plantation life without their 
owners ever having noticed they were gone.40 While the rebellion itself may have been checked, 
white fear only grew. 
The General Assembly responded to the Stono Rebellion by strengthening the slave code 
and by coordinating an effort to balance the colony’s demographics through white settlement. In 
particular, they would tax imported slaves and other goods,  
for the effectual raising and appropriating a sufficient fund for the better settling of his 
Majesty’s townships and the other frontier parts of this Province with white inhabitants, 
by which we may be the better enabled to suppress any future insurrection of negroes and 
slaves, and to repel any attempts of his Majesty’s enemies against the peace of this 
Province.41 
That is, instead of abolishing or even simply restricting their own slaveholding, the coastal and 
Lowcountry elites that controlled the Assembly attempted to import poorer whites to the 
backcountry to act as a buffer. They imagined that this new white populace would correct the 
                                                      
40 On the Stono Rebellion, particularly in the context of South Carolina’s demography, see Peter 
H. Wood, Black Majority, chap. 12. 
41 “An Act for the better strengthening of this Province” in The Statues at Large of South 
Carolina, ed. Thomas Cooper, 3:556-57. 
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demographic consequences of chattel slavery and insulate them from the Indian nations that 
circumscribed their perimeter and the Spanish and French beyond. 
Still, a more “balanced” colony could not undo the harrowing fact of enslavement. In the 
summer of 1759, two black men, Phillip John (or Johns) and John Pendarvis, used the distraction 
of the Anglo-Cherokee War to plot a slave rebellion.42 According to Governor Lyttelton, they 
had been inspired by a millenarian preacher who had predicted that South Carolina would soon 
face an apocalyptic disaster.43 John interpreted this premonition as a slave rebellion: “‘the white 
People shou’d be all underground, that the Sword shou’d go thro’ the Land, and it should shine 
with their blood, that there should be no more white King’s Governors or great men, but the 
negro’s should live happily & have Laws of their own.’”44 Reverend Simpson reported that his 
preaching was interrupted in June 1759, when a black man was "siezed and carried off...on 
suspicion of his being concerned in some evel designs.”45 Both John and Pendarvis were 
sentenced to death, but while John was killed, Pendarvis managed to escape and evade capture.46 
Although no viable revolt ever manifested, and perhaps never even existed, slave resistance, 
including marronage and poisonings, increased during the Anglo-Cherokee War.47 The missing 
Pendarvis, therefore, represented the collective threat that slaves and slavery represented to 
                                                      
42 On this rebellion, see Tortora, Carolina in Crisis and Hatley, The Dividing Paths, 110-12. 
43 Ibid., 111. 
44 William Henry Lyttelton, quoted in Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, 66. 
45 Simpson, June 17, 1759, The South Carolina Diary, 143.  
46 Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, 67. 
47 Ibid., 145. For more on these kinds of resistance, see Wood, Black Majority, chap. 11; Sharla 
M. Fett, Working Cures, 159-67; John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the 
Atlantic World, 1400-1800, chap. 10. 
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South Carolina. But he also represented the risk of collusion—that Africans and African 
Americans might escape and eventually collude with the Cherokees to destroy the colony.48 
At the same time, tensions between whites also endangered the precarious colony. The 
Acadian refugees, exiled from Nova Scotia, could help France invade, while Virginians 
threatened South Carolina’s trade monopoly and peace negotiations with the Cherokees.49 More 
importantly, the war set the backcountry against the coast as backwoods settlers began to feel 
acutely and resent deeply their role as a geographical buffer. In February 1760, Simpson wrote in 
his diary, “This day saw a good number of famelies passing down from the back settlements, 
where many have been cut of by the Indians, and that all those parts are in the most deplorable 
state of complicate misery and distress.”50 He blamed the coastal elites and the General 
Assembly for the back colonists’ plight, arguing that the war was “much owing to our own 
Inactivity, the Kings troops not having been properly supported by the country.”51 Yet he also 
exclaimed, “blessed be God” for the “many settlements behind us on all parts,” which shielded 
his town and community from “danger.”52 As the General Assembly had intended, even 
sympathetic inland whites envisioned their fellow colonists as a defense against enemies. 
Ultimately, backcountry whites felt that their province had deserted them, that the General 
                                                      
48 John allegedly changed the date of the rebellion to accommodate indigenous peoples’ 
agricultural work. On the fear of African and Cherokee collusion, see Hatley, The Dividing 
Paths, 110-12, and Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, 65-67. 
49 See, for example, Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, 34-47 and McCandless, Slavery, Disease, and 
Suffering, 55-56 on the fear of the French Acadians; on how the Cherokees played Virginia, 
South Carolina, and Georgia against each other, see Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee 
Nation, chaps. 5 and 6; on the dissonance between the backcountry and the coast, see Richard 
Maxwell Brown, The South Carolina Regulators; and, finally, on divisions between the colony 
and the metropole, see Tortora, Carolina in Crisis, chap. 11.  
50 Simpson, February 12, 1760, The South Carolina Diary, 149-50. 
51 Ibid., [June-September] 13, 1760, 157. 
52 Ibid., February 13, 1760, 150. 
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Assembly could not and would not represent and provide their particular social, economic, and 
political needs.53 
As these inland settlers resented the powerful coastal elites, the coastal elites themselves 
began to resent metropolitan governance. At first, many simply felt abandoned by their 
homeland. Garden scolded his friend in England, “You have forgot us at home—you think not of 
our situation,” while Pinckney chided her British interlocutor, “I hope the good people of 
england wont give all their superfluous mony away to French prisoners and to build foreign 
churches, but reserve some for their poor fellow subjects in America.”54 Between Garden’s 
dejection and Pinckney’s sarcasm, coastal elites smarted at British mistreatment. 
Eventually, they believed that this desertion was something more insidious—not just an 
active disregard but an abuse or deprecation of colonial intelligence and life. In particular, 
Garden argued that metropolitan “ignorance” and an unwillingness to defer to local knowledge 
had caused the war: “Our extreme ignorance of the history of those [Indian] nations that we are 
best acquaintanced with, often and daily exposes us to commit these blunders.”55 One such 
“blunder” Adair explained was Lyttelton’s “not knowing aright the temper and customs of the 
savages,” not knowing or ignoring the “well-known” fact that the Cherokees equated hostages 
with slaves.56 Garden continued, “we err greatly likewise in not getting a better and more 
accurate geographical knowledge of the continent.”57 Thus, he judged that Montgomerie’s siege 
                                                      
53 Although the Anglo-Cherokee War was not the only cause for resentment—the coast routinely 
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failed because of his “ignorance of the various passes, &c. through the [Cherokee] nation; and 
indeed our gross ignorance of the geography…will be the fruitful source of many rebuffs to any 
army that attempts to reduce them.”58 While “our” seems to blame both the Empire and the 
colony, Garden’s next line clarified: “often used to mention it to Mr. Lyttelton, but not a word 
has ever been said of it.”59 It was not just that Britain had seemed to abandon the colonists, but 
that it had ignored and underestimated their capacity to solve their crisis, to lead themselves. The 
repetition of “ignorance” suggests that Garden and other coastal elites were especially sensitive 
to British prejudice toward colonial intelligence.60  
In the midst of this chaos, of war, rebellion, and infighting, a smallpox epidemic ravaged 
Charles Town and parts of Cherokee Country. The colony’s last epidemic was in 1738, when 
approximately 295 people in Charles Town and nearly half of the Cherokees died.61 By 1760, 
therefore, an entire generation lacked immunity. Garden explained, “We have not had it for two 
and twenty years before, so that of whites and blacks there must be more than two thirds of the 
people to have it.”62 David Ramsay, a doctor, politician, and historian writing in the early 
nineteenth century, estimated that nearly 3500 people contracted the disease in 1760 and 848 
died, nearly half of whom were black.63 By March, Pinckney had moved to her Belmont estate 
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“to keep my people of the way of the violent distemper for the poor blacks have died very fast by 
inocculation.”64 
There were two potential origins of the outbreak: a young, enslaved boy who escaped the 
mandatory port quarantine and the soldiers returning from Lyttelton’s abortive march to 
Cherokee Country.65 By the time Lyttelton and company had arrived at Fort Prince George, the 
surrounding Lower Town Cherokees were already in the throes of an epidemic.66 Thus, Garden 
claimed, “Our Governor returned from the Cherokee Country...bringing pestilence along with 
him,” and “The soldiers…brought a most fatal and malignant smallpox from the Cherokees, 
which, in two or three weeks, began to spread in this little place so furiously.”67 Smallpox spared 
no one, but the enormity of the epidemic disproportionately burdened Africans and Cherokees, 
who lacked access to inoculation and isolated country retreats.68 
While the war, rebellion, and epidemic affected Native, black, and white populations 
alike, the confluence of these horrors seemed especially apocalyptic to many white colonists. 
Garden decried, “the double enemy” of “the smallpox and the negroes,” and similarly lamented, 
“We know not whether our Indians or negroes be our greatest enemies.”69 Pinckney judged that 
“a great cloud” had settled over South Carolina: “We are continually insulted by the Indians on 
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our back settlements, and a violent kind of small pox rages in Charles Town.”70 Likewise 
Reverend Simpson bemoaned the conjunction of “this awful malignancy” and “the Indians,” 
crying, “O for sparing mercy and pity to this poor land.”71 Though Garden, Pinckney, and 
Simpson sometimes alluded to those other tensions among white colonists, their horror centered 
on and coalesced around the Cherokees, enslaved and free black people, and smallpox. 
Occurring at the same time and in the same colony, these events were materially and 
imaginatively inextricable. As they converged, whites found in their experiences of inoculation a 
powerful, material metaphor for ordering their colony’s chaos, for eliding white sources of 
danger and for excising nonwhite peoples from their collective and its future.  
 
Inoculation as White Metaphor 
Inoculation produced lifelong immunity to smallpox by placing infectious matter, usually 
the scrapings of a pox pustule or scab, directly into an incision in the skin. Whereas natural 
smallpox was airborne and induced a systemic infection, inoculation instigated a localized skin 
infection that many immune systems could neutralize easily.72 Early Americans did not fully 
understand how inoculation worked, but by South Carolina’s 1760 epidemic, four decades after 
the infamous Boston inoculation controversy, they knew that inoculation offered a far safer 
method of contracting the deadly disease though it still remained dangerous. Unlike vaccination, 
which would not be developed until the end of the eighteenth century, inoculation utilized the 
live smallpox virus, which meant that the inoculated could still spread the natural disease. 
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Inoculation, therefore, was rarely used to prevent epidemics. Instead, it defended against an 
active outbreak.  
In 1760 white South Carolinians deployed inoculation to defend against other enemies as 
well. In particular, they used inoculation as a metaphor to transform people who were 
economically and geographically vital to the colony—internal in many ways though not all—into 
poisonous, infectious, and dangerous outsiders. By locating the colony’s disorder in these 
external bodies, white Carolinians elided both white tensions and the extent to which the war, 
rebellion, and epidemic were at least partially produced by their own policies and actions. 
Ultimately, inoculation warranted a fantasy of control, the belief that they could cohere as a 
single, powerful white body politic by policing their borders. 
Though they used inoculation to externalize danger in the figure of racial outsiders and to 
elide white or internal sources of disorder, they exercised this metaphor differently upon 
enslaved Africans and Cherokees. Black Carolinians represented a paradoxical threat: they were 
physically and economically vital to the colony, but this integration was itself dangerous. 
Describing the colony’s chaos in March 1760, Garden explained, “From one of the most 
flourishing provinces, we are…brought into a situation too terrible for us, who have a double 
enemy, within ourselves to fear, viz. the small pox and the negroes.”73 Smallpox and black 
people were not just “enemies” of the province, according to Garden, but “within” or internal 
enemies. As he continued to report the chaos, he refined this description using anatomical 
language: “about 70,000 negroes in our bowels!” and “70,000 intestine enemies.”74 
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Undoubtedly, this corporeal imagery drew on the symbol of the body politic to illustrate the 
geographic location of enslaved people, within the colony and within white homes.  
More pointedly, the terms “bowels” and “intestines” implied not only location but 
necessity. Black people were critical to South Carolina’s economy, culture, and the material state 
itself, building roads that connected back settlements to Charles Town, constructing defensive 
fortifications, and piloting goods and people along waterways.75 Black Carolinians may have 
been vital to the colony’s formation, but this necessity also rendered the white body politic 
vulnerable. After all, the Stono Rebellion was engineered by men assembled to work on state 
infrastructure.76 Similarly, when Reverend Simpson’s wife was “left by herself without a white 
person in the plantation, she…not being used to be only among negroes,” and in the vitiated 
position of “lyn in” after childbirth, grew “melencholy.”77 Mrs. Simpson’s anxiety condensed the 
colony’s: whites did not simply feel outnumbered but outnumbered in a particularly vulnerable 
internal space—in the bowels and intestines. Paradoxically, black Carolinians were both vital 
enemies and enemies situated in the vitals of the white body politic. 
Inoculation, however, resolved this paradox by demonstrating how something internal 
could also be external. Smallpox could be in the body, invited in even, but ultimately it was not 
of the body. Garden’s phrase “in our bowels” is telling: black Carolinians could be “in” South 
Carolina and its body politic, even vital to its existence, but were not “of” that collective “our.”  
They were physically rather than culturally or politically within the colony, located in what we 
might call the body geographic rather than the body politic. Inoculation, like chattel slavery, may 
have invited “poison” within, but it did so by reframing smallpox as something necessarily 
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different from and external to the human body. It enabled white Carolinians to imagine black 
people as both external and vital and, thus, internal but not constitutive. Inoculation allowed 
them to form the collective “our bowels”—their white body politic—by eliding their 
responsibility for creating their own “intestine enemies.” 
If whites required inoculation to externalize black Carolinians, then the Cherokees 
represented a different material problem for the medical metaphor to solve. The Cherokees were 
“external enemies,” in Garden’s words, but their lands were critical to the colony’s safety and 
thus potentially internal to the colony itself.78 Yet the Cherokees were a sovereign nation, 
distinctly separate from South Carolina’s body politic and its body geographic. While the nation 
was neither unified nor monolithic, with different regions and towns pursuing different goals in 
their relations with South Carolinians and colonists more broadly, the Anglo-Cherokee War 
facilitated an unprecedented consolidation.79 Between 1758-1761 they were knit together not 
only by language, culture, and kinship but also by Carolinian aggression. Even though they were 
intimately tied to South Carolina through trade, and the colony’s politics and culture inevitably 
affected their own, the Cherokees remained independent. 
Still, white Carolinians understood that Cherokee Country was critical to South 
Carolina’s longevity and integrity. As Garden’s persistent calls for mapping the territory attested, 
Cherokee Country was geographically important because it represented “a back door to the 
province,” one through which the French or other Native peoples could enter and escaped slaves 
could flee.80 Moreover, in the minds and actions of many whites, Cherokee Country seemed to 
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be theirs already. After all, settler encroachments had precipitated the war. Garden succinctly 
surmised, “we rightly judge here that most, if not all, the Cherokee Country lies within our 
limits.”81  
Their encroachments, however, were not only physical but also imaginative. In particular, 
they used the language of the province’s “back” and “behind” to incorporate Cherokee Country 
into their body politic.82 While the language of the back country and its settlements was not 
necessarily unique, especially during the Seven Years’ War, these terms resonated in the context 
of the Anglo-Cherokee War, the contested border, and the smallpox epidemic. When Garden 
demanded that “our back settlements” be mapped, Pinckney decried the “Murders and Outrages 
in our back settlements,” and Simpson alternately lamented the “destruction” in “our back 
settlements” and praised the “many settlements behind us on all parts,” these elite Carolinians 
materially and imaginatively collapsed the distinction between South Carolina and Cherokee 
country.83 These “back settlements” formed the colony’s border and, in the paradigm of 
inoculation, its skin. That is, this language allowed white Carolinians to stretch the skin of their 
body geographic, if not body politic, to include Cherokee Country. 
But it also revealed a fear of this skin’s porosity and erosion, a fear that the colony might 
shrink rather than expand. Garden warned that the Cherokees “no doubt will cover our backs 
before we be awakened, and may be and are ready to pour destruction on us before we open our 
eyes.”84 Reverend Simpson similarly worried that the Cherokees “raging still in our back 
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settlements” are “coming nearer and nearer daily.”85 In fact, the Cherokees had pushed the 
border back 100 miles.86 While whites needed to excise enslaved peoples from the body politic 
but not the body geographic, they needed to incorporate Cherokee Country rather than the 
Cherokee people into their colony and needed to minimize the fact that the Cherokees could and 
were incorporating them. 
They did so through inoculation, which allowed them to delineate their colony’s 
boundary and to control its permeability. Inoculation admitted that the body could be changed, 
could incorporate the outside, much as whites aimed to incorporate Cherokee lands into 
themselves, but it also stressed control. The individual intervened in the natural course of an 
epidemic to manage when, how, and in what way he or she would contract the disease. To use 
Barad’s and Alaimo’s language, inoculation enabled humans to control their trans-corporeal 
intra-action with smallpox and, thus, to transform “intra”-action into “inter”-action. That is, they 
manipulated smallpox to improve themselves and, in doing so, imagined that they controlled 
smallpox, not that they shaped each other and certainly not that smallpox shaped them. Despite 
the realities of the Anglo-Cherokee War and eventually the Proclamation of 1763, inoculation 
similarly enabled white Carolinians to believe that they controlled their border’s permeability, 
that while they could expand their colony’s skin, the Cherokees could not alter or permeate it. In 
short, they used inoculation to delegitimize Cherokee sovereignty and agency and to justify their 
own expansion. 
Inoculation, therefore, enabled white South Carolinians to cohere at a time when their 
colony and its political and territorial integrity were in jeopardy by locating danger and blame in 
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external others. Black people were forcibly and paradoxically externalized, while Cherokee land 
was increasingly internalized. Inoculation framed nonwhite resistance, rebellion, and war as 
within South Carolina’s control, suturing white tensions and fortifying the tenuous colony. Most 
importantly, it absolved whites of their own role in creating and perpetuating the horrors of 
chattel slavery, colonization, and expansion, of the extent to which their “external” problems 
were truly “internal.” In other words, the metaphor of inoculation ultimately functioned to elide 
the colony’s formative intra-actions and the power of nonwhite agents—to erase how enslaved 
and free Africans and the Cherokees shaped the colony itself. 
 
Inoculation as Material Agent 
Smallpox, however, resisted. The course of the epidemic, the variable success of 
inoculation, and its eventual restrictions subverted white South Carolinians’ beliefs about health 
and disease and thereby undermined their attempts to use inoculation as a metaphor to 
understand and master their colony. This epidemic’s particular, material circumstances 
challenged white South Carolinians’ division between a healthy, unified, white internality and 
dangerous, invasive, nonwhite outsiders. Smallpox, inoculation, and inoculated smallpox 
animated and transformed their own use as metaphors of oppression and suppression, 
highlighting how nonwhite and nonhuman intra-actions transfigured the material and figurative 
contours of the colony—with or without the permission and recognition of Carolinian elites. 
Diseases like smallpox were typically considered external threats to early America, 
imported into urban coastal cities like Boston and Charles Town through migration, trade, and 
slavery. In these cities, global traffic collided with high population density and poor sanitation to 
encourage the propagation of infectious disease. Unlike in Charles Town, the country’s 
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population was neither large enough nor dense enough to support sustained epidemics though 
some plantations and parts of Cherokee Country certainly were. As Pinckney correctly observed 
in March 1760, “the smallpox, as it does not spread in the country, must soon be over for want of 
subjects.”87  
Cities, therefore, learned to imitate the country, instituting quarantines to arrest 
epidemics. After a slave ship introduced smallpox in 1738, Charles Town established a series of 
acts aimed at preventing and managing disease, including one in 1744 that created Sullivan’s 
Island, an isle dedicated to quarantining incoming ships, and a comprehensive quarantine act in 
1759.88 They were successful; the city did not experience another smallpox epidemic until 1760. 
But while these laws also sometimes barred rural entry into Charles Town, they only did so to 
prevent the disease from spreading to the economically vital plantations in the Lowcountry.  
South Carolina’s quarantine procedures, therefore, were not designed to cure individual cases of 
diseases nor to alleviate pain and suffering but rather to protect Charles Town and South 
Carolina from diseases believed to originate from outside of the colony. As Silva’s work on New 
England immunologies has shown, this belief may have held true for the earliest generations of 
settlers, but as populations increased and grew denser smallpox could no longer be considered 
foreign.89 
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The unusual course of the 1760 epidemic reflected this change, challenging white South 
Carolinians’ beliefs about the disease and their colony. Although there were two possible origins 
of the epidemic—the quarantine escapee and Lyttelton’s army—white South Carolinians blamed 
the returning militia: “Our Governor returned from Cherokee Country…bringing the pestilence 
along with him.”90 In this epidemic, smallpox was not imported by a slaver nor an immigrant 
vessel but by Lyttelton and his returning militia. This transit circumvented both Charles Town’s 
quarantine measures and its understanding of the disease; it spread not from without the colony 
but from within it. While Cherokee Country was not “within” South Carolina, whites plainly 
envisioned it as the skin, the “back” and “behind” of the colony, that delineated the province 
from a more certain “outside” that included the French. Moreover, the soldiers had contracted the 
disease at Fort Prince George, an official state outpost, albeit one on Cherokee land.91 That is, 
this epidemic spread not just from the colony’s physical interior but also from its political 
inside—Lyttelton, the local militia, and a military fort. 
By challenging white South Carolinians’ beliefs about how smallpox spread, this 
epidemic’s transit also undermined their metaphorical use of inoculation. Although they 
employed inoculation to reaffirm the boundaries of their colony, to isolate and externalize 
nonwhites, this epidemic troubled any easy distinction between inside and outside. That the 
quarantine did not prevent the epidemic demonstrated that the colony’s interior was just as, if not 
more, dangerous than its exterior. That it was the marching white soldiers—the ultimate symbols 
of the white state—who spread smallpox demonstrated that Africans and Cherokees were not the 
only sources of the province’s disorder. And, finally, that the epidemic was spread from the 
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ambiguous territory of Fort Prince George (to whites, at least) demonstrated that the colony did 
not fully control their borders. The epidemic’s uncommon transit, therefore, undermined 
inoculation’s ability to locate danger “outside” of the province exclusively. 
Inoculation’s poor success rate in 1760 also challenged its metaphorical usage. As 
Garden estimated, somewhere between 2400-2800 people were inoculated within twelve days.92 
Yet he acknowledged that “a very great number” of those inoculated “did not come so well off as 
might have been expected.” 93 Simpson similarly remarked, “it does not answer any way so well 
as expected.”94 While Simpson did not ruminate on why inoculation was unsuccessful, Garden 
diagnosed the problem: “the inhabitants were driven precipitately to have many more inoculated 
than could be attended by practitioners of physic.”95 Likewise, Pinckney claimed that those in 
Charles Town were “inocculation mad” and “rushed into it with such presipitation that I think it 
is impossible they could have had either a proper preparation or attendance had there been ten 
Doctors in town to one.”96 Both Garden and Pinckney attempted to locate the inoculation’s 
failure in the “precipitous” public, which hastened to inoculation without professional 
consultation or care, but they nonetheless admit that failure. 
If inoculation resolved their colony’s disorder metaphorically, then material inoculation’s 
failure exacerbated this disorder and its danger. Inoculation promised safety by manipulating and 
controlling how smallpox entered the body, how a clear outside and inside inter- rather than 
intra-acted. In turn, it promised that white Carolinians could control their colony, its borders, and 
racialized outsiders. Inoculation’s failure, however, upended this promise, demonstrating that the 
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colony’s safety and control were illusory, a metaphor with material power certainly, but not a 
reflection of reality. Cherokees and black Carolinians had already punctured their fantasy of a 
self-contained and self-controlled colony. Thus, it is not just that inoculation’s failure highlighted 
the colony’s inability to manage the interaction of inside and outside, but that it exposed the lie 
of the dichotomy itself. 
Eventually, Charles Town responded to inoculation’s failure by restricting it. Yet these 
restrictions only revealed the internal white fissures that inoculation-as-metaphor intended to 
elide. In May 1760, wealthy whites pressured the General Assembly to outlaw inoculation near 
and within the city for a year.97 They did not object to the practice on social or religious grounds, 
as in Boston’s famous rejection, but for economic reasons. Epidemic smallpox inevitably 
depressed profits, and inoculation prolonged these economic consequences by prolonging the 
epidemic. After all, the inoculated remained contagious.98   
These restrictions, however, disproportionately burdened rural whites. Though nearly all 
urbanites and many in the Lowcountry could procure inoculation early in the epidemic, smallpox 
did not spread in the country, and its infectious matter did not travel well, so inoculation could 
not be had easily outside of the city. Country folk, therefore, traveled to Charles Town to 
inoculate themselves and their families. Just as wealthy coastals had disenfranchised rural whites 
by using them as a buffer against the Cherokees and as a demographic check on their own slaves, 
they subjugated backcountry settlers through these restrictions, compounding extant classed and 
geographical fractures. If the metaphor of inoculation was employed to elide tensions among 
whites, then these restrictions revealed that white tensions did not disappear or dissolve into the 
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danger of externalized outsiders like the Africans and Cherokees. Rather, inoculation’s 
materiality highlighted the very tensions—the internal, white problems—that the metaphor of 
inoculation intended to resolve. 
Inoculation’s materiality, therefore, could not and did not serve white intentions. Where 
whites wanted to externalize nonwhites, internalize Cherokee lands, elide white friction, and 
cohere as a self-contained and healthy colony, the epidemic’s transit, inoculation’s failure, and 
its restrictions conspired to undermine both their metaphor and its material consequences. The 
epidemic’s course demonstrated that South Carolina’s interior was not inherently healthy and 
that outsiders did not have a monopoly on deadliness. Inoculation’s failure demonstrated that 
whites had failed to control their body politic’s boundaries. More importantly, it exposed the 
paradigm of inside/outside as false. Whites created the material and imaginative conditions that 
rendered non-whites dangerous outsiders. Finally, restrictions on inoculation exposed the internal 
white tensions that inoculation attempted to hide. That is, both the epidemic and inoculation —
their particular and material circumstances and effects—actively challenged the way whites 
framed and manipulated them, undermining their attempts to consolidate the colony through 
straightforward, racialized insiders and outsiders.  
 
Conclusion 
Inoculation was a bad metaphor. Though it seemed to warrant externalizing enemies and 
fantasies of control, its materiality made it an uncertain and unstable vehicle to manage the 
colony’s crisis. By depositing the live variola virus into an open wound, inoculation dissolved 
rather than fortified the division between inside and outside. White Carolinians attempted to 
control this interaction and its metaphorical implications, but it was, more accurately, an intra-
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action. As Barad has asserted, “There is no absolute inside or absolute outside. There is only 
exteriority within, that is, agential separability.”99 If intra-action represents the base ontological 
state of all bodies and agencies, then difference, what Barad calls “agential separability,” must be 
made through a purposeful “cut” that divides this from that, virus from human, white from 
nonwhite. White Carolinians wanted the metaphor of inoculation to function as this “cut,” to 
parse the agencies involved in the colony’s crisis as easily as it seemed to parse “smallpox” and 
“human.” Inoculation, however, did not resolve their crisis. It embodied it—vital enemies and 
enemies situated in the vitals, internalized others and semi-permeable skins, and, most 
importantly, inseparable, intra-acting agencies. It was not just that they misunderstood their 
metaphor’s materiality, but that inoculation’s materiality rejected their metaphor. 
Likewise, though Mather mobilized the citadel metaphor to explain how an animalcular 
inoculation worked, inoculated smallpox resisted its usage. He described natural smallpox as an 
enemy invader, plunging directly into the center of the unprotected human body. Inoculated 
smallpox, however, transformed that body into a citadel with clear and carefully regulated 
borders. Still, inoculated smallpox belied this straightforward imagery: the body only became 
bounded through intra-action, by traversing and dissolving the purported borders between human 
and microbe, self and other, inside and outside. In this way, inoculated smallpox transformed 
material bodies and their metaphorical potential, planting a paradox at the heart of 
representations of bodies and body politics, a paradox that would bloom in South Carolina, 1758-
1761. 
To argue that smallpox and inoculation affected history is not revolutionary; they, in 
conjunction with human actors, profoundly and intimately shaped human bodies and lives, entire 
                                                      
99 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 377. 
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populations, and cultures across the globe. To argue that humans used their experiences of 
disease to understand their world is equally unsurprising. But to argue that smallpox and 
inoculation are agents that transformed not only bodies but also their own use as metaphors 
seems radical. New materialism, however, reminds us that neither agency nor communication are 
uniquely human. Identifying and charting how nonhumans like diseases and medical procedures 
escaped humanity’s imaginative constructs illustrates how even those without official, state 
power or even the capacity to write shaped the lives and language of early America. White 
Carolinians wanted to minimize the agency of their nonwhite and nonhuman kin, to use their 
control of smallpox to consolidate their control of Africans and Cherokees, but smallpox and 
inoculation’s materialities revealed that in spite of white posturing, writing, and destruction these 
agencies nonetheless shaped and transformed early America—materially and imaginatively. 
Disability studies strives to reimagine the metaphors that shaped lived experience of disability 
and illness. If we are to revise those metaphors that frame bodily differences and body politics, 





Chapter Three: The Pandemic Roots of the Early American Novel: Yellow Fever and the 
Haitian Revolution 
Yellow fever emerged in the New World as early as 1648. Though it struck Charleston 
and Philadelphia in the early eighteenth century, it seems to have “disappeared” from mainland 
America until after the Revolution.1 In the last decade of the century, however, the disease 
surged as a pandemic, coursing through the Caribbean and the Republic’s eastern seaboard, 
tracing the Haitian Revolution’s diaspora.2 Saint-Domingue’s rebellion moved susceptible 
Europeans to the West Indies, as West Indians fled to an immunologically vulnerable North 
America, creating a pandemic network.  
At the very same time, the novel entered the American literary marketplace. Though the 
genre had been popular in England since the beginning of the eighteenth century, it only 
belatedly began to thrive with the rise of the Republic, a response to new social and cultural 
relationships, including those gendered and raced inequalities enshrined in the Constitution.3 
                                                      
1 Kenneth F. Kiple and Mary Himmelsteib King, Another Dimension to the Black Diaspora, 39; 
Peter McCandless, Slavery, Disease, and Suffering, 72; Oscar Reiss, Medicine in Colonial 
America, 382. Some medical historians like John Duffy have suggested that yellow fever 
“disappeared” from colonial British America between roughly 1760 and 1790 (Epidemics in 
Colonial America 162). McCandless, however, argues that in Charleston, South Carolina, at 
least, “yellow fever did not disappear…but was often present without being explicitly 
acknowledged or perhaps recognized as such” (72). It could have been ignored because of 
adverse market reactions; it may have been relatively benign, and thus went unnoticed; or, its 
symptoms could have been attributed to other diseases. Even Duffy admits that why the disease 
should have “disappeared” is a “puzzling question” (Epidemics in Colonial America 163). 
2 In “Republic of Medicine,” Cristobal Silva emphasizes the pandemic nature of this period’s 
yellow fever outbreaks, arguing more broadly for a hemispheric reading of early Republican 
literature. This argument builds on Silva’s work by addressing the relationship between yellow 
fever, the Haitian Revolution, and the early American novel. 
3 On the English novel’s origins, see Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel, and Michael McKeon, The 
Origins of the English Novel. For studies on the concurrent rise of the United States and the 
novel, see Leslie A. Fiedler, Love and Death, and Cathy N. Davidson, Revolution and the World. 
In The Early American Novel, Lillie Deming Loshe argues that early Republican novelists 
responded to British literary dominance by attempting to craft a uniquely American version of 
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This chapter argues that this timing—the concurrence of yellow fever, black Revolution, and the 
novel—is not coincidental but rather coevolutionary. Both the disease and the rebellion shaped 
the “instability,” “uncertainty,” and “confusion” that early American novels are known for, 
probing the relationship between whiteness and agency, agency and intentionality, and 
intentionality and efficacy.4 At the novel’s inception, therefore, resides a challenge to the white, 
bourgeois, decidedly human subjectivity that the genre would eventually epitomize. 
Early American novels largely followed two scripts: the gothic or the seduction. 
Although there were many other related types, including the picaresque and the sentimental, this 
pair dominated. Some have argued that gothic novels anxiously responded to the gap between 
Republican ideals and reality, particularly the real horror of chattel slavery.5 Sîan Silyn Roberts, 
however, critiques this “guilt thesis,” arguing that the “symptomatic reading,” in which “social, 
political, and racial Others” become gothic horrors, elides the “‘generic obligation’” to elicit 
fear.6 That is, such analyses subjugate form to history. In turn, the seduction narrative 
purportedly reveal anxieties about sympathetic identification, about how the new American 
                                                      
the genre. More recently, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse have argued in Novels in 
the Time of Democratic Writing that the genre did not aim “to produce a comprehensive 
perspective” of American life (13), but instead “link[ed] alternative and often incompatible 
perspectives in a composite view” (14). Thus, the early form’s heterogeneity was linked to its 
social and political environment. I expand Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s argument to consider 
how nonhumans like yellow fever influenced the genre as well. On the relationship between 
social inequalities and the genre, the gap between democracy’s promise and reality, see Julia A. 
Stern, Plight of Feeling, and Teresa A. Goddu, Gothic America. 
4 Jeffrey Rubin-Dorsky, “The Early American Novel,” 6. While scholars have tackled the 
relationship between yellow fever and race, yellow fever and the Haitian Revolution, and even 
the Haitian Revolution and the novel (see Gretchen Woertendyke, “Haiti and the New-World 
Novel”), yellow fever, the Haitian Revolution, and the novel have yet to be fully analyzed 
together. 
5 See, for example, Fiedler, Love and Death; Davidson, Revolution and the Word; Goddu, Gothic 
America; and, Stern, Plight of Feeling. 
6 Roberts, Gothic Subjects, 21, emphasis in original. 
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democracy would cohere as a social body.7 Yet, recalling Roberts’s reminder, the seduction 
narrative also operated via a strict, scripted, didactic logic: those whose actions challenged 
cultural norms, including rakes and fallen women, were disciplined. As Nina Baym argues, plot 
rather than character “defined the form” of the early American novel”: a good plot and good 
novel were one where “all events…cohere[d].”8 Regardless of what these two, overlapping forms 
“revealed” about early American culture, they functioned—and grew incredibly popular—
through infinitely replicable plots and typological characters. 
This chapter, however, argues that yellow fever and black revolution disrupted these 
familiar formulas. As nonhuman and purportedly non- or subhuman agents, they challenged the 
relationship between white humanity and agency and, even more precisely, between 
intentionality and efficacy. They exposed the myth of clear causes and calculable effects, 
undermining the very premise of plot, character, and gothic and didactic denouements. In 
Charles Brockden Brown’s yellow fever novels, Arthur Mervyn; or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 
and Ormond; or, The Secret Witness, the disease and black rebels divorce plot from white 
agency and character from accessible interiority. Both novels transform into a series of effects 
with no traceable causes—plots without character, as white Americans imagined yellow fever 
and the Haitian Revolution. Brown’s novels do not pull back the curtain to reveal the villain’s 
machinations as a good gothic novel should, but instead expose the myth of an exclusively white, 
human, intentional, and effective agency—including that of the author himself. 
In turn, Leonora Sansay’s novels, Secret History; or, The Horrors of St. Domingo and 
Laura, attempt to submit yellow fever and black agency to the discipline of form and plot. 
                                                      
7 See, for example, Elizabeth Barnes, States of Sympathy. 
8 Baym, Novels, Readers, and Reviewers, 71. 
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Whereas Secret History minimizes yellow fever’s presence in the Haitian Revolution, Laura 
minimizes black agency in its yellow fever plot. These rebellious agents prove too disruptive for 
her seduction narrative’s didactic plotting, so Sansay eliminates one and then the other to 
conform. If Brown’s novels record characters without interiors, plots without human drivers, and 
causes that do not add up to effects, then Sansay attempts to control such chaos by compelling 
conventional plots that excise potential sources of rebellion.  
Though their novels differ, both Brown and Sansay demonstrate how nonhuman and 
purportedly nonhuman agents transformed the central concerns of the American novel at its very 
inception. Amitav Ghosh has argued that the modern novel’s form—its emphasis on the 
individual, the quotidian, and its concealment of the exceptional—contributes to the imaginative 
paucity that allows climate change to go unchecked. To tarry with the exceptional “risk[s] 
banishment to…‘the Gothic, ‘the romance,’ or ‘the melodrama,’” to “‘fantasy,’ ‘horror,’ and 
‘science fiction.’”9 Brown’s and Sansay’s novels may predate the decidedly “modern” novel that 
Ghosh critiques, but they reveal an exceptional nonhuman seed planted at its incipience: the 
experience of illness—the experience of the nonhuman and, as disability studies reminds us, of 
being culturally constructed as non- or subhuman. By focusing on disease in the form most 
closely aligned with modern humanity, we can begin to unravel how the category of the human 
maligns both human and nonhuman variation.10 
 
                                                      
9 Ghosh, The Great Derangement, 24. 
10 Though my argument is limited, cleaving to some of the era’s most exceptional, most 
frequently criticized works, my hope is that my emphasis on plot and character can and will be 
applied to other early American novels, even those without explicit references to yellow fever, 
including Adventures of Jonathan Corncob (1787), Constantia Neville (1800), Monima, or the 
Beggar Girl (1803), and Margaretta (1807). 
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Yellow Fever and Race 
 Unlike smallpox and syphilis, yellow fever is an arbopod disease, a virus transmitted by a 
mosquito vector. Aedes aegypti contracts the virus from an infected human or primate during a 
blood meal and passes the virus to susceptible humans or primates during other blood meals. 
Every stage of this transmission cycle requires precise conditions in order to be successful: first, 
A. aegypti must be present (and imported to nonnative locales like the Americas); second, for A. 
aegypti to thrive, the weather should be hot and humid, and there should be ample breeding 
grounds in the form of water vessels like wells, cisterns, and casks, rather than swamps, as other 
mosquitoes prefer; third, in the absence of sylvan yellow fever, or endemic primate repositories, 
the virus must be introduced from Africa or the Caribbean (the slave trade first introduced 
yellow fever to the New World and was the primary source of early Republican epidemics); 
finally, the herd immunity, whether on board a ship or in a port city, must be sufficiently low to 
ensure the chain of infection. Thus, an epidemic or pandemic yellow fever required the most 
precise choreography or intra-action of human and nonhuman actors.11 
 As Philadelphia’s famous climatist and contagionist debates dramatized, however, early 
Americans did not fully understand the disease’s etiology.12 Instead, throughout the new United 
                                                      
11 This information is collated from a number of scientists and medical and environmental 
historians. For the former, see Thomas P. Monath and Pedro F. C. Vasconcelos,“Yellow Fever,” 
and Monath and Alan D. T. Barrett, “Pathogenesis and Pathophysiology of Yellow Fever.” On 
the latter, see J.R. McNeill, Mosquito Empires, and Kiple and King, Another Dimension to the 
Black Diaspora, chap. 2, which provides readable descriptions of yellow fever’s mechanisms. 
For popular science accounts, see Dorothy Crawford, The Invisible Enemy, 21-27, and Deadly 
Companions, 118-24. 
12 Early American etiological debates, particularly of Philadelphia’s 1793 epidemic, have been 
widely studied. See, for example, Thomas Apel, Feverish Bodies, Enlightened Minds; Simon 
Finger’s The Contagious City, chap. 8; and, for perhaps the most famous take on the political 
stakes of the debate, see Martin S. Pernick, “Politics, Parties, and Pestilence.” Additionally, 
Stephen Shapiro’s Culture and Commerce implies that the importationist debates were also tied 
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States and the Caribbean, many associated yellow fever with race. Though early apologists 
justified slavery by arguing that Africans were better able to toil in the hot weather of the South 
and West Indies than indigenous and white peoples, by the end of the eighteenth century, 
apologists, scientists, and lay people alike began to believe that black people were inherently or 
racially immune to specific diseases like yellow fever and malaria.13 Even if they contracted 
yellow fever they seemed to experience a more benign disease and rarely died. 
 Yet scientists and medical historians have had a harder time identifying physical evidence 
for racial resistance to yellow fever. Many scholars take this immunity or refractoriness as fact: 
Arno G. Motulsky and Kenneth Kiple and Virginia Himmelsteib King have suggested that there 
must be a genetic component to black immunity, arguing that resistance persisted after the end of 
the transatlantic slave trade and environmental immunity, while others like Philip Curtin have 
argued that exposure to disease in childhood, which would have been more benign, sometimes 
even asymptomatic, could account for differential morbidity and mortality between races. 
Additionally, exposed housing, difficult labor, and the inability to move freely—say, to the 
North to escape the pestilence, as many whites of means did—could all have contributed to early 
and perhaps unrecognizable exposure and resistance to yellow fever.14 
 Still, all of these arguments take refractoriness as a given, presumptively searching for a 
physiological or environmental explanation. Mariola Espinosa, however, argues that the 
historical evidence these medical historians and scientists employ is incomplete and biased. 
Black people may not have contracted the disease less frequently or more benignly; rather, white 
                                                      
to shifting attitudes on trade. Pernick and Phillip Gould, “Race, Commerce, and the Literature of 
Yellow Fever,” also discuss the impact of trade on this yellow fever epidemic and its debates. 
13 McCandless, Slavery, Disease, and Suffering, 134. 
14 See Motulsky, “Metabolic Polymorphisms”; Kiple and King, Another Dimension to the Black 
Diaspora; Curtin, “Epidemiology and the Slave Trade.” 
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medical professionals might not have noticed, not recorded, or simply ignored their cases and 
suffering.15 Some Africans and African creoles were genetically immune or resistant to some 
malarial strains, but there remains no clear evidence for a genetic resistance to yellow fever.16 
 Yet in the early white Republican imagination, yellow fever was bound to both black 
bodies and black revolutionary agency, to enslaved people, free Philadelphians, and the rebels in 
Saint-Domingue. In the aftermath of the 1793 epidemic, white Americans like Matthew Carey 
accused Philadelphia’s free black population of exploiting their purported immunity and white 
susceptibility to extort exorbitant prices for nursing, removing dead bodies, and digging graves. 
17 
While Absalom Jones and Richard Allen, free black ministers, contested Carey’s account of 
black immunity and treachery, many white Americans persisted in associating yellow fever with 
race, especially during the Haitian Revolution. Philadelphia’s contagionists believed that Saint-
Dominguans were the source of the city’s 1793 epidemic, but even climatists, who believed the 
disease generated from local conditions, cited rotting Saint-Dominguan coffee as a potential 
origin.18 
                                                      
15 See Andrea Stone, Black Well-Being, and Sharla M. Fett, Working Cures, both for how white 
medical institutions legitimated black enslavement, and for how free and enslaved black people 
resisted the disciplinary mechanisms of white medical authority. 
16 For a thorough historiography of how medical historians have almost universally ascribed to 
the belief in black genetic immunity, and why this belief is invalid, see Espinosa’s “The 
Question of Racial Immunity to Yellow Fever.”  
17 See Carey’s “A Short Account.” Jones and Allen published a rebuttal, “A Narrative,” that 
detailed how many black people had suffered during the epidemic and yet still assisted their 
black and white brethren. For an overview and reading of Carey and Jones and Allen’s debate, 
see Gould, “Race, Commerce, and the Literature of Yellow Fever” and Shapiro, Culture and 
Commerce,  295-96, which argues that the black community’s response to the epidemic was 
strategic; it could serve as an especially persuasive piece of evidence for legal and moral 
arguments against the Fugitive Slave Act, even as such black benevolence could be used to 
shield runaway slaves. 
18 Gould, “Race, Commerce, and the Literature of Yellow Fever,” 65. 
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Moreover, many historians have argued that yellow fever played a pivotal role in the 
Haitian Revolution (1791-1804): it ravaged British troops who had been assisting white creoles 
against the gens de couleur, the free mixed race population, between 1794-98, and utterly 
destroyed French troops and Napoleon’s New World ambitions between 1802-1804.19 By one 
estimate, yellow fever killed between 60-70% of French troops in Saint-Domingue.20 General 
Charles Leclerc himself, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, died of the disease. As Silva describes, the 
influx of Europeans lowered the herd immunity in port cities and camps where the troops were 
concentrated, creating the perfect conditions for a pandemic. 
Africans and African creoles in Saint-Domingue and Southern ports, as well as white 
refugees, were certainly more immune to yellow fever than European soldiers and northern early 
Republicans, but this was because of environmental exposure not genetic resistance. Moreover, 
if African creoles—Haitian or American—were more resistant than white creoles, it was only 
because they were unable to flee to colder climes or to send their children to Europe to be 
educated (thus avoiding early exposure). But while slavery provided a compelling reason to link 
yellow fever to blackness and the Haitian Revolution, it is also true that the rebellion drove 
Europeans to the West Indies and West Indians to North America, setting in motion a circum-
Atlantic pandemic. Black people were not genetically immune or resistant, but the Haitian 
Revolution indelibly linked yellow fever to black revolutionary agency. 
                                                      
19 On yellow fever’s role in the Haitian Revolution, see McNeill, Mosquito Empires, chap. 7, and 
Silva, “Republic of Medicine.” For thorough histories of the disparate events of the Haitian 
Revolution, including Britain’s occupation and relationship with white creoles, and Leclerc’s 
deadly expedition, see Jeremy D. Popkin, A Concise History, and Laurent Dubois, Avengers of 
the New World. On the end of Napoleon’s New World empire, including the relationship 
between the Haitian revolution and the Louisiana Purchase, see David Geggus, “The Louisiana 
Purchase and the Haitian Revolution,” which offers a useful historiography of the topic, and 
Ashli White, Encountering Revolution. 
20 McNeill, Mosquito Empires, 259. 
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Yet other historians, including Michel-Rolph Trouillot, have criticized white historians 
for overemphasizing yellow fever, and, thereby, minimizing black loss of lives, black military 
prowess, and, ultimately, black agency in the Revolution’s outcome.  Like critics of the “germ 
theory of history,” Edward E. Baptish argues that locating the Haitian Revolution in biological 
forces like yellow fever exculpates Europeans’ role in disease morbidity and mortality and 
delegitimizes black power and agency.21 Interestingly, J.R. McNeill has modified these positions, 
claiming that Toussaint L’Ouverture and Jean-Jacques Dessalines sought to use “the power of 
the rainy season,” and, thus, yellow fever, strategically as an “ally” in the fight against European 
slavery and colonial power.22 In this formulation, nonhuman agency does not necessarily 
dehumanize or deanimate humans; rather, humans and nonhumans worked in concert. 
In a study of early America, disease, and a disease particularly linked to black people and 
bodies, it is important to remember that both yellow fever and black people were considered non 
or subhuman. As Joan Dayan describes of the French colonies’ Code Noir, “Legally, their being 
was ‘a being-for-others,’ and their civil status, that of things,” alternating between a “movable 
asset” and “garbage.”23 Their “only rights and duties…are those shared in society by beasts and 
objects” (204). Nicholas T. Rinehart, however, has argued that enslavement did “not operate by 
treating slaves as things—objects, commodities, goods,” but by “treating them as persons who 
could suffer.”24 Even if black Americans were not considered non- or subhuman, black 
experiences in the new world challenged early modern paradigms of identity, autonomy, and 
                                                      
21 See pp. 5-6 on “the germ theory of history.” See Edward E. Baptish, “Hidden in Plain View,” 
which examines the Haitian Revolution’s historiography, including how yellow fever has 
functioned in this history. 
22 McNeill, Mosquito Empires, 261, 262. 
23 Dayan, Haiti, History, and the Gods, 203, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
24 Rinehart, “The Man That Was a Thing,” (35). 
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even humanity. Monique Allewaert introduces the “parahuman” to explain enslaved humanity. 
They were “not legally or conceptually equivalent to human beings, while at the same time not 
being precisely inhuman. They were thus beside the human.”25 Parahumanity was not just a 
colonial ideology of disempowerment and disenfranchisement; rather, Allewaert argues that 
black Americans were empowered “by staying in parahumanity,” by staying in relation to 
fragmented bodies, animals, ecologies, and objects and, thus, resisting colonial definitions of 
identity, autonomy, and humanity (98). Like L’Ouverture allying with microbe, yellow fever and 
black rebels challenged the colonial ideologies that enabled both the white human and the novel: 
agency, intentionality, autonomy, interiority, and accessibility. 
 
Arthur Mervyn: A Plot without Character 
 Widely considered the father of the American gothic, Charles Brockden Brown watched 
his close friend, Dr. Elihu Hubbard Smith, die of yellow fever during New York’s 1798 
epidemic. Soon he contracted the disease as well. After these tragedies, in a “feverish two-year 
period,” he composed Arthur Mervyn, part one (1798), Wieland (1798), Ormond (1799), Edgar 
Huntly (1799), and, finally, Arthur Mervyn, part 2 (1800). 26 Published two years apart, Arthur 
Mervyn’s two sections have been described as “practically two independent works.”27 The first 
part opens with Dr. Stevens, who finds the eponymous protagonist dying of yellow fever on the 
streets of Philadelphia. As Arthur recovers, he recounts his life: expelled from his home by an 
unscrupulous stepmother, he had travelled to Philadelphia to make a living. There, however, he 
                                                      
25 Allewaert, Ariel’s Ecology, 6, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
26 Goddu, Gothic America, 32. On Smith and Brown’s relationship, see Bryan Waterman, 
Republic of Intellect, chap. 5. 
27 Loshe, The Early American Novel, 44. 
 120 
fell in with a confidence man and libertine, Thomas Welbeck. When Welbeck killed a man and 
seemed to kill himself, Arthur returned to the country. Yet yellow fever beckoned him back to 
the city, where he promptly contracted the disease. The second part follows Arthur as he tries to 
right Welbeck’s wrongs, save his own reputation, and ascend the social ladder. Jane Tompkins 
has argued that the second half provides the rational, sentimental solution to the corrupt, 
gothicism of part one, but others have argued that the novel coheres through its consistent 
concern with early Republican dangers, including commerce, slavery and racism, and print 
culture.28  
As Davidson has contended, criticism of the novel’s ambiguities—is Mervyn telling the 
truth? How and why does he look like multiple characters? How are the first and second parts 
connected?—has sought “a totalizing reading that largely resolves ambiguities and 
inconsistencies through explanation, judicious evasion, or, more often, by recourse to some 
overriding ideology that ‘makes sense’ of difference.”29 She argues that “the author resolutely 
refuses to delimit his intentions,” but here her own “overriding ideology” is too humanist (355). 
Arthur Mervyn’s structure—the nesting of stories within stories within stories—challenges the 
relationship between agency and white, human subjectivity. The novel shows how nonhuman 
and purportedly nonhuman agencies—yellow fever and black rebels—power a plot without 
accessible subjectivity or interiority, erasing Arthur’s bourgeois subjectivity and interiority in the 
                                                      
28 Tompkins, Sensational Designs, chap. 3. On commerce, see Goddu, Gothic America, chap. 2; 
on commerce and slavery, see Gould, “Race, Commerce, and the Literature of Yellow Fever”; 
Carrol Smith-Rosenberg, “Black Gothic”; Sean X. Goudie, “On the Origin of American 
Specie(s)”; and Shapiro, Culture and Commerce, chap. 6. On print, see Louis Kirk McAuley, 
“Periodical Visitations.” On how narrative functions as prophylactic in addition to danger, see 
Waterman, “Medical Repository.” 
29 Davidson, Revolution and the Word, 348-49, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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process. Ultimately, these aberrant agencies undermine the genre’s focus on the protagonist and 
his heroic plotting. 
 It is notoriously difficult to summarize Arthur Mervyn’s plot, but an important thread is 
Vincentio Lodi’s story. Lodi is a young Guadeloupean planter who dies of yellow fever in 
Philadelphia, unwittingly bequeathing his money, narrative, and identity to Welbeck, the novel’s 
villain. Though Welbeck promises to help Lodi’s sister, Clemenza, he actually seduces and 
impregnates her. In fact, Welbeck only saves Arthur, because he looks exactly like Lodi and, 
thus, could serve the con. When Welbeck shoots and kills another man, he reveals this past and 
the real Lodi’s story: 
His father’s name was Vincentio Lodi. From a Merchant at Leghorn, he had changed 
himself in to a planter in the Island of Guadeloupe. His Son, had been sent, at an early 
age, for the benefits of education to Europe. The young Vincentio was, at length, 
informed by his father, that, being weary of his present mode of existence, he had 
determined to sell his property, and transport himself to the United States. The son was 
directed to hasten home, that he might embark, with his father, on this voyage.  
 The summons was cheerfully obeyed. The youth on his arrival at the Island found 
preparation making for the funeral of his father. It appeared the elder Lodi had flattered 
one of his slaves with the prospect of his freedom, but had, nevertheless, included this 
slave in the sale that he had made of his estate. Actuated by revenge, the slave 
assassinated Lodi in the open street and resigned himself, without a struggle, to the 
punishment which the law had provided for such a deed.30 
                                                      
30 Brown, Arthur Mervyn, 92-93, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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Lodi’s narrative condenses the novel’s abiding attention to the relationship between the West 
Indies, slavery, yellow fever, and the early Republic, but this relationship is complicated through 
its narrative structure: the frame tale.31 
At first, Arthur Mervyn seems to be Dr. Stevens’s transcription of Arthur’s oral 
testimony. Teresa A. Goddu describes part one as “a series of framed narratives”: Stevens 
(Arthur (Welbeck)).32 She argues that Stevens ultimately controls Welbeck’s “gothic narrative” 
through “his enlightenment frame” (46). In turn, the second part reveals that the novel is actually, 
“Arthur’s version of Steven’s narrative of Arthur’s oral autobiography” (47): Arthur (Stevens 
(Arthur (Welbeck))).33 Yet Goddu misses what Lodi’s story reveals: Welbeck is never the center 
of the frame. 
Rather, the frame centers the unnamed slave, who kills Lodi for denying his promised 
liberty: Welbeck (Lodi, Jr. (Lodi, Sr. (unnamed slave))). Inside Welbeck’s story is Lodi’s, and 
inside Lodi’s is his father’s, and inside his father’s is the unnamed slave—a nonhuman human 
and an agential thing. This matryoshka’s heart, therefore, interrogates agency. If black people 
were without agency, subjectivity, or humanity, as racist and pro-slavery discourses maintained, 
then how could they rebel, fight for liberty, and understand and meet the repercussions of the law 
as Lodi’s slave does? Or, to put it another way, if black slaves act, possess interiority, remember 
promises, and exact justice, then how can they be things or property? By killing Lodi, Sr., the 
man refuses not just his status as transferable property but also the inextricable relationship 
between agency and white humanity. 
                                                      
31 On this nexus of concerns, see, especially, Shapiro, Culture and Commerce, chap. 5, and 
Goudie, Creole America, chap. 6. 
32 Goddu, Gothic America, 46, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
33 Goddu, Gothic America, 47, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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 At the heart of the novel, therefore, is an agent that should not be but that nonetheless 
powers the plot. Without him, Lodi, Jr., would not have returned to Guadeloupe, would not have 
inherited his father’s wealth, would not have contracted yellow fever and died. In turn, Welbeck 
would not have sheltered Arthur, and Arthur would not have felt compelled to correct Welbeck’s 
injuries in the second part. Welbeck, telling Lodi’s story, claims the unnamed man was 
motivated by revenge, but we never access his unmediated story or interiority—only the effects 
of his actions. Thus, the novel becomes a series of causes and effects without motivation or 
intention—or without accessible motivation and intention, a plot without character. The 
unnamed slave challenges the relationship not only between agency and white humanity but also 
between white human interiority and narrative. 
 Yellow fever similarly compels the novel without accessible reason or rationale. In her 
network-theory analysis, Stacey Margolis argues that though critics have used the metaphor of 
contagion to explicate the novel, Brown never represents the disease as contagious—or, at least, 
does not consistently represent the disease as contagious. Instead, yellow fever is simultaneously 
“invisible” and “hypervisible”; though it spread in random, disordered ways, its symptoms are 
unavoidably manifest. Ultimately, she contends, there is no “dark, hidden agency” that explains 
the relationships between characters, the plotting, or yellow fever’s spread, no conspiracy 
“governed by individual intention and comprehended by individual knowledge”—only senseless 
movement and unpatterned networks.34 While Margolis denies Brown a contagionist position, 
Sari Altschuler forwards a more qualified reading, arguing that Arthur Mervyn represents both 
climatist and contagionist positions but “resists aligning itself with either side of the medical 
                                                      
34 Margolis, “Network Theory,” 353, 351. 
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debate.”35 “[D]welling in uncertainty,” she argues, “produces the feeling of disease in Brown’s 
reader,” placing them in the uneasy, unclosed position and perspective of illness (76). Margolis 
and Altschuler may disagree on Brown’s intentions, but they and I agree on its effect: an 
uncertain and senseless plot that resists reason and logic. The feeling that this plotting produces 
is not only that of illness, as Altschuler contends, but that of the nonhuman—both of being made 
non- or subhuman by illness and of the nonhuman that produces illness. Like the unnamed slave, 
yellow fever drives the plot even though we cannot access its intentions or desires, its character.  
In this way, the novel yokes yellow fever to black agencies—first, through the Lodi 
family’s aborted genealogy. Whereas a black man kills the elder Lodi, yellow fever claims the 
younger. If we collapse the characters, as their shared name begs, then the relationship between 
black rebels and yellow fever becomes clearer: nonwhite and nonhuman agents not only affect 
and effect, but through that affecting and effecting radically undermine white supremacy. Both 
yellow fever and the unnamed, rebellious slave imperil the Lodi family, disassociating agency 
from whiteness and narrative from white humanity. And if Arthur himself recalls Lodi through 
their “uncanny resemblance,” then yellow fever and the unnamed slave imperil Mervyn’s 
narrative—the novel—as well.36 After all, Lodi’s death introduces yellow fever to the plot, 
linking yellow fever to the West Indies (albeit to Guadeloupe rather than Saint-Domingue).37 
                                                      
35 Altschuler, The Medical Imagination, 76, hereafter cited parenthetically.  
36 Goudie, Creole America, 187. 
37 Perhaps Lodi is Guadeloupean rather than Saint-Dominguan to mitigate the contagionist 
position and complicate the novel’s medical position, as Altschuler argues. Interestingly, White 
argues in Encountering Revolution that white Americans perceived Guadeloupe’s transition from 
slavery to freedom as “relatively smooth” (111), demonstrating the importance of “white 
consensus” in cultural stability (112). Yet, as Dayan points out, Guadeloupe’s restoration of 
slavery in 1802 lost French General Leclerc an alliance with Saint-Dominguan General 
Dessalines, losing the entire colony (150-51). 
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Second, Arthur Mervyn conjoins yellow fever and black rebels in the famous mirror 
scene. After his disastrous encounter with Welbeck, Arthur quits Philadelphia for the bucolic 
Hadwin farm, but yellow fever beckons. Reversing the course of those fleeing the epidemic, 
Arthur hastens to the city to return Lodi’s fortune and find Susan Hadwin’s missing paramour, 
Wallace. When Arthur finds Wallace, he is nearly dead, mutated by yellow fever into a cold, 
pulseless “object” (147). As Mervyn turns from this man-made-object, he peers into a mirror and 
sees “a human figure” or an “apparition” in the glass, thinking “that the dying man had started 
from the bed” (148). Instead, Arthur actually sees a large, scarred man “with tawny skin,” who 
promptly knocks him unconscious (148). Both Sean X. Goudie and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg 
read this scene as a gothic interrogation of race and class in the making of the early Republic. 
Stephen Shapiro suggests that this black man could be a runaway slave, his violence a rational 
reaction to Arthur, who acts like a slave-catcher when he breaks into the house during the 
epidemic.38 Thus, as Goudie, Smith-Rosenberg, and Shapiro argue, this mirror scene asks the 
reader to perceive the black man and Arthur as reflections of each other, as intertwined and 
constitutive as chattel slavery and the new United States 
What these readings elide, however, is that the reflection also includes Wallace—a man-
made-object by yellow fever and, thus, yellow fever itself. Moreover, when Arthur peers into the 
mirror he himself is already undergoing yellow fever’s “work of corrosion and decomposition,” 
having “imbibed” the seeds of the disease while searching for Wallace (144). Like Wallace, 
Arthur will soon be dying of –objectified by—yellow fever. When he awakes from the black 
man’s blow, he discovers that he has been stuffed into a coffin, prematurely but suggestively 
                                                      
38 Goudie, Creole America, 189-90; Smith-Rosenberg, “Black Gothic,” 254-55. Shapiro, Culture 
and Commerce, 295-96. 
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classified as dead, an inanimate corpse, thing, or object. During the extraordinary circumstances 
of the epidemic, the reflection collapses these characters, lateralizing and even conflating the 
bourgeois upstart Mervyn, the black man, and the disease. Yellow fever, therefore, not only 
imperils Mervyn’s narrative or the novel’s plot but also his very identity and character. 
The mirror scene is reflected and refracted in the pivotal stagecoach sequence in the 
novel’s second part. In this scene, Arthur travels to Baltimore to make amends for Welbeck’s 
crimes. As he rides the coach, he analyzes his travelling companions, “a sallow Frenchman from 
Saint Domingo, his fiddle-case, an ape, and two female blacks” (370). He watches the Saint-
Dominguan hum and yell at the ape, the ape eat an apple, and the black women “gaze[] with 
stupid wonder, and an exclamatory La! La! upon the passing scenery” and “chatter[] to each 
other in a sort of open-mouthed, half articulate, monotonous, and sing-song jargon” (370). 
Goudie argues that Mervyn uses “racist ethnological discourse to frame the scene,” transforming 
into a bourgeois natural historian under Dr. Stevens’s tutelage.39 Waterman similarly contends 
that the scene proves “a natural history diorama,” in which Mervyn “catalogs and categorizes 
these others without ever throwing himself into the mix, creating for himself a sense of critical 
attachment.”40 While the black women “observe” the ape, and Mervyn observes them, Mervyn 
believes that they “are unable to comprehend or articulate what they see” (237). Both Goudie and 
Waterman argue that this scene pointedly highlights anxieties about race, including the 
Republic’s indebtedness to slavery and the contagious threat of Saint-Domingue’s slave 
rebellion.41 
                                                      
39 Goudie, “On the Origins,” 75. 
40 Waterman, “Medical Repository,” 237, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
41 On commercial anxiety, slavery, and this scene, see Goddu, Gothic America, chap. 2. On the 
relationship between these anxieties and the West Indies more broadly, see Woertendyke, “Haiti 
and the New World Novel”; Smith-Rosenberg, “Black Gothic”; and Goudie, Creole America, 
 127 
 Arthur may frame this scene, but nothing is at its center. Though Arthur observes like a 
natural historian and racist ethnographer, we never gain access to his conclusions: 
As to me my thought was busy in a thousand ways. I sometimes gazed at the faces of my 
four companions, and endeavored to discern the differences and samenesses between 
them. I took an exact account of the features, proportions, looks, and gestures of the 
monkey, the Congolese, and the Creole-Gaul. I compared them together, and examined 
them apart. I looked at them in a thousand different points of view, and pursued, untired 
and unsatiated, those trains of reflection which began at each change of tone, feature, and 
attitude. [emphasis in the original] (370) 
If, as critics have argued, Arthur partakes in a dehumanizing scientific observation, why does he 
not theorize about “the differences and samenesses” or draw any conclusions about what he 
sees? When he begins to consider what might happen in Baltimore, he decides, “I will not 
describe my dreams. My proper task is to relate the truth. Neither shall I dwell upon the images 
suggested by the condition of the country through which I passed. I will confine myself to 
mentioning the transactions connected with the purpose of my journey” (371). In this scene, 
then, the reader observes Arthur observing, but does not learn his scientific conclusions, 
impressions of the scenery, or “dreams” about the future. Though Bill Christopherson argues that 
Arthur’s “singular presence…unifies the novel,” he also admits that the novel “threatens to 
become a tale told by several idiots, signifying nothing.”42 At the heart of this scene, just as at 
                                                      
chap. 5. For more on how white Americans reacted to white Saint-Dominguan refugees, a 
reaction that ranged from charity to skepticism, see White, Encountering Revolution; James 
Alexander Dun, “(Mis)reading the Revolution”; and Alfred N. Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on 
Antebellum America, chap. 2. 
42 Christopherson, Apparition in the Glass, 88. 
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the heart of Lodi’s tale, is a character who acts without interiority, who observes without 
concluding—a plot without character. 
 Though Mervyn’s scientific gaze is objectifying whether he draws any conclusions or 
not, his evacuated interiority actually conflates him with rather than distances him from his 
travelling companions. On the one hand, the correlation of the black women and the ape, enabled 
by adjectives like “open-mouthed” and “half articulate,” is overtly racist, foreshadowing the way 
nineteenth-century apologists would use science to define black people as “subhuman” and 
thereby justify slavery. On the other hand, Arthur’s missing interiority, his silent monologue, 
aligns him with the women who talk but are not understood (by Mervyn and the reader at least), 
who act and effect but are not known. Like the reflection that lateralizes a white man, a black 
man, a diseased man, and yellow fever, this stagecoach scene begins to collapse into Mervyn’s 
lateralizing list of uknowable agents—“a sallow Frenchman from St. Domingo, his fiddle-case, 
an ape, and two female blacks” (370). Ian Bogost argues, “Lists remind us that no matter how 
fluidly a system may operate, its members nevertheless remain utterly isolated, mutual aliens.”43 
When Mervyn’s observations prove empty, he too joins this list of “mutual aliens.” As critics 
have argued, Arthur’s interiority, morality, and truth are as opaque to us as the women’s are to 
him. In fact, at least one critic has argued that Mervyn himself is the novel’s true villain.44 
Ultimately, he remains an alien to us.  
 At the end of this scene, Mervyn rejects hypotheses, inferences, and dreams, dedicating 
himself to his “proper task”—“the truth” (371). The truth, he christens, is “transactions”: 
                                                      
43 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 40. 
44 See James R. Russo’s “‘Chameleon of Convenient Vice’” and Patrick Brancaccio’s “Studied 
Ambiguities.” For a quick overview of the literary debate on Mervyn’s reliability, see Davidson, 
Revolution and the Word, 339-40. 
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observing his companions, the women chatting with each other, the ape eating an apple, the 
Saint-Dominguan yelling at the ape, the fiddle case housing the fiddle. In this way, he privileges 
action and interaction rather than interiority and intentionality. The Royal Society’s rules for 
natural historians may have warned against overly confident assertions of hypotheses and 
deductions, but they also emphasized the natural historian himself. Without his authenticity and 
credibility, the genre could not succeed.45 While Stevens claims, “the face of Mervyn is the index 
of an honest mind,” Arthur has misled and lied to him (229-30).46 What the novel and especially 
the stagecoach scene reveals, then, is transaction without interiority, or action, interaction, and 
intra-action without an accessible and effective intentionality. The novel, therefore, represents a 
plot without character. 
 While Baym has argued that plot was far more important to early novel readers and 
reviewers than character, Arthur Mervyn demonstrates something finer—that plot does not need 
character. Causes and effects do not require intentional agents with accessible interiority—the 
restricted domain of white humans at the time. Instead, yellow fever and black rebels—
nonhuman, subhuman, parahuman, or, at the very least, not white humans—impacted real lives 
and real stories. The novel does not seem to argue that enslaved people and disease do not have 
interiority or intentionality; rather, their interiorities and intentionalities are as opaque as the 
eponymous hero’s. Arthur Mervyn recognizes that agency is not limited to white humans, that 
yellow fever and black rebels affected material lives and literary genres, but Arthur remains the 
titular protagonist. Thus, it is not my argument that Brown intended to explore aberrant agencies, 
but that these aberrant agencies nonetheless shaped his first novel. 
                                                      
45 See chap. 1, pp. 34-39, on the Royal Society and natural historical form. 




Ormond: A Novel without an Author 
 Yellow fever dominates the first half of Arthur Mervyn, but it is far less pervasive in 
Ormond; or, the Secret Witness. While the disease similarly enables Ormond’s plot, it fails to 
follow any etiological or symbolic logic. Christopherson asserts that yellow fever represents a 
“comprehensive vision of evil.”47 Yet, though sometimes contagious and deadly, the disease is 
also liberating, relieving, “false social pressures,” including sociability and commercialism.48 
The  narrator, Sophia Westwyn, avers, “none can tell whether this destructive pestilence was, on 
the whole, productive of most pain or most pleasure.”49 Thus, in Ormond, yellow fever signifies 
inconsistently, failing to conform to its more conventional tropes as gothic horror or didactic 
punishment.50  
 Like Arthur Mervyn, Ormond’s plot is difficult to pin down: Constantia Dudley is 
impoverished by a confidence man and a gullible father, but she steers her family through 
destitution and epidemic through thrift and hard work. When the titular Ormond enters the text, 
he at first seems a savior to Constantia, curing her father’s blindness, remunerating their debts, 
and offering stimulating conversation. Yet the novel quickly reveals his villainy. Despite already 
keeping a mistress, he desires Constantia as well, whether she accepts his advances or not. 
Again, like Arthur Mervyn, characters are doubled and tripled; almost every character looks and 
acts like another. Whereas Arthur Mervyn’s reflections delegitimate the interiority that ground 
                                                      
47 Christopherson, Apparition in the Glass, 63 
48 Robert A. Ferguson, “Yellow Fever and Charles Brockden Brown,” 299. 
49 Brown, Ormond, 94, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
50 Criticism of both of Brown’s yellow fever novels usually center the disease as a gothic 
convention: on Brown’s canon, see, for example, Loshe, The Early American Novel, 44-50, and 
Fiedler, Love and Death, 133-42; on Arthur Mervyn, Goddu, Gothic America, chap. 2; and, on 
Ormond, Stern, Plight of Feeling, chap. 4. 
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exclusionary definitions of agency, character, and novelization, Ormond’s doubling empowers, 
aligning and allying those who refuse to meet the villain’s white male standards—yellow fever, 
Constantia, her revolutionary double, Martinette, and the black Saint-Dominguans she recalls. 
Allied with its doubles, yellow fever resists Ormond’s machinations, his belief that his intentions 
are necessarily effective. The disease challenges the novel’s emphasis on the singular, 
eponymous, plot-driving character—and, thus, the singular, plot-driving author—and instead 
emphasizes complicated yet vital human-nonhuman intra-action. 
 Though Enlightenment principles inform both Arthur Mervyn and Ormond, yellow fever 
proves an irrational, unmappable adversary.51 The novel initially seems to position fear and 
irrationality as the source of disease and death. In turn, rationality functions as prophylactic and 
cure for the Dudley’s poverty and yellow fever.52 When Whiston, the Dudleys’ neighbor, 
discovers that his sister has developed symptoms of yellow fever, he flees the city and leaves her 
to die, “allow[ing] his terrors to overpower the sense of what was due to his sister and to 
humanity” (74). Though the country should have been safer, he soon develops the disease. A 
family, too terrified of contagion to help, watches as he dies alone, driven mad by thirst. They 
soon die too. Both Whiston and the family die—seem to be punished—because they allow their 
irrational fear of contagion to sever their filial and social bonds.  
Likewise, fear of the disease rather than the disease itself kills Baxter, the husband of 
Constantia’s friend and washerwoman, Sarah. Awakened one night by a strange light emanating 
from his French neighbor’s house, Baxter creeps from his home and climbs the partition to peer 
                                                      
51 On rational individualism in Arthur Mervyn and contractualism in Ormond, see, for example, 
Roberts, Gothic Subjects, chaps. 1 and 2. See also Stern, Plight of Feeling, chap. 4, on sensibility 
and fellow feeling in Ormond. 
52 See Maureen Tuthill, Health and Sickness in the Early American Novel, chap. 4, on the 
relationship between rationality and health in the text. 
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into the adjacent yard. Baxter voyeuristically watches his neighbor inter a body, a body he 
assumes is dead of yellow fever. His “teeth chattered” at the terrifying thought of “how near he 
might now be to the source of infection” (91). Although “caution had hitherto availed 
him…[n]ow, through his own inadvertency, he had rushed as he believed into the jaws of the 
pest” (92). The narrator closes this scene with its lesson: “His case may be quoted as an example 
of the force of the imagination” (93). Thus, between these two scenes, Brown seems to argue that 
those who allow their fear to overpower their reason, whose emotional disequilibrium compels 
them to abandon their sentimental ties, will be punished. Though the narrator offers a mechanical 
explanation—“panic” ripens “the seeds of this disease” already planted (93)—Brown’s narrative 
metes out narrative justice by killing men who act irrationally and reprehensibly. 
Two points, however, mitigate this symbolic logic: Constantia, the novel’s exemplar of 
rationality, contracts the disease, and Dudley, the most fearful character after Whiston, does not. 
Although the novel has carefully crafts and even champions Constantia’s supreme rationality, we 
learn that she lapses: she “judged like the mass of mankind from the most obvious appearances, 
and was subject, like them, to impulses which disdained the control of reason” (70).53 And 
although she attempts to quarantine her body and mind from poisonous miasmas, she “found it 
vain to contend against the inroads of sadness,” and soon “the grave seemed to open for her 
reception” (82). Maureen Tuthill argues, “Constantia illustrates how strategic thinking and 
temperate behaviors can accentuate good health”; while she “is not immune to anxiety…she 
manages it through continual effort.”54 Yet even the most rational character in the novel cannot 
properly protect herself from yellow fever.  
                                                      
53 On Constantia’s rational education, see, for example, Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds, “Private 
Property.” 
54 Tuthill, Health and Illness, 90, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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Moreover, Dudley, the most terrified member of the household, neither dies nor even 
contracts the fever. Despite wildly expounding on the family’s inevitable doom—“it will surely 
reach us at last, and then, whither shall we fly? For the rich, the whole world is a safe asylum; 
but for us, indigent and wretched, what fate is reserved but to stay and perish? If the disease 
spare us, we must perish by neglect and famine” (65)—Dudley somehow survives the epidemic. 
Tuthill implies that Dudley avoids the infection by choice, that his earlier ailments were a 
“calculated” ruse designed to “relinquish him from the responsibility of self-care without 
completely destroying his health” (94). Still, this does not explain how the most fearful character 
evades the pestilence. If, according to the logic divulged in Whiston’s, Baxter’s, and even 
Constantia’s cases, disease breads through fear, Dudley should be utterly ravaged by yellow 
fever, probably even dead of it. If health is a choice reducible to a person’s rationality, Dudley, 
certain that he will be “the next victim,” has effectively thrown a welcoming party for the 
disease’s generation. And if rationality really rules health and the text, the novel’s medical and 
textual logic shouldn’t unravel as completely as they do in Dudley’s case.  
In Ormond, therefore, it is not that yellow fever is “patternless,” as Margolis argues about 
Arthur Mervyn; rather, Brown creates a pattern but does not apply it evenly. Elsewhere Brown 
clearly uses disability to punish villainy: Dudley’s alcoholism is disciplined by blindness.55 In 
this logic, Dudley should die, and Constantia should never even contract the disease. Yet yellow 
fever, however, provokes both “pain” and “pleasure” (94). It is not Christopherson’s 
“comprehensive vision of evil,” and, thus, cannot neatly serve as narrative justice. Rather, it 
disrupts Dudley’s and Constantia’s characterization, the novel’s symbolic economy, and the plot 
                                                      
55 Christopherson argues that Dudley’s blindness actually punishes incest. Apparition in the 
Glass, 59-61. 
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itself. When Sophia, the narrator, concludes this portion of the tale, she claims, “Such is the 
motley and ambiguous condition of human society, such is the complexity of all effects, from 
what cause soever they spring” (94). She foregrounds “human society,” but her emphasis on 
palpable causes and unknowable effects speaks to yellow fever’s inaccessible presence in the 
historical moment and in the text itself. Like Arthur Mervyn, which recognizes that action, 
movement, and plot do not require a liberal, bourgeois intentionality, Ormond acknowledges that 
effects can rarely be traced to their causes. Yellow fever is not necessarily irrational, but Brown 
cannot submit the disease to his rationale—to the constraints of the gothic and didactic 
disciplinary mechanisms, nor to the genre itself.  
Ormond, the text’s undeniable villain, refracts this ideology. Though he admits the limits 
of human intentionality, he also actively manipulates situations, others, and his race in order to 
control and deliver his desired outcomes: 
A mortal poison pervaded the whole system, by means of which every thing received was 
converted into bane and purulence. Efforts designed to ameliorate the condition of an 
individual were sure of answering a contrary purpose. The principles of the social 
machine must be rectified, before men can be beneficially active. Our motives may be 
neutral or beneficent, but our actions tend merely to the production of evil. (127) 
As critics have noted, this passage and Ormond’s general character seem to reflect many of the 
anxieties of the new Republic, including tensions between the social contract and a diverse 
population and liberty and equality.56 Ormond, however, also probes intentionality: things tend 
towards “evil” regardless of human “motives.” Whereas the text emphasizes yellow fever’s 
“complexity of effects,” Ormond argues that a particularly human definition of agency—
                                                      
56 See, for example, Roberts, Gothic Subjects, chap. 1. 
 135 
intentionality—is ineffectual; intentions and consequences rarely align. In this way, Ormond not 
only perverts early Republican ideals but also devalues human agency. 
 Yet, even though Ormond rejects the concept of “good intentions” and, thereby, the 
concept of intent in toto, he conspires to manipulate, control, and dominate others. He  
aspired to nothing more ardently than to hold the reins of opinion, --to exercise absolute 
power over the conduct of others: not by constraining their limbs or by exacting 
obedience to his authority, but in a way of which is subject should be scarcely conscious. 
He desired that his guidance should control their steps, but that his agency, when most 
effectual, should be least suspected. (180) 
Ormond, therefore, seeks to exert his agency by both dominating others and hiding that very 
domination. He does not want to use violence or commands but subtlety, so that the dominated 
believe they remain the masters of their own actions, agents with intentionality and purpose. On 
the one hand, his logic is contradictory: a belief in the limits of human intentionality would seem 
to contradict such a profound faith in one’s own agency. On the other hand, a belief in the 
general limits of human intentionality does not necessarily impair one’s own sense of 
exceptionalism. As a villain, it comes as no surprise that Ormond thinks himself above the law, 
even his own. Ormond does not personify yellow fever, as Christopherson argues. Rather, both 
are variations on a central theme. 57 Whereas yellow fever disrupts the relationship between 
rational, traceable causes and effects, Ormond disrupts the relationship between a particularly 
human intentionality and efficacy—except where he’s concerned. 
 The villain, however, is also doubled in his purported sister Martinette. Until the end of 
the novel, Martinette compels Ormond’s plot in largely invisible ways, buying the Dudley’s flute 
                                                      
57 Christopherson, Apparition in the Glass, 68. 
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and burying the body that terrifies Baxter to death. When she and Constantia finally meet, she 
reveals her backstory over a series of interviews, describing action in the American and French 
Revolutions and her role in Baxter’s tale. Constantia questions how she was able to find “shelter” 
in the aftermath of her father’s death, when “‘the fear of infection would have shut’” all doors 
against her (208). Martinette responds,  
“Hast thou forgotten that there were at that time at least ten thousand French in this city, 
fugitives from Marat and from St. Domingo? That they lived in utter fearlessness of the 
reigning disease,--sung and loitered in the public walks, and prattled at their doors, with 
all their customary unconcern? Supposest thou that there were none among these who 
would receive a countrywoman, even if her name had not been Martinette de Beauvais? 
Thy fancy has depicted strange things; but believe me that, without a farthing and without 
a name, I should not have incurred the slightest inconvenience.” (208) 
She explains that the city was full of French and Saint-Dominguan refugees who were unafraid 
of yellow fever and, thus, hospitable to strangers (unlike the family that watches Whiston die). 
French creoles may have been immune to the disease from prior infection in the West Indies, but 
French metropolitans were likely as susceptible as most Republican Americans. Still, fleeing 
Saint-Dominguans’ resistance may have given rise to the belief that “Frenchmen were exempt 
from this disease,” as Baxter maintains while watching Martinette bury her father (87). Thus, 
Martinette not only reflects Ormond’s hidden agency but also assumes Saint-Dominguan 
immunity and identity, condensing yellow fever and the Haitian Revolution as well. 
 Yet this Saint-Dominguan identity exposes the limits of her revolutionary fervor. Though 
Martinette fights in both the American and French Revolutions, “kill[ing] thirteen officers at 
Jemappes,” and though she thrills at Robespierre’s death and her return to the Revolution, her 
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“love of liberty” does not extend to Saint-Domingue, or, at least, to black Saint-Dominguans 
(206). Not only does Martinette obviously know about the Revolution, blending in with its white 
refugees, but she even briefly stops in the colony on her way to fight in the American 
Revolution. And while the Haitian Revolution had not yet begun, a stop in the most infamous 
New World slave colony en route to combat colonial tyranny pointedly highlights her hypocrisy 
(not to mention the American Revolution’s). Most importantly, like Lodi in Arthur Mervyn, 
Martinette’s life and livelihood is supported by slavery, by her adoptive father’s Guyanese 
plantation and “fortune” (204). Both her liberty and her love of liberty are predicated on black 
bondage. Shapiro suggests that Martinette may be a mixed-race woman, who kills and buries her 
master rather than her father (or master-father), hiding runaway slaves in her retinue and thus 
secretly aiding the revolutionary cause.58 Shapiro’s argument is compelling, but it does not 
necessarily change mine. If we read Martinette as white, she not only fails to join the Haitian 
Revolution—a glaring absence for a self-described “adorer of liberty” (205)—but also survives 
through the stolen liberty of others. If we read her as mixed-race, as Shapiro suggests, she 
assumes a white, Saint-Dominguan identity. In either case, she paradoxically doubles and 
condenses Ormond, the Haitian Revolution, and yellow fever. 
While Martinette’s fortune and freedom is powered by slavery (regardless of whether she 
is white or mixed race), Ormond explicitly appropriates black identities, dressing in black face, 
changing his dialect, and posing as a chimney sweep in order to infiltrate the Dudley home. Julia 
A. Stern argues that Ormond “profits from assuming the (negative) power of blackness.”59 His 
“racial cross-dressing, while affording the libertine a certain social invisibility, paradoxically 
                                                      
58 Shapiro, Culture and Commerce, 287-88. 
59 Stern, Plight of Sympathy, 213, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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enables his unlimited access to the private sphere; the very property that makes blackness a 
liability can also prove a source of intimate knowledge about white culture” (215). Ormond 
assumes black agency, all the more potent because the culture assumed it was a non-agency. 
 Although Brown compels the reader to see Martinette and Ormond as parallel, 
particularly in their use of false identities, gender disrupts this similarity. In particular, it is 
important to remember that Martinette is a woman, who like black Americans and black Haitians 
fought for rights in a system that refused her any. Thus, while Ormond appropriates the 
“(negative) power of blackness” to pass as a non-person, the better to dominate, Martinette never 
poses as black. Instead, she appropriates the decidedly positive power of masculinity, cross-
dressing in order to fight in the Revolutions. Moreover, Shapiro argues that she also appropriates 
the positive power of whiteness—the direct inverse of Ormond. Martinette’s freedom may or 
may not be predicated on slavery, she may or may not be mixed race, and she may or may not 
have supported the Haitian Revolution; nonetheless, the text aligns this complex, contradictory 
character with those black agents who rejected their culture’s script, claiming the freedom and 
agency that the culture denied them. In this way, Martinette recalls yellow fever’s ambiguity, its 
capacity to induce both “pain” and “pleasure.” Yellow fever and black rebels may undermine her 
revolutionary characterization and expose her hypocrisy, but they also suggest more potent 
alliances than her manipulative brother. After all, both enable her to survive the epidemic. 
 To make things even more complex, Martinette also proves a double for the novel’s 
heroine, Constantia. When Constantia first meets Martinette, she finds herself transfixed by the 
woman’s similar appearance. Sophia, our narrator, presumes that Constantia was “unconscious 
of this resemblance,” but she also claims that it was this uncanny similarity that “influence[d]” 
the heroine to “reverence” (98). As Constantia listens to the revolutionary’s life story, she learns 
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that they also share an abnormally masculine education. Though she is also “sensible” of “all the 
differences between them,” she imputes these differences to “diversities of situation,” nurture 
rather than nature (192). But when Martinette reveals that she has killed at least thirteen people, 
Constantia realizes, “The likeness which she had feigned to herself was no longer seen. She felt 
that antipathy was preparing to displace love” (207). With her ardor waning, Constantia decides 
that she and Martinette are nothing alike. 
Yet Constantia grows more rather than less like her martial double in the remainder of the 
novel. When her father suggests a move to Europe, Constantia claims, “her mind had undergone 
the most signal revolution” (211). Primed by Martinette’s revolutionary tale, Constantia thrills at 
the prospect of discoursing “with nature in her most august forms, with men in diversified states 
of society, with the posterity of Greeks and Romans, and with the actors that were now upon the 
stage” (211). In other words, Constantia is excited to close the gap between her and Martinette’s 
“diversities of situation” (192). And while Constantia never takes this trip with her father, she 
does end the novel by travelling to Europe, but only after she has grown like Martinette in a 
more dangerous way—through murder. 
 Ormond and Constantia’s tale closes with a duel. Even though she’s rebuffed Ormond’s 
advances repeatedly, he does everything in his power to claim her: first, he convinces Craig to 
kill Dudley, removing her father as an impediment to their consummation; then, when Sophia 
proves yet another obstacle, hiding Constantia from his licentious grasp, he discovers her hiding 
place. In the novel’s final scene, Ormond determines to take what she will not give freely, 
arming himself with his phallus and the threat of rape—“an evil worse than death” (274). 
Constantia, however, wields a penknife and kills Ormond. When Sophia finally arrives on the 
scene, Constantia explains, “‘My stroke was desperate and at random. It answered by purpose 
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too well…His heart was pierced, and he sunk, as if struck by lightning, at my feet” (274). Her 
attack might have been “desperate” and “random,” the odds stacked against her, but 
righteousness was on her side. As in the didactic novels of the time, the heroine survives, while 
the villain dies. 
Ormond may or may not have raped Constantia successfully, but he does succeed in 
objectifying and dehumanizing her. Roberts argues that Brown’s description of Constantia—
“Her hands were clasped on her breast, her eyes fixed upon the ceiling streaming with tears, and 
her hair unbound and falling confusedly over her bosom and neck” (272)—suggests that Ormond 
actually has raped her. While Roberts reads this scene as an American commentary on British 
paradigms of purity, it also highlights how Ormond transforms Constantia into something not 
entirely human—at first, an object of lust, and, eventually, an inhuman murderer like Martinette. 
Roberts argues that Brown disciplines Constantia for refusing to creolize, that she becomes what 
she abhors as punishment. Yet her objectification also keeps her alive. She does not rely on 
human intentions and domination like Ormond. Instead, her efficacy is disassociated from her 
intentions, the causal “stroke” “desperate” and “random.” 
 Following the likenesses and doubles in any of Brown’s novels is a Herculean feat, but, 
in Ormond, the chain of connections that coalesces in the final scene—Constantia, Martinette, 
yellow fever, and the black rebels of the Haitian Revolution against Ormond, himself a double 
for Constantia, Martinette, yellow fever, and even blackness—functions similarly to Lodi’s tale 
and the stagecoach scene in Arthur Mervyn. Constantia and Ormond condense the same 
agencies, but while Ormond maintains the efficacy of his subjectivity and his white male 
intentionality by manipulating others, Constantia’s disconnect between intentions, cause, and 
effect aligns her with those aberrant agents that similarly challenged rational plots and accessible 
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character. Ormond’s death demonstrates the lesson that he fails to apply to himself—that 
“human” intentionality is limited, an unsatisfactory foundation for “agency” in a world where 
women murder, things rebel, and epidemics fail to signify. If Arthur Mervyn challenges the 
relationship between white humanity and agency, then Ormond’s doubling, tripling, and 
quadrupling of characters suggests that intra-action powers and empowers character and 
narrative. In this way, both Arthur Mervyn and Ormond undermine the thrust of the author’s 
intentionality that charges most literary scholarship. Brown’s intentions certainly existed, but 
that does not mean they were effective, does not mean that other agents, including yellow fever 
and black rebels, did not also shape his novels 
 
Secret History: A Novel that Erases Yellow Fever to Save Form 
 
 Leonora Sansay’s yellow fever novels attempt to redress this formal quagmire, 
submitting those very same agents to the disciplinary mechanisms of form. Of all the texts 
gathered here, Secret History most explicitly grapples with the events of the Haitian Revolution. 
Whereas Brown’s Arthur Mervyn is set at the beginning of the Revolution, Secret History takes 
place in its closing moments between 1802-1804. After Toussaint L’Ouverture fought alongside 
the Royal French forces to repel the alliance between white creoles and the British, and after 
Napoleon rose to power, L’Ouverture declared himself the Emperor of Saint-Domingue. Though 
he did not formally declare independence from France, he drew up a constitution and encouraged 
white refugees to return to their plantations to begin rebuilding the shattered economy—a call 
that the Secret History’s protagonist, Clara, her refugee husband, St. Louis, and her sister, Mary, 
answer when they return to the island. In turn, Napoleon assembled “one of the greatest overseas 
military efforts any European power had ever undertaken” under the direction of his brother-in-
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law, General Leclerc, whose mission was to capture L’Ouverture, quash resistance, and reinstate 
slavery.60 Although Leclerc succeeded in seizing L’Ouverture, yellow fever ravaged the French 
troops, killing Leclerc and some 35,000-45,000 of his men.61 Of course, even more French men 
died at the hands of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, L’Ouverture’s more violent replacement as leader 
of black Saint-Dominguans. Sansay’s novel charts this moment in the Haitian Revolution and its 
aftermath, depicting Leclerc’s death and his replacement by General Rochambeau, a man known 
for throwing lavish parties as the colony crumbled and for using starving dogs to kill black 
rebels.62  
Yet Secret History spends the least time on yellow fever of all the texts gathered here. 
Instead, the novel largely follows Clara’s unhappy marriage to St. Louis, as recorded by her 
sister, Mary, in a series of letters to Aaron Burr. 63 Clara escapes from St. Louis and Haitian 
creole life, tracing the circum-Atlantic rim where she eventually reunites with her sister before 
returning to Philadelphia. In Secret History, yellow fever is largely present by its conspicuous 
absence (like the Haitian Revolution in Ormond)—an absence made all the more perplexing 
given Sansay’s historical context and form. 
                                                      
60 Jeremy D. Popkin, A Concise History, 119. Though there is debate on when Napoleon decided 
to reinstate slavery—before or after Leclerc left for Saint-Domingue—his intention was clear by 
October 1802, when Leclerc promised freedom to the already freed population as payment for 
fighting for the French. See Dubois, Avengers of the New World, chaps. 11 and 12.  
61 McNeill, Mosquito Empires, 258-59. 
62 See Popkin, A Concise History, and Dubois, Avengers of the New World, for this history. 
63 Sansay’s affair with Burr is infamous and probably over determines how her work is read. 
Dayan argues about Laura, “Cheated of marriage to one who was her lover as well as 
mentor…Laura’s sad story is Leonora’s own, and is also the story of the narrative of Secret 
History” (169-70). Sansay herself invited this reading, for as Drexler argues, she “leveraged her 
relationship with Aaron Burr” through the novel, “converting what for her had become a 
potentless patronage into something of value” (“Introduction” 32-33). The genre of the secret 
history applies not only to Madame Leclerc and General Rochambeau’s scandals in Saint-
Domingue but also to Sansay’s own with Burr.  
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As many scholars have acknowledged, Sansay’s Secret History resists generic 
description. Brown himself placed it in the “History” section of his magazine; Elizabeth 
Maddock Dillon reads it as a particularly creole novel; Roberts emphasizes the “almost dizzying 
confluence of generic registers,” including “the captivity narrative, the Barbary narrative, and the 
epistolary novel”; Gretchen Woertendyke argues that it is a “secret-history-as-novel,” straddling 
the two genres.64 Sansay’s work includes vestiges of a literary past, such as the secret history’s 
emphasis on political history’s scandalous truths, even as it strains toward the newer codes of the 
didactic novel. Still, Michael Drexler argues that debate on Secret History’s genre “has been a 
cause for critical disinterest in the particularity of the text itself.”65 Secret History’s particulars, 
including its absent particulars like yellow fever, are not antithetical to an analysis of form but 
constitutive contributors. 
In particular, Sansay attempts to discipline the aberrant agencies that challenged Brown’s 
novels—yellow fever and black rebels—through form. The secret history genre demanded 
historical and political verisimilitude, while the novel demanded didactic lessons. Yet yellow 
fever, associated with black liberty and white destruction, proved too dangerous and disruptive 
for the narrative to control. Her text cannot contain and tame their lesson: that black rebels were 
on the righteous side of history. Thus, in order to save form, Sansay eradicates yellow fever 
entirely, both as an historical phenomenon and as a literary symbol. Whereas Brown’s novels 
undermine white, human intentionality, including that of the author, Sansay’s attempts to 
reaffirm the figure of the intentional and effective writer through the disciplinary mechanisms of 
                                                      
64 Dillon, “The Secret History”; Roberts, Gothic Subjects, 251; Woertendyke, “Romance to 
Novel.” Additionally, Henri Petter includes it in his study, The Early American Novel, describing 
it as “picturesque,” “martial,” “romantic,” and even a “tourist guide” (377-78) 
65 Drexler, “Brigands and Nuns,” 184. 
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form. Still, this same affirmation nonetheless exposes a how yellow fever ruptured the early 
novel’s formal seams. 
Yellow fever is largely but not entirely absent from the text. In Mary’s very first letter, 
she explains, “Clara has had the yellow fever. Her husband, who certainly loves her very much, 
watched her with unceasing care, and I believe, preserved her life, to which however she attaches 
no value since it must be passed with him” (63). Despite yellow fever’s omnipresence in Saint-
Domingue, these two sentences constitute the text’s entire meditation on the subject. They seem 
to function to foreshadow the text’s primary concern: the gothic state of Clara and St. Louis’s 
marriage. To Mary, the marriage seems perfect. St. Louis cares for Clara, and his careful 
attention saves her life. Yet Clara would rather die than continue living with St. Louis. Initially, 
therefore, yellow fever functions sentimentally, allowing the lover to care for the loved (replayed 
in Laura), but the representation quickly turns gothic, revealing a marriage worse than 
pestilence. While any illness could suffice, yellow fever was particularly associated with the 
emergent American gothic, as Brown’s earlier novels suggest.66 Moreover, it was an historically 
accurate disease, an important value of the secret history genre. That is, Sansay strategically 
employs yellow fever as a gothic and historical vehicle, unmasking the sentimental scene of 
illness and the sentimental marriage itself. 67  
Despite Sansay’s use of the disease, and despite the pervasive connections between 
yellow fever and the Haitian Revolution, she never explicitly links black Saint-Dominguans to 
yellow fever. Instead, she links black rebels to the environment:  
                                                      
66 Despite actually dying of yellow fever, Sansay’s Leclerc dies of a “fever” (69). 
67 Similarly, Roberts argues that Sansay uses the extreme setting of the Revolution to explore 
how marriage functions as a gothic household; Clara and Mary’s incessant movement at the end 
of the novel suggests an alternative to the domestic model of the home. Gothic Subjects, chap. 2. 
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The negroes have felt during ten years the blessing of liberty, for a blessing it certainly is, 
however acquired, and they will not be easily deprived of it. They have fought and 
vanquished the French troops, and their strength has increased from a knowledge of the 
weakness of their opposers, and the climate itself combats for them. Inured to a savage 
life they lay in the woods without being injured by the sun, the dew or the rain. A negro 
eats a plantain, a sour orange, the herbs and roots of the field, and requires no cloathing, 
whilst this mode of living is fatal to the European soldiers. The sun and the dew are 
equally fatal to them, and they have perished in such numbers that, if reinforcements do 
not arrive, it will soon be impossible to defend the town. (73-74) 
This passage regurgitates one of the retroactive justifications of slavery—that the environment 
was better suited to black over white people, an argument also applied to differential disease 
morbidity and mortality. Moreover, by claiming that “the climate itself combats for them,” 
Sansay foreshadows those historians who would emphasize yellow fever’s role in the Haitian 
Revolution, seemingly incapable of recognizing black agency in the outcome.  
Though yellow fever would seem a logical extension of the “climate,” particularly during 
the time, it is conspicuously absent. Sansay explicitly cites the sun, dew, and food as allies in the 
war, she fails to mention yellow fever, understood to be at least partially environmental, as 
Philadelphia’s debate between contagionists and climatists highlighted. Moreover, before early 
Americans understood disease vectors and immunity, they believed “that the native-born enjoyed 
immunity because they were accustomed since birth to tropical heat and humidity, while the 
‘unacclimated stranger’ was highly vulnerable because he had not yet adapted to the climate.”68 
Yellow fever was conflated with the local climate—hence the moniker “stranger’s disease. If 
                                                      
68 Jo Ann Carrigan, “Yellow Fever: Scourge of the South,” 63. 
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Sansay knew the disease’s historical context (its omnipresence during the revolution, particularly 
at the moment of Leclerc’s death, recorded in the text) and employed the disease elsewhere for 
gothic effect, then why is yellow fever missing here, where it could also function historically and 
gothically? 
She erases yellow fever where its inclusion would seem most logical and narratively 
functional, because it exposes too dangerous a lesson about white fantasies about Saint-
Domingue. In the same letter that she claims, “the climate itself combats for them,” Mary 
fantasizes about a pre-Revolution life, where the rebelling slaves  
were reduced to order…where I should repose beneath the shade of orange groves; walk 
on carpets of rose leaves and frenchipone; be fanned to sleep by silent slaves, or have my 
feet tickled into extacy by the soft hand of a female attendant…to wander over flowery 
fields of unfading verdure, or through forests of majestic palm-trees, sit by a fountain 
bursting from a savage rock frequented only by the cooing dove… (73) 
As Drexler maintains, “Mary temporarily yields to Creole fantasy,” finding herself “seduced by 
the object of their collective desire: a return to slaveholding and luxurious ease.”69 Dayan, 
however, suggests that Mary’s “sentimental idyll of plantation life” derives from the material 
circumstances of the Revolution.70 By fall of 1803, the French were circumscribed to Le Cap, “a 
piece of land about two miles long,” blocked “by the English at sea and the blacks on land” 
(152). Thus “imprisoned in one area of Le Cap,” Sansay “can only imagine what she does not 
know” (158). Mary fantasizes about a prelapsarian immersion in the environment, underwritten 
and enabled by chattel slavery. This fantasy, however, erodes when the letter reveals that the 
                                                      
69 Drexler, “Brigands and Nuns,” 190. 
70 Dayan, Haiti, History, and the Gods, 158, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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environment refuses to naturalize black bondage and white plenitude, and instead works in 
concert with black rebels to overthrow white oppression. Revolution rather than bondage 
becomes “natural” and right—a terrifying lesson for a white American writer. 
  As the following letter demonstrates, Sansay represses yellow fever because its lesson is 
too damning and disruptive to the novel’s form. Mary recounts a duel between a French officer 
and a creole planter. The newly arrived French officer mistakenly addresses the creole’s wife as 
citoyenne, the moniker applied by all good Republicans to other citizens after the French 
Revolution. She is offended, her husband intervenes, and the French officer challenges him to a 
duel. After a spat about weapons (the officer wants to use a rifle, to which the husband retorts 
that he would fight with a canon), “the officer fired without effect. Monsieur C---, with surer aim 
laid his antagonist lifeless on the ground” (78). Though the riff on weapons reads as a humorous 
criticism of the performative masculinity that undergirds the duel, a consistent point of criticism 
for Sansay, the duel seems to properly punish the impudent party, the French officer—impudent 
not only in carelessly addressing a woman but also by presuming to simply transfer French codes 
of conduct to the Creole situation.71 Sansay would seem to emphasize the latter when Mary 
writes, “the Europeans are so insolent that a few such lessons are absolutely necessary to correct 
them” (78).  
Yet the sentence before paradoxically expounds, “On what trifles depends the destiny of 
man!” (78). Here, “trifles” and “lessons,” two antithetical positions on the duel’s resolution, are 
fused together in a single phrase. In the first half, Mary could be lamenting the duel itself—that 
something as silly as a word should lead to a man’s death, or that something as serious as death 
                                                      
71 Hence, Dillon argues in “The Secret History” that the novel is particularly focused on the 
creation of a creole identity and culture. 
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should be decided by a game of chance. In both, “trifles” and “destiny” are ironically 
counterpoised for “destiny” boils down to coincidence, a misplaced word and a stray bullet. Yet 
the next line directly contradicts this reading for Mary applies a “lesson”: the duel punishes the 
French officer, teaching him and the reader that Creole life is fundamentally different from 
French life. The duel, therefore, would seem to confirm Dillon’s argument that the novel is 
particularly interested in Creole social reproduction: the scene strives to consider the difference 
between the French and the creoles, exacerbated by the war. Furthermore, Mary’s recourse to 
both “trifles” and “lessons” suggests both the impossibility and the necessity of making sense of 
the insensible, of gleaning a “lesson” from chaos, especially during an era of Revolutions. 
However, this duel and its logic of “trifles” and “lessons” also help to explain yellow 
fever’s conspicuous absence. First, yellow fever’s etiology and epidemiology were 
unfathomable. The high numbers of European deaths from yellow fever and the comparatively 
low morbidity of African and African creoles, who had either been born in spaces of endemic 
yellow fever or whose suffering was invisible to whites, would have heightened the disease’s 
mystery. In other words, the disease seemed “trifling”—its spread, morbidity, and mortality as 
illogical, irrational, and coincidental as in Ormond.  
Second, then, is what yellow fever would seem to teach. If the duel instructs the French 
on the creoles, then yellow fever, associated as it was with race and climate, would seem to 
deliver a lesson on the black Revolution to white, would-be masters. According to didactic logic, 
in which the righteous prevail and the villains perish, extensive white mortality should remind 
white creoles that they were the evil in this particular narrative—that the black rebels were on the 
right, perhaps even predestined side of history. While Sansay, through Mary, is sometimes 
sensitive to the plight of the free and freed black Saint-Dominguans—“The negroes have felt 
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during ten years the blessing of liberty, for a blessing it certainly is” (73)—Secret History 
ultimately prohibits yellow fever’s revolutionary “lesson.” 
Early novels were overtly didactic, instructing readers on cultural dangers and right 
conduct—all the more important considering how the form was initially vilified. Yet, when 
Secret History erases yellow fever rather than owning up to its lessons, the form’s didactic logic 
ruptures. While Brown’s novels undermine the intentional, effective author, Sansay attempts to 
recuperate this figure in Secret History. By expunging yellow fever from the historical and 
generic record, however, the novel inadvertently reveals just how much the disease and the 
Haitian Revolution shaped the early form. 
 
Laura: A Novel that Erases Black Agents to Save Form 
Sansay’s novel, Laura, published only a year after Secret History, faces the same 
dilemma, but solves it differently. After the eponymous Laura is orphaned, she meets a young 
man, Belfield, who surreptitiously courts her. Her stepfather wants her to marry another man, but 
she runs away and consummates her relationship with Belfield. In the midst of this ardor, her 
lover contracts yellow fever, and she nurses him to health. After an estrangement—Belfield 
hides her in a brothel where she’s accosted—the pair decide to wed. Yet on the day of their 
nuptials, Belfield enters a duel to save Laura’s honor and dies. Laura survives, but she is never 
happy again. Though Laura’s plot is more overtly didactic and sentimental than Secret History—
the preface declares its goal “to promote virtue” (156)—Laura operates via an inverse logic. 
Whereas Secret History foregrounds the Haitian Revolution at the expense of yellow fever, 
Laura foregrounds yellow fever at the expense of that vexing aspect of the Haitian Revolution, 
black agency. Laura’s genre, the sentimental seduction novel, compels a particular kind of 
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plotting that makes yellow fever narratively pliable—if, and only if, black bodies and agencies 
are evacuated. 
 In Laura, the yellow fever plot complicates the seduction narrative, transforming both 
Laura and Belfield into sympathetic and even virtuous (if somewhat naïve) lovers. Though the 
pair have been illicitly interacting (and copulating) for some time, yellow fever affords Laura the 
narrative space to demonstrate her virtue—critical to a heroine of the genre. When Belfield fails 
to visit her country retreat for a number of days, Laura rushes to Belfield’s rescue, helping 
strangers along the way. In some of the novel’s most gothic scenes, which recall Brown’s 
pestilential cityscapes, Laura witnesses a woman crying for water in the street as her baby 
unsuccessfully tries to suckle, howling dogs, starving cats, and gravediggers carting not-yet-dead 
people to the grave, people who were “tearing their hair with frantic gestures and painful shrieks, 
endeavoring to escape from the vehicle where they were forcibly detained” (179). She eventually 
finds Belfield, “abandoned…to the care of a negro” by his friends (177), struck down by the 
fever, “pale and exanimate” (179). His “sallow cheek confessed the direful touch of disease,” 
and his “inflamed eyes rolled with an expression of wildness in their hollow orbits, and rested on 
Laura without giving a sign of recognition” (179). Slowly, however, Belfield’s health returns 
through Laura’s care. Yellow fever allows Laura to demonstrate her worth and allows Belfield to 
appreciate that worth: her “unbounded…devotion,” “the ardor of that attachment which had 
rendered her unmindful of danger when attending him in his illness,” and “the purity of her 
confidence” (180), proved to him that she was “no common object,” providing him the evidence 
necessary to decide that he should “call her his” through marriage (181). Yellow fever would 
seem to transform the seduction narrative into a sentimental plot, demonstrating Laura’s 
benevolence, swaying Belfield’s heart and ushering them on the righteous path—marriage.  
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 Though yellow fever does not immediately net their nuptials, it solidifies and seems to 
sanctify their relationship. According to Davidson, Belfield is a “seducer who is himself seduced 
by delusions,” who “embod[ies] the consequences of a fall more subtle than mere physical 
seduction.”72 Petter similarly contends that Laura both utilizes and critiques the underlying code 
of the seduction novel: “less regard is paid by society to genuine virtue,” like Laura’s expansive 
compassion in the yellow fever scenes, “than to its reputed absence,” her seduction.73 She “is a 
victim above all of the world’s shallow values and customs” (Petter 266). Laura’s yellow fever 
scenes, therefore, undermine the conventional plotting of the seduction novel by portraying 
Laura as truly virtuous, a real heroine rather than a superficially pure one. 
 If the novel, at least in the yellow fever scenes, undermines some of the tropes of the 
seduction novel, it closes with conventional didacticism in the form of a duel. When Belfield 
stows Laura in a brothel to hide their illicit love affair, a man named Melwood presumes she is a 
prostitute. As their twinned names foreshadow, the two men eventually meet, and Melwood 
remarks of Laura, “‘I have myself seen her only once at the house of an accommodating friend, 
who has, however, promised to procure me another interview’” (213). When Belfield tells him to 
not “trifle” with Laura’s name, Melwood boldly retorts, “‘I presume that I may mention the 
name of a girl at met at Mrs. W—s, in any manner I please!’” (213). Melwood challenges 
Belfield to a duel, and although Belfield initially resists, he ultimately decides that because he is 
the source of Laura’s shame, he must prevent “future attacks on her reputation” (216). He 
decides, “To die is nothing, but to live and suffer is dreadful. Eternal justice cannot have marked 
a being so fair for a destiny so cruel; all must end well. I will meet my fate without delay; and 
                                                      
72 Davidson, Revolution and the Word, 216-17. 
73 Petter, The Early American Novel, 266, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
 152 
then have peace,--be married and be happy” (216). Thus, Belfield enters into the duel not only 
because he must protect Laura, but also because he believes that Laura’s righteousness, her 
rightness will prevail against the villainous Melwood. “Eternal justice” is on his side, so “all 
must end well”—with marriage and happiness.  
All, however, does not end well for Belfield (nor for Laura). The duel itself is short, 
almost perfunctorily written: “The distance was measured; the parties took their stand; the word 
was given—they fired. Belfield bounced as if struck by and electric shock, and then fell flat on 
the ground” (218). But while this scene does not accord with Belfield’s notion of justice, it does 
accord with the seduction novel’s typology: Belfield seduced Laura. While he may represent a 
“humanized antagonist,” he remains the narrative’s villain, ruining Laura’s honor, and, thus, 
deserves to die.74 Likewise, Laura, by forfeiting her maidenhead, deserves to be punished as 
well. The story, therefore, neatly punishes its fallen protagonists as the seduction novel’s 
conventions require. The final line of the novel declares, “‘that perpetual uneasiness, disquietude, 
and irreversible misery, are the certain consequences of fatal misconduct in a woman; however 
gifted, or however reclaimed” (222). Unlike Ormond, where “the complexity of effects” cannot 
be untangled into certain causes, “fatal misconduct” necessarily leads to “certain consequences.” 
No matter what Laura or Belfield did—no matter how much yellow fever redeemed them—the 
plot was already scripted. 
 While Laura flirts with unconventional form, such as Laura’s courage and her survival 
(after all, she gets to live, albeit unhappily, unlike her more famous compatriot, Charlotte 
Temple), and Belfield’s complexity, the novel closes with the proper didactic lesson that the 
seduction novel requires. Unlike Secret History, which repressed yellow fever because its lessons 
                                                      
74 Davidson, Revolution and the Word, 216. 
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were too disruptive, Laura tames yellow fever by divorcing it from its relationship with black 
revolutionary agency. First, though this novel has some sense of transatlantic context—Laura’s 
parents are Irish and emigrate to the United States—it includes no references to Saint-Domingue 
or the West Indies. While this is not necessarily bizarre, it is strange given: how closely yellow 
fever and the West Indies, particularly Saint-Domingue, were connected at the time; the 
Philadelphia setting, which suffered epidemics in 1797, 1798, 1799, 1802, 1803, and 180575; and 
Sansay’s earlier novel, Secret History.  
Second, and, more importantly, the novel almost immediately erases the one black 
character it introduces. When Belfield falls ill, the narrator relates, “His friends, as was too 
generally the case, abandoned him to the care of a negro on the first appearance of the disorder, 
and left the city” (177). This line obviously draws upon both white and black experiences of 
yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1793: yellow fever severed the sentimental bonds that 
purportedly cohered early white Republican life, as black people, believed to be immune, 
stepped in to fill critical roles, including nurses and carters of dead bodies, as Brown describes in 
Ormond and Arthur Mervyn.76 When Laura finally finds Belfield after his absence, a “little negro 
boy who knew her opened the door,” probably the same “negro” that remained even as his 
friends abandoned him (179). As Belfield finally begins to recover, the narrator declares, “at 
length Belfield’s constitution, the skill of his physician, and the care of Laura prevailed” (180). 
Nowhere in this list is the “negro boy,” the only person besides Laura who did not abandon 
                                                      
75 Apel, Feverish Minds, 2. 
76 On how African Americans participated in the 1793 epidemic, see Gould, “Race, Commerce, 
and the Literature of Yellow Fever,” and Philip Lapansky,“‘Abigail, A Negress.’” See also pp. 
123-24 and note 17. 
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Belfield. The boy does not seem to be a narrative necessity; in fact, his complete absence could 
have heightened Belfield’s desperation, Laura’s benevolence, and the pair’s reunion.  
Instead, by introducing and abandoning the character, much as yellow fever is used and 
erased in Secret History, Sansay recalls the black people that circulated in Philadelphia’s 1793 
epidemic and the Haitian Revolution without impairing the novel’s need to make a lesson of 
Laura and Belfield’s romance. In other words, whereas Secret History erases yellow fever 
because it highlights black agency too pointedly, exposing too dangerous a “lesson” about white 
creole agency, Laura erases black agency from its depiction of yellow fever so that yellow fever 
might function to ensure proper narrative closure and justice. Yellow fever functions 
didactically, but it can only guarantee Laura’s generic conventions because it expunges 
subversive revolutionary black agency. 
 
Conclusion 
In the pandemic context of the Haitian Revolution, yellow fever and black rebels 
challenged definitions of agency—the relationship between clear causes and calculable effects, 
between intentionality and efficacy, between interiority and accessibility. In turn, they also 
challenged and shaped the genre most dedicated to these restrictive and normative relations. 
They disrupt Brown’s yellow fever novels, undermining plot and characterization as well as the 
figure of the intentional and effective author. Sansay’s novels attempt to redress such disruption 
by repressing yellow fever and then black agents through form, but even this repression belies 
the extent to which her novels and herself as a writer were shaped by the very agents she tries to 
discipline. Yellow fever and black revolutionaries planted insurrection—aberrant, inaccessible, 
nonhuman agency—at the very heart and inception of the American novel. 
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Though my argument is necessarily limited, the relationship between yellow fever and 
race would persist into the nineteenth century and even into nineteenth-century novels. Yellow 
fever ravaged the south in the antebellum years, but New Orleans’s 1853 epidemic was “the 
worst single epidemic ever to strike a major American city,” killing at least 9,000 people.77 By 
the middle of the nineteenth century, yellow fever had largely abandoned northern ports like 
New York and Philadelphia where it once wreaked havoc, transforming into a regional, Southern 
disease. It soon became a focal point in debates on abolition: apologists argued that white 
susceptibility to diseases like yellow fever required slavery, while abolitionists argued that 
yellow fever represented divine judgment for the gross sin of chattel slavery.78   
During the 1853 epidemic, however, black people seemed to contract the disease at 
unprecedented rates (to white Southerners at least).79 Apologists argued that only Northern black 
people contracted the disease because God was punishing them for their “‘attempt…to exist in 
climates and regions which are adapted to the organization of the white man.’”80 In turn, Dr. 
Samuel Cartwright, noted taxonomist of “drapetomania,” the disease that led black slaves to run 
away, argued that poor whites died more frequently during the epidemic than wealthier whites, 
because they had subverted “‘Nature’” and “‘the aristocracy of the white skin’” by doing the 
work more properly reserved for black slaves.81 As Philadelphia’s 1793 epidemic was 
memorialized in Brown’s novels and to a lesser extent Sansay’s, New Orleans 1853 epidemic, 
including its relationship to the Haitian Revolution, would be immortalized in works like  
                                                      
77 John Duffy, Sword of Pestilence, vii, 167. 
78 On yellow fever as a Southern disease, particularly in the context of debates over slavery, see 
Carrigan’s “Yellow Fever: Scourge of the South.” See also Chaplin, Anxious Pursuit, chaps. 3 
and 4., and Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land, This South, chap. 2. 
79 Kiple and King, Another Dimension, 44. 
80 Qtd. in Duffy, Sword of Pestilence, 144. 
81 Qtd. in Carrigan, “Yellow Fever,” 352. 
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Ludwig von Reizenstein’s The Mysteries of New Orleans and William Wells Brown’s Clotel; or, 
the President’s Daughter.82 
 Brown’s Clotel especially traces questions of yellow fever, black revolution and agency, 
and form. Written in 1853, Clotel describes yellow fever as integral to New Orleans as fog to 
London. Though the novel includes no explicit reference to the Haitian Revolution, its 
description of yellow fever is almost completely cribbed from John R. Beard’s The Life of 
Toussaint L’Ouverture, The Negro Patriot of Hayti, also published in 1853.83 Moreover, New 
Orleans itself was closely associated with Haiti. Many Saint-Dominguans fled and settled in 
Louisiana, a territory that the United States acquired in part because of the Haitian Revolution. 84 
Though Brown borrows from Beard, he changes one part, adding “The negro, whose home is in 
a hot climate, was not proof against the disease.”85 To Roberts this line “suggests that Brown 
consciously set out to dismiss the racist logic of autochthony and immunity,” to demonstrate that 
“differences between race break down at the level of the biological rather than inhere within 
                                                      
82 Although I do not have the space for close analysis, Reizenstein’s novel, written in German 
and unpublished in English until 2002, closely follows the experiences of German immigrants 
during New Orleans’ 1853 epidemic. In particular, Reizenstein characterizes yellow fever as 
punishment for slavery and envisions a biracial liberator christened Touissant L’Ouverture. The 
novel does not argue that black people are immune or especially resistant to yellow fever but 
instead suggests that the disease is as deeply an American problem as slavery, and that the health 
of the American body politic depends on extirpating the root cause, slavery. 
83 Roberts, Gothic Subjects, 157. Much of Clotel, in fact, is taken from other sources, including 
short stories, slave narratives, newspaper accounts, and Brown’s own autobiography (Roberts 
160). Moreover, Brown would republish Clotel with unique variations three more times by 1867. 
84 On the Louisiana Purchase, see note 19. Refugees did not begin to move to Louisiana and New 
Orleans in mass until 1809, after it had become clear that Saint-Domingue would never again 
become a slave colony under French rule. On migratory patterns and the Saint-Dominguan 
influence on Louisiana, see Nathalie Dessens, From Saint-Domingue to New Orleans, Paul 
Lachance, “Repercussions of the Haitian Revolution in Louisiana,” and White, Encountering 
Revolution. 
85 Brown, Clotel, 204. 
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it.”86 Thus, she argues, Clotel critiques antebellum America’s scientific racism “by 
reconstituting” the nation “as a single biological mass” (154). Yet yellow fever, historically 
associated with blackness as Brown’s amended plagiarism highlights, also contributes to that 
“biological mass.” After all, if the conditions of slavery render “proprietary subjecthood” 
impossible, even farcical, Brown’s plagiarism highlights what Brown’s and Sansay’s novels also 
attest: if white, intentional, effective agency was no longer sacrosanct for characters, plots, and 
the genre itself, then neither was the figure of the author. 
None of these novels is what one would call clear or perhaps even coherent. This is not 
just a coincidence of the genre’s earliness, as the later novel suggests, but a formal disruption 
written by those agencies that ascribed neither to Republican definitions of agency nor to 
novelistic conventions. Yellow fever and black rebels argued that causes did not add up neatly to 
particular effects—that plot was not always coherent. They argued that intentions were not 
necessarily effective—that character did not necessarily drive plot. And they argued that 
interiority was not necessarily accessible—that character could be empty or simply unknowable. 
At the beginning of the American novel and the center of the form, therefore, is the inhuman and 
nonhuman experience of illness—of uncertain identity, invisible agents, rebellion, unknown 
motivations, and a suspended plot. In his seminal work, The Wounded Storyteller, Arthur W. 
Frank argues that the medical doctor subsumes the narration and, thus, the experience of illness: 
“The physician becomes the spokesperson for the disease, and the ill person’s stories come to 
depend heavily on repetition of what the physician has said.”87 Yet early American novels reveal 
that neither the narration nor experience of illness is singular. 
                                                      
86 Roberts, Gothic Subjects, 158, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
87 Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, 6. 
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Chapter Four: A Rotting Sensibility: Dysentery’s Putrefaction and the Limits of Human-
Centered Ethics 
 In the beginning of August 1775, Abigail Adams wrote to her husband, John, explaining 
his brother’s illness and impending death: 
Tis with a sad Heart I take my pen to write to you because I must be the bearer of what 
will greatly afflict and distress you, yet I wish you to be prepaired for the Event. Your 
Brother Elihu lies very dangerously Sick with a Dysentery. He has been very bad for 
more than a week, his life is despaired of. Er’e I close this Letter I fear I shall write you 
that he is no more.1 
Elihu’s illness heralded a devastating dysentery epidemic that Adams would chronicle in tragic 
detail in her letters to John. This initial missive foreshadowed both the Adams family’s suffering 
and their response to that suffering—sensibility. An eighteenth-century paradigm that spanned 
the Atlantic, sensibility referred to the universal capacity to feel and to a refined emotional life. It 
was a physiological experience as well as a moral philosophy and cultural value. Elihu’s illness 
and imminent death activate Adams’s “Heart”; his pain becomes hers. In turn, she worries that 
this news will “greatly affect” and “distress” John, that Elihu’s suffering will be transferred to 
John through her. In this way, Adams’s “sad Heart” anticipates John’s; his future suffering 
prompts her present misery. Sensibility not only helped to explain how this pain travelled across 
bodies but also provided a powerful cultural framework for easing that pain as well.  
Yet it was not only sensibility that united these three people; dysentery also knitted them 
together. The disease provided the material basis that activated their sensibility, while at the 
same time exposing the paradigm’s inherent limitations. After all, sensibility’s cultural reign 
                                                      
1 Abigail Adams to John Adams, August 10, 1775, Founders Online 
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coincided with chattel slavery. Dysentery putrefied human embodiment and, thus, relations based 
on a particularly limited definition of human embodiment and feeling. Instead, the disease 
emphasized nonhuman relations and affinities, positing an ethics of shared materiality rather than 
shared humanity. 
Like syphilis, dysentery is hard to track in the historical record.2 It went by many names, 
including flux and bloody flux, and its symptoms overlapped with cholera and gastroenteritis. As 
the preeminent physician Thomas  Sydenham described, dysentery “sometimes begins with a 
chilness and shaking…and soon after gripes and stools follow,” which “are very frequent; and all 
mucous, not excrementitious…[and] generally streak’d with blood.”3 It was both a chronic, 
endemic illness and an epidemic disease as Adams’s letters detail. 4 It killed many outright, but it 
also killed by attenuating human health, paving the way for other disorders. As Adams observed 
in the months following Braintree’s epidemic, “Many, very many people who have had the 
dysentery, are now afflicted both with the Jaundice and Rhumatism, some it has left in 
Heckticks, some in Dropsies.”5  
Ultimately, in the language of the time, dysentery was a corruption, mortification, or 
putrefaction of bile or aliment, what William Cullen called “a putrid Diathesis.”6 The bloody 
                                                      
2 “Dysentery” is an umbrella term for two distinct diseases. Amebic dysentery is typically 
chronic with no fever, while bacillary dysentery is usually responsible for epidemics and onsets 
more suddenly. See the “Amebic Dysentery” and “Bacillary Dysentery” entries in The 
Cambridge Historical Dictionary of Disease.  
3 Thomas Sydenham, The Entire Works, 142, 144, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
4 The amebic and bacillary strains probably account for these different presentations. For 
historical accounts of American epidemics and contexts, see John Duffy, Epidemics, 214-22, 
Richard B. Sheridan, Doctors and Slaves, 209-10, and Reiss, Medicine in Colonial America, 330. 
5 Abigail Adams to John Adams, November 27, 1775, Founders Online. 
6 See Cullen, Lectures on the Materia Medica (1772), 294. In his A Commentary on the 
Dysentery: or, Bloody Flux (1767), Mark Akenside contends that the disease was produced by 
“morbid mucus” (80). Likewise, in An Inaugural Dissertation on Dysentery (1794), David G. 
Abeel describes the “morbid secretion” of the irritated intestines (18) and the “putrid 
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excrement was not a symptom of the disease, per se, but the body’s attempt to purge—literally, 
purify—an internal rot.7 Sydenham explains, “in a dysentery the morbific matter is discharg’d by 
stool” (8), while leading Republican physician, Benjamin Rush, argued that it was not 
dysentery’s “evacuations” that “destroy[ed] life,” but rather “the fever with the emaciation or 
mortification” in the bowels.8 If unpurged, the putrefaction would not stop at rotting excrement. 
It would rot the entire body, mutating a sensible, feeling human being into insensible, dead 
matter.  
Early American writers, including Abigail Adams, West Indian poet and physician James 
Grainger, and Virginian plantation owner, Landon Carter, deployed “rhetorics of sensibility” to 
mitigate their personal suffering and reaffirm their own sensitivity and virtue.9 Yet dysentery 
consistently disturbed these goals and exposed their hypocrisy. Adams’s letters describe her 
mother’s dysenteric death in acute sentimental language, but they also record her servant Patty’s 
death in gruesomely dehumanizing terms. As Patty putrefies, so too does Adams’s sensibility, 
highlighting the limits of an ethics based on a decidedly limited definition of humanity. 
Similarly, Grainger’s poem, The Sugar-Cane, and his medical treatise, An Essay on the More 
Common West-India Diseases (1764) detail the danger of a human-centered sensibility and 
morality, which failed to check chattel slavery and its lust for profit. In turn, Carter’s Diary 
(1752-1778) attempts to deploy sensible hierarchies of parent-child, master-slave to regulate his 
                                                      
appearance” of the dissected bowels (10). See also Sydenham, The Entire Works, section 4, chap. 
3.  
7 “Purge, v. 1,” Oxford English Dictionary. 
8 Rush, “An Account of the Bilious Remitting Yellow Fever,” 251. 
9 Brycchan Carey uses this phrase to describe how both abolitionists and apologists mobilized 
sensibility to persuade an audience on the topic of slavery. Although I also expand on this topic 
in the sections on Carter and Grainger, here I am using the phrase to consider how early Atlantics 
attempted to persuade themselves of their acute sensibilities. 
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plantation’s chaos during an epidemic, but the wormy dysentery only exposes this false order. 
Both sensibility and dysentery connect these disparate writers and their texts: each strived to 
write and act sensibly, but dysentery putrefied human bodies and the physiological and ethical 
paradigm based on human bodies, sensibility. The disease’s materiality, its sensual, poisonous 
putrefaction, ruptured the bonds of human relations. Instead, it emphasized material affinities, 
decomposing the distance between human self and nonhuman other. 
Moreover, putrefaction posited an alternative, material foundation for ethical relations. 
As sociological and psychoanalytic studies have shown, attitudes towards excrement are 
culturally constructed and highly variable, only accruing their modern negative valence with the 
rise of the bourgeoisie. 10 Yet excrement was also immanently material. Dung heaps could 
produce smelly, poisonous miasmas, and feces was used to diagnose disease and sometimes even 
to treat it.11 Joshua Ozias Reno argues, it is “meaningful to speak of ‘waste’ as a set of objects in 
the world that pre-exist symbolic categorization.”12 Excrement reminds humans of our own 
“embodied animality” (Reno 8). In turn, putrefying excrement like dysentery and manure remind 
us of our shared materiality. “Compost,” Serpil Opperman argues, “means being a part of a 
                                                      
10 As Mary Douglass famously asserted in Purity and Danger, “There is no such thing as 
absolute dirt: it exists in the eye of the beholder” (2). Norbert Elias, Dominique Laporte, and 
David Inglis have shown how excrement became “absolute dirt” with the rise of the bourgeoisie, 
whose emphasis on order and cleanliness regulated where defecation took place and how it was 
talked about—through euphemism or not at all. Likewise, scholars of the middle ages, like Jeff 
Persels and Russell Ganum, Susan Signe Morrison, and Peter J. Smith have demonstrated that 
excrement signified more than disgust or danger pre-microbes. After the rise of the bourgeoisie, 
Freudian psychoanalysis linked excrement to the repressed anality of childhood, in which feces 
symbolized play, gift, property, and weapon. See Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death, chaps. 
10-14, and Inglis, A Sociological History, chaps. 3 and 4. While this argument emphasizes 
excrement’s materiality, these studies are important in that they remind us that that materiality 
has signified multivalently across time and space. 
11 On both the danger of poisonous smells and the medical uses of feces, see Corbin, The Foul 
and the Fragrant, chaps. 1 and 2, and Inglis, A Sociological History, 83-86, 197-98. 
12 Reno, “Toward a New Theory of Waste,” 4, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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fertility cycle…part of things that are dead but are in a way not dead.” 13 It is “the poetics of 
transformative matter” that “draws its existential meanings from its relation to other matter” 
(139). Early Americans’ paradigm of putrefaction meant that dysentery could decompose and 
recompose; it could rot sensibility and relations between humans, highlighting the paradigm’s 
limits, but it could also offer alternatives. In each of these texts, dysentery’s putrefaction re-
embodies and rematerializes humanity, reminding us that we are not exempt from the biological 
and chemical processes of entropy, aging, and death. By emphasizing our material affinity, 
dysentery ultimately suggests that ethical care should not revolve around the limiting paradigm 
of shared humanity. After all, shared humanity did not and does not ensure the just treatment of 
enslaved, disabled, and aging or otherwise “rotting” people. Instead, dysentery posits ethical 
relations based on shared, mutating materiality, a radical alternative both to eighteenth-century 
sensibility and to the modern discourse of humanity that animates disability studies and the 
medical humanities. 
 
Sensibility, Sympathy, and Sentiment in the Atlantic World 
Sensibility was a moral philosophy and cultural value based on the material human body. 
At its simplest and earliest, it referred to the physical senses, to the ability to perceive what John 
Locke called “impressions” made by “outward Objects.”14 Physician George Cheyne refined 
Locke’s seminal theory, arguing that nerves and fibers “communicate[d] the Impression they 
receive[d] from outward objects, or the muscular Fibres to the Sensorium in the Brain.”15 These 
                                                      
13 Opperman, “Compost,” 136, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
14 Locke uses this language throughout “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding” (1690). 
15 Cheyne, “The English Malady,” 64. 
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nerves and fibers enabled communication between the disparate parts of the human body like the 
eyes and the brain, as well as between the self and the outside world.  
This physiology soon became a philosophy of human relation. Adam Smith begins his 
canonical Theory of Moral Sentiments, arguing for a physiological basis for human connection 
and morality: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to 
him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”16 In his famous image of 
the man being tortured on the rack, he contends, “our sense will never inform us of what he 
suffers. They never did and never can carry us beyond our own person” (2). Rather, “it is by the 
imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations” (2). Although we 
can only imagine how the tortured man feels, this imagining is enabled by our own senses. Our 
physiological sensibility allowed us to see the man on the rack, sending the visual stimuli 
throughout our bodies to be understood. Moreover, I could imagine his experience based on my 
own experience of a body. Physiology, therefore, activated affectivity. Sensitive nerves and 
fibers meant sensitive human beings, receptive and responsive to a friend’s joy or a stranger’s 
pain. In turn, the receptive and responsive person wore their sensibility quite clearly—blushing, 
crying, and fainting. 
As a physiological fact of human relations, sensibility soon became a moral imperative, a 
sign of “humanity.” As G. J. Barker-Benfield argues, “The word human became very closely 
associated with sensibility.”17 Humanity, however, “denot[ed] sympathy and sympathetic action” 
(116). If all humans could feel, then the best humans not only felt keenly but also acted to 
                                                      
16 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
17 Barker-Benfield, John and Abigail Adams, 115, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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alleviate suffering. Ann Jessie Van Sant argues, “sensibility accounts for an intensely felt 
humanity or philanthropy; it is an ‘inward pain’ in response to the sufferings of others.”18 
Ideally, it should motivate this pain’s alleviation or amelioration though it was not always 
successful. 
While sensibility was physiologically universal, its moral mandate was limited by 
gendered, classed, and especially raced prejudice.19 In eighteenth-century Britain, for example, 
sensibility motivated both abolitionists and apologists. As Brycchan Carey argues, abolitionists 
invoked the universal experience of human suffering to persuade, while apologists used 
“sentimental diversion”—their own or poor Europeans’ suffering—“to divert attention away 
from slavery and the slave trade.”20 Even though the eighteenth-century Atlantic failed to apply 
sensibility evenly, the paradigm’s moral probity derived from a purportedly universal 
physiology. 
In the early Republic, sensibility and sympathy functioned to create a nation out of a 
disparate populace. Elizabeth Barnes argues that sensibility “imagin[ed] diverse individuals 
connected in a sympathetic chain,” flattening a true “democratic politics” into “a politics of 
affinity.”21 This “affinity” was “idealized” in the “bond between parent and child” and “filial 
attachment” (23). Kristin Boudreau similarly contends that “consanguinity” animated American 
sympathy from the colonial period until after the Civil War.22 While studies on sensibility and 
                                                      
18 Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel, 5. 
19 On gender and class, see, for example, Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility and John 
and Abigail Adams. On race, see Markman Ellis, The Politics of Sensibility and Brycchan Carey, 
British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility. 
20 Carey, British Abolitionism, 120. Apologists especially highlighted miners’ plights, pp. 119-
29. 
21 Barnes, States of Sympathy, 1, 4, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
22 See Boudreau, Sympathy in American Literature, x. 
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America have tended to emphasize the early Republic, John Winthrop’s sensibly embodied 
community in “A Modell of Christian Charitie” suggests that physiological and cultural affinity 
were important before the Revolution as well.23 Sensibility and sympathy may have been put in 
the service of abolition, and may have even helped free and enslaved Africans empower 
themselves, but it did so through an exclusionary vision of human similitude.24 
Sensibility, sympathy, and sentiment were not necessarily synonymous, but they were 
closely related. Van Sant argues that “sensibility is associated with the body,” with physical 
sensitivity and the processes of sensation,” while Sarah Knott contends, “sympathy was a 
‘special case’ of sensibility,” referring to the “nervous connection between divergent bodily 
organs that integrated the body’s overall functioning.”25 “Sentiment,” however, was correlated 
“with the mind” and “refinement of thought.”26 Neither early Atlantics nor modern critics agree 
on the precise differences between these interrelated terms. All shared a physiological 
foundation, and all referred to how individual and communal bodies related. For the purpose of 
this argument, I use sensibility and sympathy interchangeably, referring to the way physiology 
underwrote morality. I use “sentiment” and “sentimental” to refer to particular literary tropes 
enabled by sensibility and sympathy. Each of these terms emphasized a universal human 
                                                      
23 Boudreau analyzes Winthrop’s speech, emphasizing how physiological sympathy conditioned 
social cohesion. Sympathy in American Literature, 4-5. Similarly, Sarah Knott argues, “What 
changed between 1630 and 1776…was the grafting of a complex set of moral, social, and 
psychological meanings onto physical ‘sensibleness.’” Sensibility and the American Revolution, 
326. By the late eighteenth century, the period I analyze, the “social and cultural—and 
political—reach” of sensibility was well at work (Knott 326). 
24 On how Africans in the Atlantic world used sympathy and sensibility, see Christine Levecq, 
Slavery and Sentiment. 
25 Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility, 4; Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, 
10. 
26 Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility, 4. 
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similitude, even if that universality was only theoretical—but dysentery showed how early 
American affinities were shaped not only by human sympathy but also nonhuman rot. 
 
Abigail Adams Rotten Humanity 
  “Remember the ladies” may be Abigail Adams’s most famous line, but her regular 
record of her aches and pains and her inquiries after John’s health suggest that she just as easily 
may have chided, “Remember the body.” 27 Edith B. Gelles, however, argues that her form was 
“disembodied,” enabling her to “speak” more freely than she could in actual conversation.28 
Adams herself admits in the aftermath of the dysentery epidemic, “My pen is always freer than 
my tongue. I have wrote many things to you that I suppose I never could have talk’d.”29 Yet her 
letters were not quite “disembodied.” In the same missive, she describes how her heart has been 
“made tender by repeated affliction,” and worries about “wound[ing]” John’s: “Why should I? 
Ought I to give relief to my own by paining yours?” Adams’s writing was embodied through 
sensibility, through her awareness of her own feeling body and mind and that of her reader’s.30  
 Braintree’s 1775 dysentery epidemic, however, challenged her sensibility. She strived to 
order the epidemic’s chaos through this familiar frame, but it faltered under the disease’s 
putrefying pressure. Adams’s servant Patty slowly rots to death, gruesomely devolving into a 
rotting mass of flesh and stench. As dysentery rots Patty’s sensing body, it also rots her 
                                                      
27 See Edith B. Gelles, First Thoughts, chap. 2 for an overview of interpretations of this line.  
28 Gelles, First Thoughts, 7. 
29 Abigail Adams to John Adams, October 22, 1775, Founders Online. 
30 Barker-Benfield analyzes the Adams family, especially Abigail, through the lens of sensibility 
in John and Abigail Adams. He argues that this “Americanization” entailed sensible white 
Americans defining themselves against indigenous people, the lower and working classes, and 
African Americans. This argument, however, emphasizes how dysentery warped Adams’s 
sensibility. 
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humanity, decomposing Adams’s sensible humanity in turn. When the disease claims her 
mother, she attempts to isolate and repress the disease’s putrefaction in Patty and, thereby, shore 
up her mother’s and her own quickly eroding sensibility. Yet this repression fails. Dysentery 
putrefies Patty, Adams’s mother, herself, and her letters, decomposing sensible, human relations 
and recomposing them through their shared capacity to rot. In these discrepant representations, 
the disease revealed the danger of relying upon human senses and, thus, a limited definition of 
humanity to power ethical care and relations. 
From the beginning of the dysentery epidemic in early August 1775 to its first 
anniversary a year later, Adams describes in excruciating detail the disease’s sensible toll. Less 
than a month after John’s brother died, Adams and a number of friends and family had also 
contracted the disease:  
Since you left me I have passed thro great, distress both of Body and mind…You may 
remember Isaac was unwell when you went from his home. His Disorder increasd till a 
voilent Dysentery was the consequence of his complaints, there was no resting place in 
the House for his terrible Groans…Two Days after he was sick, I was seaz’d with the 
same disorder in a voilent manner…The next person in the same week was Susy…Our 
Little Tommy was the next, and he lies very ill now…Yesterday Patty was seazd and 
took a puke. Our House is an hospital in every part, and what with my own weakness and 
distress of mind for my family I have been unhappy enough.31 
Chanting a litany of the ill, Adams repeats three words that capture the disease’s sensible burden: 
seized, violent, and distress. “Seized” and “violent” suggest the disease’s sudden and explosive 
onset and, thus, the effects on both the sufferer’s sensing body and the caretaker’s, while 
                                                      
31 Abigail Adams to John Adams, September 8, 1775, Founders Online. 
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“distress” indicates how palpably the epidemic weighed on Adams’s “Body and mind,” her 
sensibility. With the majority of her family ill, John away at the Continental Congress in 
Philadelphia, and the “distress of the Neighbourhood” such that she could “scarcly find a well 
person to assist,” Adams supported the family, administering medicines, cleaning bodies and 
linens, and fumigating the house.32 As Isaac’s inescapable “Groans” illustrate, dysentery 
permeated and began to erode the sensible home. 
 Although Patty is just one of many names in the preceding tally of the sick, she soon 
occupies a central place in Adams’s home and letters. Others recover, but Patty slowly and 
gruesomely rots to death. A week after she notes Patty’s onset, Adams notes, “we live in daily 
Expectation that Patty will not continue many hours. A general putrefaction seems to have taken 
place, and we can not bear the House only as we are constantly clensing it with hot vinegar. I had 
no Idea of the Distemper producing such a state as hers till now.”33 Although she does not 
delineate Patty’s symptoms explicitly, the term “putrefaction” signified decomposition, 
especially the smell of decomposition. As Adams’s use of “hot vinegar” implies, Patty’s rotting 
smell was so pungent that the house required fumigation to “bear” it. 34 Yet this smell was not 
only noisome but poisonous. “The fetid, penetrating odor of the rotting body,” Alain Corbin 
argues, “could not be regarded as a simple symptom of decomposition”; rather, the odor “was an 
integral part of the process of decomposition.”35 If the smell could rot Patty, then it could also rot 
                                                      
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., September 17, 1775. 
34 See Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant, 63-64 on the use of vinegar, along with 
gunpowder and spices, to cleanse poisonous spells. On poisonous stenches and miasmas, see 
Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant, chap. 1; Laporte, History of Shit, 76-95, and Inglis, A 
Sociological History, 85, 197-98. 
35 Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant, 17. 
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the Adams family. Thus, the word “putrefaction” captured the disease’s danger: Patty was slowly 
decomposing, and her decomposition threatened to infect the others. 
As Patty’s body rotted, her humanity did as well. Adams complains, “I…am obliged to 
return home to the most gastly object my Eyes ever beheld, who is continually desirous of my 
being with her the little While she expects to live, and who is now become such a putrid mass as 
scarcely to be able for any one to do their Duty towards her.”36 Patty devolves into a “gastly 
object” and a “putrid mass,” dehumanizing characterizations that emphasize her rotting body. In 
another letter describing Patty’s death, Adams again emphasizes her decomposition:  
She has lain 5 weeks wanting a few days so bad as that we had little hopes of her 
Recovery; the Latter part of the Tim she was the most shocking object my Eyes ever 
beheld, and so loathsome that it was with the utmost difficulty we could bear the House. 
A mortification took place a week before she dyed, nothing but duty and humanity could 
and renderd her a most pityable object.37 
While “mortification” could function as a synonym for putrefaction, it could also refer to “a state 
of torpor and insensibility preceding death.”38 Patty may represent “a most pityable object,” but 
Laura M. Stevens reminds us that pity “tends to describe relationships marked by an imbalance 
of power, between those feeling and those provoking this emotion.”39 Modifying “object,” the 
sensible and sentimental adjective “pityable” isolates, dehumanizes, and objectifies Patty, 
distancing her from Adams and from humanity more broadly. Though the sensible body was 
                                                      
36 Abigail Adams to John Adams, September 29, 1775, Founders Online. 
37 Ibid., October 9, 1775. Adams deleted “nothing but duty and humanity could,” an important 
deletion in reference to sensible humanity, which I discuss below. 
38 “mortification,” n. 3, Oxford English Dictionary. 
39 Stevens, The Poor Indians, 8. While Stevens argues that “pity” and “sympathy” “began to 
overlap in the eighteenth century” (9), Adams’s use of “pityable object” recalls the earlier 
usage’s “imbalance of power” (8). 
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physical, it also required a subjective interiority that descriptions like “gastly object,” “putrid 
mass,” “shocking object,” and “pityable object” mitigated against.40 Dysentery, therefore, rots 
Patty’s clear human embodiment, putrefying her into an insensible mass. As she becomes more 
material, she draws nearer to nonhuman objects and masses and further away from humans like 
Adams. And as dysentery rots her humanity, it also rots her claim to sensible bonds with other 
humans, including Adams. 
 Patty infects and decomposes Adams’s sensibility. Conflating sensibility and humanity, 
as many did at the time, Adams asserts, “Humanity obliges us to be affected with the distresses 
and Miserys of our fellow creatures.”41 Sensible humanity should have enabled both “sympathy 
and sympathetic action”; however, Adams struggles to feel and care for Patty as a fellow human 
should. 42 She admits, Patty “is now become such a putrid mass as scarcely to be able for any one 
to do their Duty towards her.”43 She confesses, albeit in the dispersed figure of “any one,” that 
she is incapable of doing her “Duty.” She cannot care for Patty—can barely “bear” the house—
because she can no longer perceive her as a fellow, feeling human being. Similarly, when Adams 
describes Patty’s final “mortification,” she begins to write but deletes, “nothing but duty and 
humanity could…”44 Adams implies that though sensible humanity should enable her to perform 
her “duty,” it has failed her here. She deletes this reference to fellow feeling because it would 
                                                      
40 In Sentiment and Sociability, John Mullan argues, “it is the body which acts out the powers of 
sentiment…Tears, blushes, and sights—and a range of postures and gestures—reveal conditions 
of feeling which can connote exceptional virtue or allow for intensified forms of communication. 
Feeling is above all observable, and the body through which it throbs is peculiarly excitable and 
responsive” (201). As Mullan’s language intimates, the sensible body’s physical and visible 
responses “reveal[ed]” a hidden, feeling interiority. 
41 Abigail Adams to John Adams, August 11, 1763, Founders Online. 
42 Barker-Benfield, John and Abigail Adams, 116. 
43 Abigail Adams to John Adams, September 29, 1775, Founders Online.  
44 Ibid., October 9, 1775. 
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expose this lapse too acutely. When Patty finally dies, Adams admits, “the heavy stroke which 
most of all distresses me is my dear Mother,” callously minimizing the young woman’s life and 
death.45 In her final reference to Patty, she concludes, “I hope it will make me more continually 
mindful and watchfull of all those who are still committed to my charge,” acknowledging what 
she should have done and what she did not.46 If Adams could not responsively feel for Patty, 
then her own sensible humanity was at risk. Dysentery rotted Patty’s humanity—the universal 
body that grounded sensibility as a moral imperative—and, in doing so, rotted Adams’s 
humanity as well. 
 Yet this effect was not inevitable. When her mother, Elizabeth Quincy, succumbs to the 
disease, Adams uses sensibility to fathom the tragedy. With her heart “Bursting” from grief, she 
tells John, “my Dear Mother…left this world for an infinitely better…Nature fainted and she fell 
asleep.”47 Whereas Patty rots to death, Elizabeth Quincy simply falls asleep. Adams expands on 
this sensible and sentimental imagery in another description of her mother’s death: 
My dear parent knew in whom she had Believed, and from the first attack of the 
distemper she was perswaded it would prove fatal to her. A solemnity possess’d her soul, 
nor could you force a smile form her till she dyed. The voilence of her disease soon 
weakened her so that she was unable to converse, but whenever she could speak, she 
testified her willingness to leave the world and an intire resignation to the Divine Will. 
She retaind her senses to the last moment of her Existance, and departed the World with 
                                                      
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., October 22, 1775. 
47 Ibid., October 1, 1775. 
 173 
an easy tranquility, trusting in the merrits of a Redeamer. Her passage to immortality was 
marked with a placid smile upon her countenance…48 
On the one hand, these descriptions are classic examples of the Christian good death. Elizabeth is 
resigned to “Divine Will”; “trusting in the merrits of a Redeamer” and the promise of an 
afterlife, she dies peacefully “with a placid smile.” Adams certainly would have found comfort in 
such a death and such writing about death. On the other hand, this passage also carefully 
emphasizes Elizabeth’s senses. Although she may have been unable to speak—one of, if not the 
defining characteristics of “human”—“she retaind her senses,” her physical, intellectual, and 
emotional awareness, “to the last moment of her Existance.” Adams emphasizes her mother’s 
senses and sensibility—a far cry from Patty the “putrid mass.” Using Christian, sentimental, and 
sensible tropes to preserve her mother’s humanity, Adams also preserves her own. 
  Though both Elizabeth and Patty die of dysentery, Adams describes Patty’s death far 
more gruesomely than her mother’s.49 In fact, Adams confesses, that “the same Scene” of 
suffering was “only varied by a remoter connexion.”50 Undoubtedly, Adams writes so 
sentimentally about her mother, because she’s her mother—“one of the Best of parents.”51 As 
Barnes argues, all forms of sympathy and sensibility were grounded in the “idealized…bond 
between parent and child.”52 Moreover, Patty’s class, her status as a servant, may have also 
contributed to this “remoter connexion” and, therefore, the discrepant representations. 
 Yet this discrepancy’s particularity—the rotting body—is governed by dysentery itself. 
As Patty illustrates, the dysenteric body was a horrifying spectacle, a noisome stench, a 
                                                      
48 Ibid., October 9, 1775. 
49 Ibid., September 29, 1775. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Abigail Adams to John Adams, September 29, 1775, Founders Online. 
52 Barnes, States of Sympathy, 23. 
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putrefying mass, a poisonous object, and, eventually, an insensible corpse. As Patty’s body and 
humanity rotted, so too did Adams’s own sensibility—her ability to feel and care for others as 
kin. Adams represses her mother’s similar rot by isolating its material and dehumanizing effects 
in Patty. In turn, she reconsolidates and reaffirms Elizabeth’s sensible humanity and her own. 
This insulation, however, fails. Adams’s letters rot over the course of the epidemic. First, 
her grief takes on an increasingly physical cast: “My Heart is made tender by repeated 
affliction”; “my Heart bleeds”; “the Hand of God presseth me soar”; and “O my (Bursting 
Heart).”53 While much of this language was commonplace in sentimental literature, it resonates 
differently in the context of Patty’s rotting, dysenteric materiality. Adams cannot “overcome her 
selfish sorrow,” correct her grief, or restrain her bursting heart.54 Her grief is not only material 
but overflowing and uncontrolled like dysentery. It cannot be restrained in Patty, and instead 
seeps into and putrefies her writing. 
Second, her letters rot as they abandon almost all discussion of local politics and events, 
even though she usually includes such information. She writes, “As to politicks I know nothing 
about them. The distresses of my own family are so great that I have not thought about them”; 
“You will not expect me to look abroad for any news”; “I hope for the future to be able to give 
you more intelegance with regard to what passes out of my own little circle, but such has been 
my distress that I know nothing of the political world.”55 Adams’s embodied grief takes material 
form, decomposing her typical content. As she recognizes, these rotting letters are insensibly 
insular, affecting, even potentially infecting, John. 
                                                      
53 Ibid., October 22, 1775; September 21, 1775; October 1, 1775. 
54 Ibid., October 22, 1775. 
55 Ibid., September 8, 1775; September 29, 1775; October 9, 1775. 
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Third, then, her letters threaten to transmit or infect John with her grief. According to the 
logic of sensible rhetoric, writing could and did transmit feeling. Though both Abigail and John 
considered each other’s writing pleasurable and even medicinal, words could inflict pain as much 
as they could soothe. Abigail’s embodied grief could become John’s. Describing her mother’s 
death, she begs him, “Forgive me then; for thus dwelling upon a subject Sweet to me, but I fear 
painfull to you.”56 In a later letter, again describing Elizabeth’s death, she writes, “I know I 
wound your Heart. Why should I? Ought I to give relief to my own by paining yours?”57 She 
worries that she might communicate her grief to John, that they will become connected not by 
sympathy or sensible humanity but by dysentery’s rot. 
Finally, despite this fear of infection, her letters persist in describing her grief. She writes, 
“I hope to be properly mindful of the correcting hand,” but, in the very next line, she beseeches 
John, “You will pardon and forgive all my wanderings of mind I cannot be correct.”58 Although 
she should submit to God’s will and the correcting hand as gracefully as her mother, she can’t. 
Dysentery escapes from Patty to infect her letters—which in turn threaten to infect John. 
Although she tries, sensibility fails to control and contain the disease, her identity, and her 
letters; dysentery rots sensibility, linking microbes or smells, humans, and texts into a chain of 
shared decomposition rather than shared humanity. 
 As Adams’s letters demonstrate, dysentery rots, decomposes, and putrefies humans and 
humanity. By seizing and perverting our waste processes, dysentery turns us into human waste—
a putrid smell, an inhuman “mass,” a corpse. It putrefies our subjectivity, emphasizing our 
material rather than human relations. And, finally, it rots sensibility, undermining fellow feeling 
                                                      
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., October 22, 1775. 
58 Ibid., October 1, 1775. 
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as the basis for ethical care. In her “Manifesto for Waste Studies,” Morrison argues, “Excrement 
provides us with a reason for acknowledging affinity among all people…Waste is the great 
leveler linking us all.”59 Dysentery, however, reminds us that our affinities stretch not only 
toward other people but also toward nonhumans. Moreover, it exposes the lie at the heart of 
sensibility: if Adams could not perform her “duty”—could not act humanely—because Patty was 
not human enough, then “human” represented and continues to represent a seriously inadequate 
foundation for ethics and ethical action. 
 
James Grainger’s “Reptile” Rot 
 After all, neither sensibility nor humanity effectively challenged slavery. Abolitionists 
may have invoked human sympathy, but apologists mobilized the very same rhetoric. William 
Wright advertised James Grainger’s An Essay on the More Common West-India Diseases, the 
first compendium of medical advice for plantation masters, as a “humane and sensible tract.”60 
Grainger himself explained that such advice would, “save many valuable lives; a circumstance 
not less profitable to the owner, than pleasing to humanity.”61 Conflating humanity with 
profitability, Grainger outlines how slavery, economy, and sensibility commingled in the 
Atlantic world.62 His more famous work, The Sugar-Cane, notoriously struggles to incorporate 
                                                      
59 Morrison, Excrement in the Late Middle Ages, 156. 
60 Wright, Introduction, 3. 
61 Grainger, An Essay, 6. 
62 For example, see Ellis, The Politics of Sensibility, and Carey, British Abolitionism. On slavery, 
profit, sensibility, and Grainger specifically, see Richard Frohock, Heroes of Empire, epilogue; 
Ellis, “‘Incessant Labour’”; Cristobal Silva, “Georgic Fantasies”; Anna M. Foy, “Grainger and 
the ‘Sordid Master’”; and, Tristan J. Schweiger, “Grainger’s West Indian Planter.” 
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enslaved labor into the classic georgic structure.63 Formal irregularities pervade the text.64 John 
Gilmore, however, asks readers if Grainger’s strange writing and formal discrepancies might be 
evidence of “an essentially humane man who realises that he is compromised by his economic 
dependence on the fundamentally inhumane system of slavery”—someone recognizing (if not 
fixing) his own hypocrisy.65 Grainger was not an abolitionist, but both his poem and his treatise 
argue for amelioration, for the better medical treatment of slaves, a position that ambivalently 
straddled sensibility and prosperity. 
 To traverse the discrepancies between slavery and sensibility, Grainger’s writing effects 
multiple transformations: plantation slavery into georgic labor, West Indian content into proper 
poetic material, degenerate creole into metropolitan author. In particular, Grainger draws on the 
georgic figure of manure to illustrate these transformations. Yet manure and dysentery’s shared 
materiality, putrefaction, upsets his poetic, rhetorical, and medical control. Manure may seem to 
                                                      
63 Essentially, the georgic’s “modal orientation to the world,” as Timothy Sweet argues, “is 
labor,” but Grainger’s source of labor is slavery, potentially setting the poem up for thematic and 
formal failure (American Georgics, 11). Frohock argues that the muse “laments slavery in 
abstract terms,” while the poem nonetheless forwards its use (179). Similarly, Silva maintains 
that Grainger displaces slavery from “an ethical problem in the world” to “a formal problem of 
poetry” (“Georgic Fantasies” 143). Ellis, however, argues that the form mitigates the content: 
“While the poem is ineluctably pro-slavery, the intelligence of the poetic form is abolitionist” 
(“‘Incessant Labour’” 52). While I do not explicitly analyze the relationship between slavery and 
the georgic form, I do address how putrefaction exposes the hypocritical reliance on slavery that 
underwrites both the poem and the poet’s claims to sensibility. 
64 Most critics note the georgic’s footnoting apparatus, which frequently overwhelms the poetry 
on the page. Kelly Wisecup and Britt Rusert argue that African medical knowledge and the West 
Indian environment, respectively, disrupt the poem’s form. See Wisecup, Medical Encounters, 
chap. 4, and Rusert, “Plantation Ecologies.” In “Georgic Fantasies,” however, Silva argues that 
footnotes characterized Grainger’s poetry even before he lived in the West Indies. While 
Grainger may have been fond of footnotes before his life in St. Kitt’s, they were still an unusual 
in poetry. Silva’s reminder—that the poem’s “many thematic and formal disruptions” are not 
“failures” but “traces of Grainger’s own attempt to aestheticize colonial landscapes in the service 
of his literary and commercial ambitions” (130)—emphasizes how Grainger attempted a new, 
perhaps impossible task, reconciling slavery with the georgic.  
65 John Gilmore, “Introduction,” 59. 
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offer a flexible metaphor for transformation—waste matter into fertilizer, fertilizer into vegetable 
life, agriculture into poetry—but it also reveals that neither Granger-the-farmer nor Grainger-the-
poet can effectively harness its transformative power. Ultimately, dysentery’s putrefying bowels 
posited a life and ethics beyond human feeling, intentions, and control. 
 Grainger introduces manure’s transformative power within the first 200 lines of The 
Sugar-Cane, writing about it both practically and imaginatively:  
Planter, if thou with wonder wouldst survey 
 Redundant harvest load thy willing soil 
 Let sun and rain mature thy deep-hoed land, 
 And old fat dung co-operate with these. 
 Be this great truth still present to thy mind; 
 The half well-cultur’d far exceeds the whole, 
 Which lust of gain, unconscious of its end, 
 Ungrateful vexes with unceasing toil.66 (I.197-204) 
Grainger warns the reader that the “lust of gain” that leads to “redundant” planting will make 
“lands grow poor” (I.205). Monoculture unchecked by crop rotation or “not indulg’d” by manure 
will net less productive fields and thus less wealth (1.205). “[O]ld fat dung,” however, can 
replenish and renew “the poorest soil” (I.227). This recommendation may not have been unique, 
but the frame is evocative: manure is vital because of its capacity to transform matter—to renew 
the soil, to produce plants, and, ultimately, to create wealth. 
                                                      
66 Grainger, The Sugar Cane, I.197-204, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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 If feces beget fecundity, as Grainger argues, it powered this alchemical transformation 
through its own materiality. Manure had to be composed or, rather, decomposed. Grainger 
writes,  
 Then, Planter, wouldst thou double thine estate; 
 Never, ah never, be asham’d to tread 
 Thy dung-heaps, where the refuse of thy mills, 
 With all the ashes, all thy coppers yield, 
 With weeds, mould, dung, and stale, a compost form, 
 Of force to fertilize the poorest soil. (I.218-227) 
In this passage, Grainger locates manure’s economic power in its materiality, homologously 
linking wealth to the physical processes of composition and decomposition. Beccie Puneet 
Randhawa argues that these lines speak to “the West Indies’ image as a tropical cesspit,” 
recuperating “the repellent vision of a Creole colony which may be full of undesirables, whether 
they be slaves, criminals, indentured servants, prostitutes, depraved planters, or opportunists” by 
“reorienting the reader’s gaze toward the indispensable commercial value of waste products.”67 
Yet, as Monique Allewaert reminds us, Grainger’s “fecal orientation is not simply symptomatic 
but substantive.”68 The georgic’s manure was also always literal manure. Describing the “weeds, 
mould, dung, and stale,” Grainger defines manure’s materiality as the putrefaction required to 
decompose and recompose this plantation “refuse.” Beyond agricultural byproduct and necessity, 
manure was a process of material change and transformation. 
                                                      
67 Randhawa, “The Inhospitable Muse,” 74. 
68 Allewaert, “Insect Poetics,” 328-29. 
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As such, Grainger attempts to use manure to frame his poetry, to effect the 
transformations of content, form, and language that a poem, especially a West Indian poem, 
required. After recommending “old fat dung” (I.200), he returns to the subject to ponder 
manure’s poetic propriety: 
Of composts shall the Muse descend to sing, 
 Nor soil her heavenly plumes? The sacred Muse 
 Nought sordid deems, but what is base; nought fair 
 Unless true Virtue stamp it with her seal. (I.218-221) 
Grainger begins this section by asking whether addressing “composts” or manure must 
necessarily debase his Muse, which ambivalently stands in for himself and the poem more 
broadly.69 The word “soil” offers at least three meanings in this context: first, it refers to 
manure’s use as a fertilizer to enrich literal soil or earth; second, it implies contamination, that 
manure could dirty the Muse’s garments and potentially the poem; finally, “soil” could be 
reflexive, suggesting that poem might “soil itself,” might literally turn to waste by simply 
mentioning manure. Grainger acknowledges that manure could ruin his poem and his literary 
reputation, but his layered use of soil attempts to redirect manure’s potentially contaminating 
effects into poetic fodder. More pointedly, he attempts to equate the farmer’s production of 
manure with the writer’s production of poetry. Manure, therefore, illustrated his central problem 
and its resolution: the poet, like the farmer, needed to transform the dung heap into gold. 
                                                      
69 Ellis argues, “the muse is the poetical embodiment of the disciplinary force of the genre,” 
which enables Grainger to displace his personal and poetic investment in chattel slavery, to 
“pretend that someone else, namely his female and English muse, dictates our attention to the 
details of slave plantation life” (“‘Incessant Labour’” 53). Likewise, Silva contends that “the 
muse of poetry” rather than Grainger himself “bore responsibility for the failure to abolish 
slavery” (“Georgic Fantasies” 151). 
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 In his material focus and imaginative use of manure, however, Grainger clashes with the 
ideology of sensibility. As Norbert Elias and Dominique Laporte have shown, both the presence 
and language of excrement were highly regulated by the second half of the eighteenth century.70 
Sensible people simply did not discuss it. Yet, of all poetic genres, the georgic certainly seems 
like the most appropriate space for excrement, especially manure. The OED even lists John 
Dryden’s translation of Virgil’s Georgics under its entry for “manure.” 71 Still, just as 
agricultural waste had to be turned into manure, the poet had to transform manure into poetry. 
John Gilmore argues that the georgic accomplished this transmutation through “self-consciously 
lofty terms” or euphemisms and “elaborate paraphrases.”72 As Joseph Addison described 
Dryden’s translation, “‘He delivers the meanest of his precepts with a kind of grandeur, he 
breaks the clods and tosses the dung about with an air of gracefulness.’”73 The good georgic 
poet, therefore, elevated his lowly material topic—“basically grubbing around in the dirt” 
(Gilmore 27)—through his own literary skill, including language, imagery, and meter. 
Contemporary reviews of the poem were generally good but acknowledged missteps. According 
to John Langhorne, The Sugar-Cane was “‘rather an useful than an entertaining poem.’”74 If 
Grainger needed to transform agriculture into poetry, manure into “grandeur” and 
“gracefulness,” then eighteenth-century critics were not sure he had accomplished his task.75 
 His poetry and sensibility were threatened by his West Indian location, content, and 
degeneration. Many eighteenth-century metropolitans and even many colonists maintained that 
                                                      
70 See Elias, The Civilizing Process, and Laporte, History of Shit. 
71 “manure, n.1,” Oxford English Dictionary. 
72 Gilmore, “Introduction,” 27, 28, hereafter cited parenthetically 
73 See Addison, “An Essay on Virgil’s Georgics,” qtd. in Gilmore, “Introduction,” 27. 
74 Qtd. in Gilmore, “Introduction,” 39. 
75 For more on the poem’s reception, see Gilmore, “Introduction,” 36-53, Steven W. Thomas, 
“Doctoring Ideology,” 196-98, and Silva, “Georgic Fantasies.” 
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just as the tropical heat and humidity quickly rotted meat and provoked incessant perspiration, it 
physiologically and culturally decomposed European transplants. As Silva explains, while 
Grainger’s choice of a georgic indicated both “his continuing literary ambitions” and “his desire 
to set himself apart from the creoles who now made up the bulk of his social world,” the West 
Indian setting forced him “to mediate between the conventional form and function of the georgic 
on the one hand, and the unfamiliar geographic space of the cane plantation on the other.”76 
Samuel Johnson noted in his review, “‘it was not an easy to task to reconcile the wild imagery of 
an Indian picture to the strict rules of critical exactness.’”77 Any deviation, such as his strange 
invocation of manure, could prove his tropical degeneration and endanger his intelligence, 
sensibility, and even his humanity.78 
 Ultimately, the most fundamental threat to Grainger’s sensibility and his poem’s efficacy 
was slavery and the pursuit of profit. Sensibility and the market economy were constitutively 
intertwined, and Grainger’s argument for amelioration was essentially economic. He 
acknowledged, albeit parenthetically, “(For spite of vanity, thy slaves are men)” (III.178), and 
beseeched, “planter, let thy humanity prevail” in the treatment of slaves (IV.211). Yet, though he 
allows for enslaved peoples’ sensible bonds—“Perhaps he wails his wife, his children, left / To 
struggle with adversity” (IV.217-18)—he couches his plea for “humanity,” for planters to 
perceive their slaves as humans, in material possessions: 
                                                      
76 Silva, “Georgic Fantasies,” 135. 
77 Qtd. in Gilmore, “Introduction,” 42. 
78 Moreover, as Gilmore explores, Grainger was both “a Scotsman by birth and a Kittitian by 
adoption,” a “doubly colonial writer,” who potentially endangered the empire by “asserting the 
dignity and importance of the Caribbean,” as well “appropriating a well-established form in 
contemporary English literature” (35). On Grainger’s “double” colonialism, including his 
complex promulgation of British imperialism, see, for example, Gilmore, “Introduction,” 59-60, 
135; Jim Egan, “The ‘Long’d for Aera’”; Thomas, “Doctoring Ideology”; Randhawa, “The 
Inhospitable Muse”; Silva, “Georgic Fantasies”; and Foy, “Grainger and the ‘Sordid Master.’” 
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 Perhaps thy Negroe, in his native land, 
 Possest large fertile plains, and slaves, and herds: 
 Perhaps, whene’er he deign’d to walk abroad, 
 The richest silks form where the Indus rolls, 
 His limbs invested in their gorgeous pleats… (IV. 212-16, emphasis mine) 
Grainger imagines humanity defined by possessions.79 As dysentery’s putrefaction drew Patty, 
Abigail, and John into a chain of rotting materiality, here, pursuit of profit draws Africans, 
creoles, and the empire itself into a network of slavery that similarly rots sensibility, exposing its 
tangible limits as a moral paradigm. Grainger cannot effectively humanize Africans and, thus, 
cannot effectively humanize himself.  
He attempted to mine manure’s transformative power to enable his poetic project, but 
manure only highlighted his own degeneration and eroding sensibility. In the passage above, 
Grainger attempts to recuperate the figure of “soil” by emphasizing its “true Virtue,” the capacity 
to bear vegetable and thus human life: he claims, only “base” things are “sordid,” and only 
virtuous things are “fair.” The word “base,” however, complicates this argument. Base signifies 
“low,” physically, culturally, and economically. Physically, Grainger claims soil is not “base,” 
but the Muse must “descend” to acknowledge it. Culturally, he claims soil’s virtue, but he still 
self-consciously addresses its poetic propriety and his own sensibility. Economically, Grainger 
claims that slavery will not soil his poetry, but even his arguments for amelioration are based in 
                                                      
79 In “Georgic Fantasies,” Silva argues that Grainger encourages “sympathetic identification” 
between the reader and the enslaved African in these lines, urging readers to  “recognize 
themselves in the African”: “Grainger brings slavery home by mapping Africans onto a model of 
the cosmopolitan liberal subject who is homologous to his reading public” (149). While Silva 
emphasizes the role that “domestic freedom” plays in this identification, it seems like that 
freedom was rendered in terms of economic consumption (149).  
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profit rather than shared human senses. “Soil” and “base” cannot prove his poetic prowess, 
because their material referent, manure, is a process rather than a product—decomposing and 
recomposing that extends before and after the farmer’s or the poet’s interventions. Opperman 
contends, composting “is a metaphor of change in which a continual storying of the world is 
unalterably scripted.”80 Manure does transform, translate, and transmute, but its “script” does not 
privilege or serve humans and, thus, cannot function as the straightforward, malleable metaphor 
Grainger desires. Instead, it undermines his claims to sensibility, highlighting the “sordid” and 
“base” sediment of chattel slavery that soiled his professions of “humanity.” It revealed the 
hypocrisy at work in the poem and, thus, the real danger of locating ethical action in sensible 
humanity.  
Even as it points toward material processes beyond the writer’s purview and control, 
putrefaction—manure and dysentery’s shared materiality—binds the poem and the medical 
treatise together. Whereas manure exposes sensibility’s hypocrisy, dysentery offers an 
alternative. In An Essay on the More Common West-India Diseases, Grainger explains, “fluxes 
kill more people in the West Indies than all other diseases.”81 The flux ““is either watery with 
blood, or bilious with blood, and excrement. Both these dysenteries are difficult to cure” (22). He 
advises, “vomits and purges,” a seemingly redundant therapeutic course given the flux’s 
characteristic symptom was already diarrhea (23). Yet these purges were designed to supplement 
the body’s natural excretory processes. The majority of eighteenth-century therapeutics—
bloodletting, emetics, diuretics, sudorifics, etc.—were cathartics that aimed to build on the 
                                                      
80 Opperman, “Compost,” 137. 
81 Grainger, An Essay, 18, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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body’s natural cleansing properties by expelling dangerous humors.82 If these humors were not 
released, they could accumulate and eventually rot the body from within.83 For example, 
Grainger notes, “sweating is an highly healthful evacuation,” especially “in warm climates,” 
because it “preserv[es] the juices from putrefaction” (10). By releasing pent up humors, sweating 
and other “evacuation[s]” recalibrated the body, preventing “putrefaction” and disease. In the 
case of the flux, which Grainger argued derived from “watery crude vegetables,” “corrupted 
bile,” or “suddenly suppressed perspiration,” purges assisted the body in carrying off and out 
corrupted and putrefied humors (22). Bloody stool represented the body’s attempt to cure itself, 
to purify some putrefaction, whether rotten vegetable, bile, or sweat. Putrefaction was not simply 
a theme that linked Grainger’s two texts; more importantly, it drew manure and dysentery, 
nonhumans and humans, into intimate, material, and rotting relation. 
In Book II of The Sugar-Cane, manure and dysentery form a continuum of rot when a 
“plague” of insects putrefies the sugar (II.202). Grainger declares, “pity the poor planter” 
(II.201), whose cane has mutated from delicious, profitable “waving gold” into poisonous waste 
(II.203): 
 First pallid, sickly, dry, and withered show; 
 Unseemly stains succeed; which, nearer viewed 
 By microscopic arts, small eggs appear, 
 Dire fraught with reptile-life; alas, too soon 
                                                      
82 Sudorifics or diaphoretics induce perspiration (“sudorific, adj. and n.”). Of The Sugar-Cane’s 
32 medicinal footnotes, 13, or over a third, explicitly grapple with excrement. Seven describe 
“astringents” meant to halt different types of diarrhea, including lax, flux, and “fish poison.” Six 
detail purgatives or vermifuges meant to produce diarrhea. Grainger’s remaining 19 footnotes 
offer recommendations on other cathartics, antidotes, and poultices for sore throats and 
inflammations.   
83 See Charles E. Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics, chap. 1. 
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 They burst their filmy jail, and crawl abroad, 
Bugs of uncommon shape; thrice hideous show! (II.210-15) 
The insects infect the cane, staining and rotting the plant. As Patty’s putrefaction infects Abigail 
and then John, the rotting cane soon infects the human body: 
 …In vain, its [the cane’s] pith 
 With juice nectarious flows; to pungent sour,  
 Foe to the bowels, soon its nectar turns: 
 Vain every joint a gemmy embryo bears (II.222-25) 
The cane’s putrefying materiality transfers from insects to produce to person. Allewaert argues 
that these insects “convert[] human bodies into excremental parts and the plantation to an 
unproductively fecal terrain.”84 While she admits that “Grainger attempts to show how various 
sorts of dung are useful to agriculture,” she ultimately contends that his “proleptic conversion of 
green into gold is a cover for another prolepsis where green runs to scat” (328). Grainger’s 
writing certainly reveals a latent fear that the insensible pursuit of profit will rot his poetry and 
himself. Yet it is not just that “green runs to scat”—that crops can be destroyed, that the 
plantation economy is corrupted by its reliance on enslaved labor and thus doomed—but that scat 
also runs to green. Manure could produce life and wealth that was not oriented to human needs 
and concerns. 
 Manure and dysentery’s shared rot united humans and nonhumans through shared 
materiality rather than shared humanity. The putrefying cane, like Patty’s putrefaction, links 
disparate humans and nonhumans together in a chain of shared materiality: household waste 
contributes to manure; the “well-manur’d” land nourishes the cane; enslaved Africans raise and 
                                                      
84 Allewaert, “Insect Poetics,” 317, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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harvest it; the insects rot it; the humans consume its sugar; and, the sugar putrefies the bowels. 
Manure, produce, insects, and humans are drawn together through their shared capacity to mutate 
and to mutate others. These humans and nonhumans are linked not by shared feeling, which did 
little to stem the mistreatment and enslavement of fellow, feeling humans, but by a shared, 
mutating, and affecting materiality. 
Moreover, manure and dysentery’s rot spawned life beyond human goals and needs. The 
putrefying cane may signal human rot in both the bowels and the coffer, but it also generated 
new nonhuman life as well. The visible signs of the cane’s putrefaction—“pallid,” “sickly,” 
“dry,” “withered,” and “unseemly stains”—are also the signs of birth as the phrases “small 
eggs,” “embryo,” and “reptile-life” demonstrate. Grainger certainly does not romanticize this 
life, mourning the loss of “waving gold” and cursing the insects. Yet, as Allewaert argues, his 
poem nonetheless forwards an “insect poetics”: the insects “catalyze[] animating processes,” in 
which “the movement and combination of the particulate precedes, and directs, form and 
system” (313). Though Allewaert downplays manure’s importance—in fact, she acknowledges 
the utility of dung and Grainger’s substantive “fecal orientation” in a footnote85—putrefaction 
actually illustrates her argument, representing a process of combination and recombination that 
coalesces humans and nonhumans into new forms and beings. In this passage, the insects 
represent participants in rather than the sole cause of putrefaction, setting in motion processes of 
rot and life that neither they nor the human farmer, not to mention the human poet, can fully 
control. Ultimately, this nonhuman life posits an alternative to the ethics of sensibility, an ethics 
of rot that reminds us that our shared, mutating, and affecting materialities could produce life and 
wealth beyond a circumscribed definition of “human.” 
                                                      
85 Allewaert, “Insect Poetics,” 328-29. 
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 Manure and dysentery’s putrefaction rejected sensibility’s implicit and hypocritical 
premise of human supremacy, especially as it enabled chattel slavery. Allewaert argues that 
Grainger’s “insect poetics” revise conventional personification from an “affective operation” that 
effectively erases “diversity” to “a disaffecting operation…[that] tends toward division” rather 
than “connection” (302). On the one hand, putrefaction divides, breaking human subjects down 
into material parts, and, thus, severs bonds based on affective similitude as Adams’s letters 
describe. On the other hand, putrefaction also connects, combining cane stalks and dung into 
manure and rotten cane and humans into a dysentery. In short, putrefaction connects by dividing, 
evolves by devolving. It decomposes a paradigm of common humanity by privileging common 
materiality. It rots Grainger’s writing, sensibility, and humanity, but it also produces new 
“reptile-life,” as the insect infestation illustrates, pointing toward the positive and possibly 
ethical relations these shared materialities could animate. 
 
Landon Carter’s Wormy Sensibility 
While Grainger almost certainly intended The Sugar-Cane for a metropolitan audience, 
he directed his medical treatise to the untrained plantation owner or manager whose profit 
margins, if not humanity, needed to know how “to treat the diseased, till proper advice can be 
called in” (8). Landon Carter, a wealthy plantation owner in Virginia, may have been Grainger’s 
ideal audience. Carter was not a professional doctor—in fact, he frequently criticized the local 
doctors, touting his superior skill—but he carefully documented plantation medical practice in 
his Diary (1752-78).86  
                                                      
86 In one entry, Carter recounts a quarrel with Dr. Flood, who refused to divulge his medicine’s 
ingredients (637-38). In another, he describes to Dr. Jones his own therapeutic system, but the 
doctor, “as Flood did of old, condemned the Practice.” Carter self-importantly concludes, “I 
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Additionally, he recorded his own aches and pains, both literal and affective. He 
repeatedly notes his children’s disobedience, ungratefulness, and perceived treachery. His 
daughter elopes, his son gambles, and none of them visit him as he dies. When one of his 
grandsons hides an illness, Carter complains,  
I wish the Child don’t conceal his sickness long before he speaks of it, for it is 
impossi[ble] such a load [of vomited bile] could be to come off without a complaint 
sooner: he scarcely owned a sickness at his stomach and pretends he has been at stool 
yesterday, but I fancy it is a mistake and have ordered a Clyster in about an hour or two 
after his vomit is over…87  
With vomits and enemas awaiting him, one can imagine why the boy might have lied.88 Carter’s 
diary thus traces the fault line between disobedience and sympathy, hierarchy and sensibility—
particularly between himself and his children and enslaved Africans. Attempting to understand 
Carter’s obscurity, Rhys Isaac argues that the diary’s Southern origin, size, and “erratic,” 
unedited prose all probably contributed to its historical insignificance.89 James Greene argues 
that Carter has been forgotten, because he “failed…to make any lasting impression upon his 
                                                      
disregarded him” (776). While medicine was not yet fully professionalized, Carter’s arrogance is 
striking. 
87 Carter, Diary, 508, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
88 Gail Kern Paster argues that purges and enemas “offered an alluringly ambivalent bodily 
experience” in early modern England, “of pleasure and shame, of erotic release within the 
sanctioned precincts of current therapeutic practice,” which “recall[ed] memory traces of 
infantile sensation.” The Body Embarrassed, 161. Purging, she argues, represented a vital 
moment “in the early history of the subject: the contest for physical autonomy every child wages 
with his/her primary caregivers” (114). See chap. 3. Here, the enema seems to function as a 
disciplinary mechanism of sensibility, delineating and mandating the proper relations of the 
home. 
89 Isaac, Landon Carter’s Uneasy Kingdom, xi, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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generation.”90 Certainly, his personality contributed as well: obsessed with his superiority, 
hierarchy, and self-righteousness, Carter was acutely unlikeable and unsympathetic. 
Though it would seem like Carter was less governed by sensibility than Adams and 
Grainger, and certainly less worried about persuading anyone of his sensibility—after all, he was 
writing a diary—he nonetheless obsesses over the paradigmatic sensible bond: kinship.91 In 
particular, he maintains a steadfast belief in the hierarchy that ruled relations between kin, 
including his children, grandchildren, and slaves. Isaac notes that Carter’s response to his 
daughter’s elopement “rewrote Clarissa,” a classic text of sensibility, “from the point of view of 
old Mr. James Harlowe” (47). Isaac explains, “In the forms of his stories—now sentimental, now 
authoritarian—we can see Landon clearly as a divided individual facing two ways: he wanted to 
be a lordly patriarch like his father, and he wanted to be loved and understood like Pamela or 
Clarissa” (48). This hierarchical sensibility is disrupted, however, when a dysentery epidemic 
and worm infestation upend his plantation and thwart his medical acumen. According to Reno, 
scat is biologically “notable,” because it demonstrates “the ability to incorporate another life 
form without destabilizing organismal form and identity,” indexing the individual’s capacity to 
consume without fundamentally changing.92 Yet the plantation’s bloody, wormy excrement 
threatened not only “organismal form and identity”—what disrupts both more than death?—but 
also the hierarchy implied by excrement itself. Morrison argues, “excrement…is both self and 
other, food made me, and me made waste,” but this wormy dysentery was me made food and me 
                                                      
90 Greene, “Introduction,” 10. For more on his relative obscurity, see 9-10, 28-48. 
91 See pp. 176 on the importance of the family to sympathy and sensibility, especially after the 
Revolution. 
92 Reno, “Toward a New Theory of Waste,” 13. 
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made waste. 93 It rejected sensibility’s hypocritical premise of human supremacy, redefining 
ethical relations in material, anti-hierarchical terms.  
Carter was not averse to sensibility and sentiment, but his feelings and his diary were 
scripted along strict patriarchal and authoritarian lines. When his daughter Susannah died after a 
protracted malarial illness, Carter illustrates his sincere grief: “Severe stroke indeed to A Man 
bereft of a Wife and in the decline of life because at such periods ‘tis natural to look out for such 
Connections that may be reasonably expected to be the support of Greyhairs and such an one I 
had promise myself in this child in Particular” (221). Still, he frames this grief through a limited 
and hierarchical paradigm of the parent-child relationship; parents “natural[ly]” provide for their 
children so that one day they will support them in age and infirmity, a quid pro quo. As 
Boudreau argues, the ideology of sensibility fulfilled a disciplinary function: “through repetition 
and example,” sensibility “could be made to seem natural and original to the individual, not to 
the law…personal feelings are brought into the service of social concord even as subjects believe 
themselves to be acting as individuals” (23). Thus, when Carter invokes sentimental language to 
reaffirm a hierarchical relation, he engages in complementary rather than antithetical disciplinary 
mechanisms.  
While Carter’s beliefs were not necessarily unique, his discipline frequently failed. He 
was plagued by disobedient and disorderly children, in-laws, and grandchildren. “I am much 
mistaken,” he sarcastically muses, “if duty to Parents is not within the Scripture Rule. How can 
you love God whom you have not seen, and dispise Parents who you have seen. I am tortured 
with this species of filial disrespect” (736). Invoking the Bible, Carter aims to be obeyed and 
respected as his family’s earthly God. When he discovers that one of his grandchildren has been 
                                                      
93 Morrison, Excrement in the Late Middle Ages, 155. 
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“sawsy” with his mother, he “gave him one cut over the left arm with the lash of my whip” 
(310). The mother “then rose like a bedlamite that her child should be struck with a whip and up 
came her Knight Errant [her husband, Carter’s son] to his father with some heavy God daming’s, 
but he prudently did not touch me. Otherwise my whip handle should have settled him if I could” 
(310). In this passage, Carter attempts to correct “filial disrespect” with physical remonstrance. 
As the parents’ responses demonstrate, however, such abuse was no longer considered 
appropriate or sensible, leaving little guesswork as to why his children might have disliked and 
disobeyed him. In one of his final entries, Carter sighs, “I see it is in vain to expect much of my 
Children’s Company” (1149). Carter expected the sensible bonds of family to “support” him at 
the end of life, but his authoritarianism, his need to reassert filial hierarchies, seems to have 
strained if not completely severed these affective relations. 
Thus, as he struggles to discipline his “indoors family,” he also fails to discipline his 
outdoors family—his slaves (168). While eight of his slaves used the Revolution as an 
opportunity to escape their fetters and claim freedom, his diary is peppered with small-scale 
rebellions as well.94 Mary purportedly “shams her fits” (604), and “sicke people” suddenly 
“refuse to complain on Sundays because they look on that as holy day and don’t care to be 
confine by physic” (174). As Sharla M. Fett has shown, many Africans feigned illness to resist 
enslaved labor, while many others feigned health to resist the slave master’s invasive, 
dehumanizing, and frequently dangerous physic.95 Most frequently, Carter complains about 
Nassaw, his purportedly alcoholic slave and medical apprentice. He records,  
                                                      
94 For an analysis of this rebellion and its effects on Carter, see Isaac, Landon Carter’s Uneasy 
Kingdom, chap. 1. 
95 See Working Cures, especially chap. 7.  
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I have been obliged to give Nassaw a severe whipping this day. He has every day drunk 
ever since Mulatto Betty [Nassaw’s wife] was taken ill…I have threatened him, begged 
him, Prayed him, and told him the consequences…and yet all will not do; he seems 
resolved to drink in spight of me, and I beleive in order to spight me. (779)  
While Carter does not meditate on Betty’s illness, it seems possible that Nassaw’s binge was 
precipitated by anxiety for his wife’s well-being. Overall, Carter chronicles tale after tale of 
small-scale resistance to his hierarchical relations and discipline. 
Like many of his time and position, Carter underestimated African and African 
Americans’ sensibility. When his “faithful and…profitable servant,” Jack Lubbar, dies, Carter 
observes, “I fancy not a child of mine but would refuse even their duty. In short an Old Parent is 
not so happy as old Jack Lubbar was; for he with only common feelings was blessed with his 
children’s Company” (835, 836). Although Carter acknowledges and even pines for Lubbar’s 
filial affection, he still manages to reject his sensible humanity. Lubbar has “feelings” and 
devoted children, but Carter qualifies this sensible humanity with the adjective “common.” 
Lubbar’s feeling was not and could never be as refined as Carter’s. Yet while Carter strives to 
order his plantation in a strict and racist hierarchy of obedience and refined feeling, Lubbar’s 
story illustrates how sympathetic relations evaded his control: he could not negate his slaves’ 
filial affections, just as he could not manufacture his own. To use Isaac’s terms, “the 
sentimental” and “authoritarian” collided as Carter attempted to order the affective relationships 
between himself and his children, his children and their children, and even his slaves and their 
families. 
When a dysentery epidemic strikes, however, it rots the hierarchies that govern Carter’s 
sensibility. As the entire neighborhood falls ill, Carter, the untrained but well-read and well-
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stocked medical practitioner, notes the ailment: “a violent purging with much gryping and 
bloody stool” (624). Diagnosing “the flux,” which was ravaging settlements along the York and 
James Rivers, Carter orders “Vomits for all” (627). He hoped that the emetics would purge the 
poisonous humors for he was “certain [that] without speedy and carefull evacuation the acrid and 
prodigeous quantity of bile must grow putred and turn into a mortal flux” (627). A “mortal” 
dysentery, he argues, develops from excess, unpurged bile, which could rot or putrefy the body 
from within. He theorizes, “even by the fruit they have eaten their bile grown so rancid as to 
grype them much and tear their bowels which produces these bloody purgings” (632). Moreover, 
if this bile was not purged, it could “concreat[]” the excrement and produce a dangerous 
“Mortification” in the bowels (555). Like Adams and Grainger, Carter describes the dysentery 
epidemic through the common paradigm of putrefaction or mortification. Like Grainger, Carter 
believes that he can safely combat the flux by harnessing and amplifying the body’s natural 
purgings. 
Yet Carter struggles to manage the epidemic, growing increasingly anxious about the 
limits of his medical acumen and treatment. On the one hand, Nassaw informs him that the 
enslaved children are faring better, “their stools…only soft” now (627). On the other hand, “the 
mothers say they [the children’s “stools”] are quite blood and water so that I know not what to 
do” (627-28). When a seven-year-old enslaved girl named Eve “was seized with a cramp in her 
bowels and died in an Instant,” Carter seemed especially shaken:  
She had been setting up at usual times this week, eaten and drank well, walkt about, and 
stooled as regular as can be without any complaint…I don’t know what to think of 
it…No one thought her the least in danger…Something very uncommon must have 
happened or have been done to her that I don’t know of…(631-32) 
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Not only has Carter’s curative regimen failed; his certainty in his own medical knowledge, skill, 
and superiority has eroded as well. 
 Worms further complicate the epidemic. When Carter first diagnoses the “very bloody 
stools” of the flux, he also notes “many worms” (627).96 Consuming the bowels even as the 
rotten bile putrefied them, the worms added to the epidemic’s danger. One enslaved girl, 
Charlotte, who was suffering a “combined disorder of a bilious purging Joined with an 
unconquerable fund of worms,” sipped some beer and suddenly “screamed out…complaining of 
her belly and immediately voided a stool of real excrement, with dead worms and maggots in it” 
(635). She died that day. Carter decides that those “Corrupted worms within must have brought 
on instant death” (636). Though these worms could rot the bowels, like the bile that caused 
dysentery, Carter also characterizes them as voracious consumers. He cries, “these poor 
children…are almost eaten out with the worms” (633). In another case, a man named Phil is 
“devoured” by “a prodigeous number of these animals” (663). Like the “reptile-life” born from 
the Grainger’s rotten cane, these worms survive and persist by consuming and rotting the human 
body. 
Dysentery’s bloody flux could be understood as the body purging itself of corruption and, 
thus, as reconsolidating the human body and subject. The worms, however, disrupted this 
paradigm. Whereas excrement demonstrated how humans retained “organismal form and 
identity,” the wormy dysentery demonstrated how nonhumans maintained their forms and 
                                                      
96 Though he initially blames the worms for the plantation’s illness, he himself soon developed 
“a watry purging” without worms, which suggests that they were probably not the sole cause of 
the epidemic (637). Benjamin Rush notes in his Medical Inquiries and Observations that 
“epidemic dysentery” could be caused by worms, and that worms “frequently…accompan[ied] 
the dysentery” (176). Thus, Carter’s initial diagnosis was in line with the era’s medical 
teachings. 
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identity by consuming us (Reno 13). After all, the presence of worms in feces, whether dead or 
alive, attests to the fact that they have not been digested and incorporated into the human body 
and self. Instead, we have been incorporated into them—a terrifying threat to the hierarchies that 
governed Carter. The wormy dysentery reminded him that “kin” was neither human nor 
deferential. Kin stretched from feeling humans like himself to his rebellious children to his 
unrefined and insensitive slaves to rotten bile, bowels, and worms. As the wormy dysentery 
suggested, humans are embedded in processes that decompose our bodies and selves, but these 
processes also compose new relations that resist human-centered hierarchies. 
Though Carter was strikingly sensitive to perceived wrongs, he rarely extended such 
sensitivity to others. Instead, Carter’s sensible bonds were strictly hierarchical: children followed 
parents, African slaves obeyed white masters, and diseases submitted to astute medical 
practitioners. Yet Carter’s children, his slaves, and the wormy dysentery epidemic rot this 
hierarchy. Carter attempts to reaffirm his authority, arguing that the children “might have been 
saved” if only “anybody followed my orders” (636, 633). By displacing blame, however, he only 
draws attention to his inability to rule effectively. As Fett argues, “Any suggestion of 
independent care for the body signaled a potential threat to the slaveholder’s control over 
enslaved laborers.”97 Ultimately, this wormy dysentery resisted Carter’s particular brand of 
authoritarian sensibility, highlighting the dangerous, hierarchical, disciplinary power that 
sensible humanity enabled. Instead, the wormy dysentery posited an ethics of putrefaction—
shared, mutating materiality—that undermined sensibility’s static and hierarchical relations 
between humans and between humans and nonhumans. 
 
                                                      
97 Fett, Working Cures, 141. 
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Conclusion 
 In the final years of his life, Carter was afflicted by a “costive tendency” and colic— 
constipation and gas (730). He was unable to ride his horse, visit his fields, doctor his family, 
neighbors, and slaves, and eventually could not walk, sleep, or even eat. He attempted many 
cures, including wine, egg yolk, and sleeping fully dressed, but nothing availed. At 67, Carter 
eventually decided, “No such an intimate with old age seldom leaves” (974). While Carter never 
uses the words rotted, putrefied, or corrupted in this context, he believes that old age has 
“weak[ened]” his stomach and bowels, that he is doomed to suffer because of his age (831). As 
the wormy dysentery epidemic highlighted humanity’s mutating materiality, Carter’s aging, 
colic, and constipation rooted him in his mutating, material body. An ethics of putrefaction could 
account for his changing abilities and offer an alternative, more responsive and responsible mode 
of relating and caring for our mutable relation to senses, sensibility, and humanity.  
In his final entry, just three days after he claimed, “it is in vain to expect much of my 
Children’s Company,” Carter reported, “A backwoods visit to see an aged, Very sick almost unto 
death, and very infirm father whose constant care has been to provide well and the best he could 
for his Children” (1149, 1150). Writing of his own “harbinger of death” just weeks before, Carter 
seems to see himself in this dying father (1146). Like Adams, Carter wants to be perceived as 
sensible—and to be treated sensibly. Yet, if the goal of sensibility or sympathy was to be 
responsive to others’ pain and suffering by imagining how one would feel in a similar situation, 
here, Carter projects rather than responds. As Boudreau argues, “sympathy…erase[s] the gap 
between subject and object—not by bringing the two together, but by superimposing the 
spectator’s perceptions onto the body of the perceived image.”98 Carter’s sympathetic 
                                                      
98 Boudreau, Sympathy in American Literature, 12. 
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identification not only elides important differences, but also exposes sensibility’s core limitation: 
the gap between subject and object, human and nonhuman, and human and human perceived to 
be nonhuman. An ethics of putrefaction, however, revised sensibility’s human supremacy, 
including white human supremacy, emphasizing shared, rotting materiality as a potential 
wellspring of responsive relation. 
 Each of these writers engaged rhetorics of sensibility to persuade their audiences and 
themselves of their keen and sensitive humanity. Adams desperately struggled to inscribe both 
her mother’s and her own humanity into her letters, while Grainger tried to reconcile slavery and 
sensibility through the figure of manure. Likewise, Carter attempted to mandate his family’s and 
his plantation’s sensible relations through strict hierarchies. As these writers demonstrate, 
sensibility was a vital paradigm for ordering individual identities and personal relations across 
early America and the early Atlantic world. 
Dysentery, however, disrupted their rhetorics of sensible humanity. It knitted Patty’s 
putrefying body to Adams’s rotting sensibility and letters and, thus, to John, fusing them into a 
chain of putrefying materiality that undermined fellow feeling as the basis for ethical care and 
attention. It revealed the hypocritical paradox at the heart of Grainger’s and the larger Atlantic 
culture’s profession of sensibility—the fact of chattel slavery—but it also envisioned 
decomposition, rot, and putrefaction as productive, engendering life unrestrained by a limited 
paradigm of humanity. It challenged sensibility’s fundamental hierarchies and instead posited an 
ethics based on their putrefaction, the decomposing of standard methods of relating and 
responding to others. In this way, it also joined these disparate writers and their texts together 
across time and space. Ultimately, this ethics of putrefaction revised sensibility, proposing 
relations and connections bred through materiality rather than a circumscribed humanity or 
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human feeling—a lesson that could enable more expansive ideas about human ability and 




Chapter Five: How the West was Undone: Malarial Seasoning in Narratives of Western 
Imperialism 
In the earliest years of colonization, white settlers marveled at the land’s health. Their 
epidemiological environment was not “virgin soil,” but the crowd diseases that plagued Europe 
and England—smallpox, measles, and tuberculosis—seemed nonexistent.1 Yet seasoning 
diseases like malaria forced them to admit that the land itself was not a vacant, salubrious 
paradise.2 While white settlers and chattel slavery probably introduced malaria to the Americas, 
the paradigm of seasoning allowed them to believe that the illnesses that followed their 
settlement—headaches, rhythmic fevers, sweats, wracking chills, and delirium—were local, 
indexing their acclimation to a new environment. 3 By the nineteenth century, they imagined 
seasoning illnesses as a rite of passage, a routine stage in the inexorable march of western 
expansion and colonial progress. As surely as they would survive the illness, they would 
colonize the land.4 
                                                      
1 See pp. 4-6 on the virgin soil model. 
2 Many other diseases like dysentery and typhoid fever were included under the rubric of the 
seasoning. One of the most routinely described seasoning diseases, however, was malaria. 
Because it is impossible to diagnose malaria accurately, I focus on the relationship between the 
environment and illness, which enabled the cultural-historical paradigm and the disease itself. On 
other seasoning diseases, see Gerald L. Cates, “The Seasoning Disease,” and Oscar Reiss, 
Medicine in Colonial America, 267.  
3 In this chapter, I am particularly interested in a “white” paradigm of seasoning, how white 
colonists used seasoning to encourage Western expansion. Slave seasoning included disease 
acclimation, but it also referenced psychological acculturation to slavery.  
4 In Seasons of Misery, Kathleen Donegan provides an important rereading of seasoning, arguing 
that the paradigm was not so teleological during the initial period of American settlement, when 
successful colonization was not guaranteed (6-9). While I am focusing on a later period, 
Donegan’s argument is helpful in explaining the gap between the cultural paradigm of seasoning 
and lived experiences of seasoning diseases like malaria. On early American seasoning more 
generally, see, for example, Joyce Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit, chap. 4. 
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Yet no one was every fully seasoned by malaria. Fevers and chills could cycle for months 
at the slightest provocation, relapses could recur for years, and complete immunity was 
biologically impossible.5 Colonists imagined malaria to be a natural byproduct of the land, one 
that white civilization would inevitably eradicate, but their civilizing actions—felling trees, 
planting crops, and establishing homes—actually created the perfect environmental conditions 
for the disease to thrive.6 As Kathleen Donegan has argued, “Seasoning was something to pass 
through, an inevitable byproduct” or stage “of settlement,” but the actual experience of seasoning 
was far more harrowing than the paradigm itself implied and promised.7 
While malaria did recede from the cold, quickly industrializing North at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, two strains—the benign p. vivax and the deadlier p. falciparum—
persisted in the South until the twentieth century. Moreover, as white pioneers traveled past the 
Appalachian mountains toward the Pacific, p.vivax immigrated west with them. As critics from 
Frederick Jackson Turner and on have argued, the Western frontier represented a particular 
white, male fantasy of unlimited, inexorable expansion. Yet, as Annette Kolodny argues, the 
frontier was also a material place: “a physical terrain that, for at least one group of participants, 
is newly encountered and is undergoing change because of that encounter.”8 One such active 
                                                      
5 For an overview of malaria’s symptoms, strains, and history in America, see Margaret 
Humphreys, Malaria, introduction and chaps. 1-2. 
6 In “The Seasoning Disease,” Cates contends, “the very changes that most colonists felt were 
necessary to a prosperous and vital society produced an environment favorable to the growth and 
dispersal of parasites that would prey upon it” (153). On the relationship between “civilizing” 
forces like deforestation and malaria, see, for example, Cates, J.R. McNeill, Mosquito Empires, 
54-55, and Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land, This South, 83-85.  
7 Donegan, Seasons of Misery, 7. 
8 Kolodny, “Letting Go of Our Grand Obsessions,” 5. Here, I invoke the classic formulations of 
“Manifest Destiny” and “the frontier”: Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History”; Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land; Leslie A. Fiedler, The Return of 
the Vanishing American; Richard Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence and The Fatal 
Environment; Annette Kolodny,  The Lay of the Land; and Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest 
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participant was malaria. Its material symptoms and history exposed the lie at the heart of 
seasoning and imperialism. If immunity was impossible, seasoning’s promises—acclimation, 
acculturation, and colonization—were also impossible or, at the very least, unguaranteed. 
It is impossible and unnecessary to diagnose malaria in the narratives of Western 
imperialism collected here. Instead, this argument analyzes how the cultural paradigm of 
seasoning failed to account for complex, contradictory lived experiences of environmental 
illness—and, thus, how such illnesses resisted colonialism’s mythic teleology. From the late 
eighteenth century through the early nineteenth century, western immigrants like Elizabeth 
House Trist, Timothy Flint, and Caroline Kirkland conflated their illnesses with their local 
environments, invoking the seasoning to fathom their unfathomable experiences and to assure 
themselves of their own survival. Yet each writer experiences an illness that unsettles the 
certainty the paradigm should ensure. In her Travel Diary (1783-84), Elizabeth House Trist 
unsuccessfully searches for signs of familiar civilization as she travels to her new home in 
Natchez, Mississippi. Instead, she discovers an environment that resists her physical and literary 
incursions; environmental illness settles and, therefore, unsettles her body, her journey, and her 
writing. While the powerful promise of inexorable progress was not yet available to her, Timothy 
Flint witnesses the mythos’ proof some thirty years later (in many of the same spaces Trist had 
travelled). Yet, as Flint attempts to settle in the Missouri and Arkansas territories, he realizes that 
the seasoning is neither guaranteed nor certain; malarial illness rejects his fantasy of inevitable 
expansion and ejects him from the West. Similarly, Caroline Kirkland’s more famous works on 
                                                      
Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. Though only Kolodny and Greenberg explicitly 
gender the paradigm, the others implicitly emphasize men’s relationship to the frontier. My 
argument is that “seasoning” complemented the paradigm of manifest destiny, while malaria 
itself undermined it. 
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frontier life—A New Home—Who’ll Follow? (1839), Forest Life (1842), and “Western Clearings 
(1845)—also invoke the teleological myth of Western imperialism. Malarial illnesses, however, 
engender a “fitful” integration into Michigan life, disrupting her elitism as well as her colonial 
rhetoric. The seasoning may have functioned to bolster Western imperialism, but actual 
seasoning illnesses like malaria belied the certainty of civilization’s progress, resisting both 
Western imperialism and the writing of that imperialism. 
Moving through time and space, this argument contends that even as Western 
imperialism became more entrenched in American culture, malarial illness resisted its 
inscription. Even as colonists attempted to actualize Western imperialism, they record seasoning 
as a complicated, unfixed, and unfinished exchange with their environment. Yet the 
environment, as David Mazel, argues, is not a static backdrop for human drama but “‘the action 
of environing,’” an “‘encircl[ing] or ‘surround[ing].’”9 Another word for environing might be 
seasoning. Ultimately, a malarial environing and seasoning rejected the certainty that all disease 
could and would be conquered and, thus, that the West itself could and would be conquered. 
 
Malaria’s Region and Regionalism 
 Malaria is not a single disease, but a constellation of similar symptoms produced by 
different strains of the plasmodium parasite. Nineteenth-century America hosted at least two 
strains: p. vivax and p. falciparum. P. vivax is not typically fatal, but its symptoms—headache, 
rhythmic fever and chills, hallucinations, all of which can relapse for months and even years—
                                                      
9 David Mazel, American Literary Environmentalism, 35. Mazel, however, is suspicious of any 
ecocritical recourse to being, matter, and materiality, emphasizing how culture and history 
condition “the environment.” My hope is that my understanding of seasoning, as a 
“naturalcultural” intra-action (to use Donna Haraway’s term), resists the paradigm of the 
environment as an “ontologically stable, foundational entity” (xii). 
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can lead to chronic anemia and opportunistic infections. If these ailments did not kill 
immediately, they nonetheless made labor difficult and sometimes impossible, and thus poverty, 
malnutrition, and death more likely. In turn, p. falciparum is far deadlier, far more quickly, 
sometimes impairing the central nervous system and causing cerebral malaria. Though both of 
these strains (and possibly more) were present in early America, p. vivax was more widespread.10 
Like yellow fever, malaria is spread by mosquitoes that contract the parasite and infect 
humans during blood meals. In its human host, the parasite retreats to the liver, eventually 
entering the bloodstream to feed and reproduce. In turn, the immune system responds to this 
periodic reproduction, producing the disease’s characteristic rhythmic cycles of fevers and chills. 
Some populations have genetic protections for some strains, while others develop partial or 
acquired resistance through prolonged exposure. Still, even this resistance wanes if the individual 
leaves their malarial environment. Unlike smallpox or yellow fever, malaria never produces full 
immunity. Reinfection is possible and likely in endemic areas. Despite the disease’s vast toll, it 
remains prevalent and virulent, especially in Africa. Though scientists, governments, and the 
World Health Organization have waged coordinated eradication campaigns, much like those they 
successfully implemented for smallpox, quinine, DDT, mosquito nets, and genetically-
engineered mosquitoes have not yet extirpated the dangerous disease. There are at least 156 
plasmodium parasites and 30 anopheles mosquito vectors, and each permutation of the disease 
poses a new complicated life cycle for a vaccine or genetic engineering to solve.11 
                                                      
10 Humphreys, Malaria, introduction and chaps. 1-2. 
11 On etiology and genetic resistance, particularly in the context of race, see Humphreys, 
Malaria, chap. 1, and Kenneth F. Kiple and Virginia Himmelsteib King, Another Dimension to 
the Black Diaspora. For a readable overview of malaria, including eradication attempts, see 
Randall M. Packard, The Making of a Tropical Disease. Packard also contends that eradication 
has failed because the disease is perceived as a “third world” or “tropical” disease. See “Malaria” 
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Of course, early Americans did not fully comprehend malaria’s complex pathology. In 
fact, they rarely used the word “malaria” at all. Instead, the disease’s periodic cycles of fevers 
and chills went by “the ague.” To them, the ague spread not by infected mosquitoes but by the 
swamp’s poisonous miasmas—the “bad air” of mal aria. Agues were associated with swampy 
areas prone to flooding like rice plantations and the banks of the Mississippi River. Hot, humid 
weather and unprotected strolls in the dew produced fevers that induced delirium and chills that 
chattered teeth.  While we cannot know if ever reference to the ague was actually malaria, its 
environmental conditions certainly sound malarial.12 
The swamp’s poisonous miasmas may not have produced disease, but the swamp itself 
provided the ideal breeding conditions for Eastern North America’s most pervasive malarial 
vector, Anopheles quadrimaculatus, which preferred “stagnant, sunlit pools of fresh water,” a 
temperature in the low 80s, and 85% humidity to breed and bite.13 Hot, humid summers enabled 
the sturdier p. vivax to survive as far north as Southern Canada during the nineteenth century, 
while the “more fastidious” p. falciparum required even warmer temperatures and rarely traveled 
farther north than South Carolina.14 In short, malaria thrived in the exact environment that early 
Americans believed disease it did. 
Though they may not have understood malaria’s complex etiology, nor have even 
diagnosed “malaria” at all, they did have a paradigm for explaining the ague and its 
                                                      
and “Anopheles Mosquito” at the CDC on the disease’s lifecycle, including descriptions of 
various parasites and vectors. 
12 On nineteenth-century attitudes toward swamps and health, including how white and black 
Americans perceived swamps differently, see Conevery Bolton Valenčius, The Health of the 
Country, chap. 5, and Monique Allewaert, “Swamp Sublime.” On rice plantations and disease, 
see Peter H. Wood, Black Majority, chap. 3 and McNeill, Mosquito Empires, 203-07. 
13 Andrew McIlwaine Bell, Mosquito Soldiers, 19; Darret B. Rutman and Anita H. Rutman, “Of 
Agues and Fevers,” 36. 
14 Humphreys, Malaria, 11. 
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environmental conditions: seasoning. White immigrants to the West believed that the illnesses 
that followed their settlement—sweating, fevers, and diarrhea—indexed their acclimation to a 
new environment. The land was “seasoning” them. In turn, they used “seasoning” to describe 
both the ague and the cultural attitudes toward it—that is, the belief that it was routine and 
transitory, and that civilization would eventually erase it entirely. Immigrants would survive and 
conquer the disease and, thus, survive and conquer the West itself. 
Just as not every reference to the ague was necessarily malaria, not every reference to the 
seasoning was necessarily malaria. The seasoning probably included diseases like dysentery and 
typhoid fever, but where malarial conditions are described—swamps, deforestation, irrigation, 
and immigration—references to the seasoning ague invariably followed, and malaria was 
certainly probable.15 All three represent decidedly regional phenomenon. Both the ague and 
malaria only survive in particular climates and conditions, while the disease’s cultural 
framework, seasoning, emphasizes place as well. This argument, therefore, is not invested in 
quixotic, retroactive diagnosis; rather, it emphasizes what bound the seasoning, ague, and 
malaria together, culturally, historically, and materially: the local environment. 
If all three were regional, then they also shaped the writing of region. Conventionally, 
regionalism is considered a nineteenth-century genre that responded to New England’s literary 
dominance by representing places outside of the nation’s mainstream. On the one hand, 
regionalism, as Richard Brodhead argues, could fetishize such geographical and cultural others 
and thereby reify a genteel, Anglo, New England audience.16 On the other hand, as Judith 
Fetterley and Marjorie Pryse contend, regionalist literature could critique the sedimented 
                                                      
15 See notes 2 and 6. 
16 See Brodhead, Cultures of Letters. 
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hierarchies of gender, race, and class that dominated the East. Place-based literature could 
naturalize difference as “strange, exotic, or queer,” but Fetterley and Pryse differentiate this 
writing from regionalism, labeling it “local color.”17 While Josephine Donovan contends that 
local color critiques male supremacy, if not always racism and classism, Edward Watts maintains 
that local color “strives for a certain placelessness” that ultimately bolsters a kind of Eastern 
colonialism.18 Whether regionalism and local color are parsed, criticism of these intertwined 
genres revolves around whether a writer’s representation of geographical other either challenges 
or reinforces Eastern cultural hierarchies. 
In spite of their names, however, criticism of regionalism and local color find material, 
geographical, climatic places to be relatively unimportant. Watts maintains that local color’s 
“placelessness” is imperial in its universalizing impulse, implicitly highlighting the importance 
of place, but his interest still resides in the human culture of a place. Likewise, Fetterley and 
Pryse define region and regionalism through social “rather than physical and ‘natural’ 
borders.’”19 Though they both contend that good regionalism deconstructs Eastern hierarchies by 
attending to a particular place, neither links this meaning to the land itself.  
Gary Snyder’s bioregionalism, however, could help emphasize the region in regionalism. 
He asserts, “Our relation to the natural world takes place in a place”: it is not only local culture 
that creates a region but also “natural criteria” like waterways and rock shelves.20 Malaria may 
not have been a “natural” byproduct, shaped as it was by human immigration and deforestation, 
                                                      
17 Fetterley and Pryse, Writing Out of Place, 29. 
18 Watts, An American Colony, 183. 
19 Fetterley and Pryse, Writing Out of Place, 4. 
20 Snyder, The Practice of the Wild, 42, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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but it did inform how people lived in a place.21 When Snyder claims, “We have the terms 
enculturation and acculturation, but nothing to describe the process of being placed or re-
placed,” he misses the (admittedly outmoded) paradigm of seasoning, which not only derived 
from the material experience of living in a place—from acquired immunity—but subsequently 
framed how newcomers lived that place (27). The malarial region seasoned and environed, 
shaping how humans lived a place and, thus, how humans wrote about the place they lived. 
Of the writers analyzed here, only Kirkland could be considered a regionalist in the 
conventional sense (and even then, critics disagree on her representation of region, discussed 
below). Whether Trist, Flint, or Kirkland considered themselves regionalists or not—not to 
mention whether critics consider them regionalists or not—their malarial illnesses embed their 
writing in region. In turn, these illnesses shaped their experiences of the West, their writing of 
the West, and myths about the West, including seasoning and Manifest Destiny. They may not be 
regionalists, but malaria makes their writing regional.  
 
Elizabeth House Trist’s Oppressive Seasoning: When the Environment Settles the Settler 
 Elizabeth House Trist’s Travel Diary is considered the first of its kind: “the earliest 
surviving travel diary of a white woman” to cross the Allegheny Mountains.22 In December 
1783, she left her young son and mother in Philadelphia to join her husband in Natchez, in the 
                                                      
21 As theorists like Bruno Latour and Donna Harraway have shown, the paradigm of “natural” 
falsely separates nature from culture. Malaria’s growth and eventual disappearance in the Old 
Northwest illustrate how human-engineered changes in the environment shaped the region 
beyond the false dichotomy of nature/culture. 
22 Kolodny, The Land Before Her, 37. Trist’s diary was never published in her lifetime but 
probably circulated among friends and family, including Thomas Jefferson. Susan Clair 
Imbarrato suggests that such diaries could have reached an audience of 20-30 people. Travelling 
Women, 27. Kolodny recovered the diary, including analysis in The Land Before Her, and edited 
and annotated it for publication in the collection, Journeys in New Worlds. 
 209 
internationally disputed Mississippi Territory. Her diary breaks this journey into three parts: the 
trek from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, featuring daily accounts of her lodgings; one long, 
retroactive entry recounting her time in Pittsburgh waiting for the Ohio to thaw; and, the final leg 
from Pittsburgh to Natchez down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, including near daily entries 
on the environment. When she finally arrived in Natchez, she discovered that her husband had 
died months earlier, so she immediately began to plan her voyage home. While Trist’s travels 
and writing predate the nineteenth-century’s faith in Western expansion, she actively sought 
familiar signs of Eastern civilization on the frontier. As Susan Clair Imbarrato writes, Trist was 
“less interested in conquering a land than in finding a comfortable place to rest for the night.”23 
Yet, as Amy Kaplan has shown, women’s Western writing frequently deployed “manifest 
domesticity” rather than “manifest destiny,” constructing the home as the site of empire. As one 
of, if not the first woman to describe her journey West, however, Trist envisions the wilderness 
not as refuge, fortune, or potential but as an unsettlingly oppressive environment of raging 
waters, nagging mosquitoes, and wracking fevers and chills. Her harrowing descriptions are 
inseparable from her intent: to settle. She does not make a home of the wilderness; the 
wilderness makes a home of her, settling and unsettling her attempts to domesticate her Western 
region through familiar tropes, including domesticity and the sublime.  
 The first part of House’s diary establishes the importance of home and domestic spaces, 
not only for “traveling women,” as Imbarrato contends, but also for women colonizing the West. 
For the most part, however, the accommodations en route to Pittsburgh are less than satisfactory. 
One home is “so dirty that I would rather have slept out of doors,” while others force her to 
                                                      
23 Imbarrato, “Ordinary Travel,” 32. On Trist’s emphasis on home, see Kolodny, The Land 
Before Her, 37-47, and Imbarrato, Travelling Women, 187-200. 
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cohabitate with smelly “pickling tubs” and even men.24 Imbarrato argues that such descriptions 
could have functioned as a travel guide, instructing others, particularly women, on where and 
where not to stay.25 Yet in the context of her own journey’s intention, Trist’s abiding interest in 
accommodations and domestic spaces reveal a potent anxiety about home on the frontier. 
 Trist’s desire for a familiar, Eastern standard of home was not unique. In “Manifest 
Domesticity,” Amy Kaplan famously argues that nineteenth-century white women engaged in 
Western imperialism through their domestic rhetoric: “Through the process of domestication, the 
home contains within itself those wild or foreign elements that must be tamed; domesticity not 
only monitors the borders between the civilized and the savage but also regulates the traces of 
the savage within itself.”26 If white men used guns and agriculture to colonize the West, women 
used silverware, doilies, and gentility. Other critics, however, have argued that women writers 
were rarely able to establish such dominion.27 Rain and dirt snuck through crevices, cooking took 
hours without Eastern amenities, and good help could rarely be found. In other words, living on 
the frontier challenged the white woman’s authority over her personal fiefdom and thereby 
destabilized her purportedly imperial function. Cathryn Halverson posits, “if prescriptive 
domestic texts reinforce the ideology of imperialism, then perhaps those that allow domestic 
upheaval,” as Western texts invariably do, “undermine it.”28 Though “Manifest Domesticity” 
was still imaginatively viable, an undeniably powerful colonial tool, the frontier’s material 
conditions undermined its rhetorical potential. Trist may precede the primary era of “Manifest 
                                                      
24 Trist, Travel Diary, 204, 205, 206, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
25 See Imbarrato, “Ordinary Travel.” 
26 Kaplan, “Manifest Domesticity,” 582.  
27 See, for example, Kolodny, The Land Before Her; Brigitte Georgi-Findlay, The Frontiers of 
Women’s Writing; and Janet Floyd, Writing the Pioneer Woman. 
28 Cathryn Halverson, Playing House in the American West, 25. 
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Domesticity”—the nineteenth century—but her routine criticism of domestic spaces foreshadows 
its rise. Moreover, her persistent quest for signs of civilization inadvertently revealed how the 
frontier itself undermined such gendered, classed, and colonial rhetoric. 
 Trist’s skepticism of the frontier home is compounded by the diary’s second part—her 
extended stay in Pittsburgh, the then gateway to the West. At first, she seems elated to have 
reached the outpost, claiming, “I like the situation of Pittsburg mightily” (213). Yet she quickly 
qualifies her ardor: “I shou’d be contented to end my days in the Western country” if only there 
were “good Society” (213). After five months, however, none of this admittedly limited passion 
for Pittsburgh remained. She leaves the city “with as little regret as I ever did any place that I had 
lived so long in” (214). Undoubtedly, she was anxious to begin the final leg of her journey and 
reunite with her husband, but her shift in tone also recalls her initial qualification. She could have 
considered Pittsburgh home if it had “good Society”—in other words, if it weren’t the frontier. 
Similarly, on an excursion to “Cherties settlement,” outside of Pittsburgh, Trist contends, “Here 
and there a farm wou’d present it self to our view with a few acres around it clear’d. But the 
country is yet in a very rude state or else it wou’d afford many beautifull prospects” (213). As 
Kolodny asserts, “Trist everywhere sought out…the open clearings of recognizable settlement 
or, where these were lacking, the signs that such settlement might soon be possible.”29 Trist, like 
many other women immigrants, Kolodny argues, sought signs of familiar environmental patterns 
in attempt to assuage some of the trauma and anxiety of male-driven immigration. She clearly 
desired familiar, Eastern signs of home and settlement, but home seemed impossible rather than 
inevitable. 
                                                      
29 Kolodny, The Land Before Her, 37. 
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 Though the absence of settlement unsettled Trist, the wilderness’s overwhelming 
presence also provoked her. During this same excursion, she cannot imagine the land’s potential 
for cultivation and utterly fails to assuage her anxiety: 
For my part, I felt oppres’d with so much wood towering above me in every direction and 
such a continuance of it. A little opening now and then, but a very confined Prospect: 
nothing but the Heavens above and the earth beneath…I began at last to conceit myself 
Attlass with the whole World upon my shoulders. My spirits were condenc’d to nothing. 
My head began to ach[e], and I returned to town quite sick. (213-14) 
Overwhelmed by the infinite expanse of the forest, her “spirits…condenc’d to nothing,” Trist 
imagines herself to be Atlas, the Greek God who holds the world upon his shoulders. Her head 
aches, she grows sick, and she abandons the trip entirely. She is “oppres’d” by her environment 
not invigorated by its potential, adventure, or sublime terror. 
 This passage rejects the sublime paradigm for perceiving and writing a frontier home, 
echoing, modifying, and perhaps even influencing Thomas Jefferson’s infamous description of 
the Natural Bridge in Notes on the State of Virginia. Trist and Jefferson became close friends and 
correspondents after meeting at the House family’s inn in Philadelphia, and Trist and eventually 
died at Monticello in 1828. Kolodny argues that Jefferson was the diary’s intended audience, its 
descriptions of flora and fauna in the third part a reflection of Jefferson’s own natural historical 
interests.30 In a letter to him from her time in Pittsburgh, she writes, “Whatever observations I 
am capabl of making I shall not fail to communicate to you,” but admits that she cannot match “a 
Philosophical mind like yours,” which “can gather information from all you see…and make such 
                                                      
30 Kolodny, “Introduction,” 184-88, 196-97. 
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observations as will benefit Mankind in general.”31 Jefferson probably did not read the diary 
before publishing Notes, but their correspondence could have shaped it.32 
  At the time, the sublime represented one of the most prominent paradigms for ordering 
the overwhelming experience of human finitude at the expense of nature. In his classic treatise 
on the subject, Edmund Burke writes, “Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, 
and danger, that is to say, whatever is any sort terrible…is a source of the sublime.”33 If “danger 
or pain press too nearly,” however, “they are incapable of giving any delight” (13-14). Thus, the 
sublime is produced “at certain distances, and with certain modifications” (14), such as “looking 
down from a precipice” rather than “looking up” (52). Jefferson, however, experiences the 
inverse: he falls to his knees and develops “a violent head ach” while looking down from the 
famous natural bridge, finding this perspective “painful and intolerable.” 34 Yet he finds “the 
view…from below…delightful in an equal extreme” (23). As Gordon M. Sayre argues, Jefferson 
modifies the scene’s “painful” sublimity by numerically and economically measuring the bridge. 
Ultimately, then, “the sublime tempts reason to abandon itself, only to return and reclaim 
sovereignty.”35 Both Burke and Jefferson suggest that the experience of the sublime revolved 
around perspective—both physical and literary. 
 Outside of Pittsburgh, however, Trist is too physically and emotionally near her 
environment to invoke the sublime aesthetic. After all, it was out of this wilderness that she was 
                                                      
31 Eliza House Trist to Thomas Jefferson, April 13th, 1784, Founders Online. On this 
correspondence, see Imbarrato, Declarations of Independency, 77-84. 
32 On Trist and Jefferson’s relationship, see Kolodny, “Introduction,” 184-88, and Imbarrato, 
Declarations of Independency. 77-84, and Travelling Women, 187-200. 
33 Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, 
13, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
34 Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 23, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
35 Sayre, “If Thomas Jefferson had Visited Niagara Falls,” 160. 
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tasked with building a home. As she looks up at the vast, infinite expanse of the trees, she 
imagines herself not as the heroic Atlas supporting the world but as the burdened Atlas tasked 
with maintaining order and cohesion amidst chaos. While Jefferson manipulates his perspective, 
maintaining his “reason” and “sovereignty,” as Sayre contends, Trist finds both utterly unsettled. 
She is made sick because she gazes upon her new home—a harrowing perspective compounded 
by the fact that she, as a woman, was the one burdened with carving genteel, domestic order 
from the chaotic wilderness. As Judith Fetterley argues, “Assigned the task of home-making and 
committed to the values associated with the home, women nevertheless frequently experienced 
homelessness on the frontier,” while men’s “agenda of upward mobility” provided “little 
incentive to make homes,” only to move further West.36 Trist’s perspective is fixed in a way that 
Jefferson’s is not; she gazes upon home—not an interesting natural phenomenon or potential site 
for industry. While later colonists and writers could invoke the certainty of manifest destiny and 
domesticity, Trist, travelling and writing at the very beginning of the Republic, found little surety 
in any ideological or rhetorical framework. 
 As she finally begins the last leg of her journey, the environmental oppression that she 
experiences outside of Pittsburgh is only exacerbated by the Mississippi River and its implacable 
mosquitoes. “The land” does not “remain[] external” to her, as Imbarrato argues, because “she 
has neither the spirit nor inclination toward communion with nature alone.”37 Rather, the 
environment penetrates Trist, physically and psychologically infiltrating and overwhelming her. 
On the Mississippi, she describes, “our teasing visitants,” mosquitoes, who are “not to be borne” 
and who “have allmost done for me already” (222). She remains hopeful in this entry, noting the 
                                                      
36 Fetterley, Provisions, 122. 
37 Imbarrato, Declarations of Independency, 82. 
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netting she plans to use to keep them at bay. Yet just a week later, she writes, “The Musquitos 
bite and tease me so much that my life is allmost a burthen to me. I do sincerely think that all the 
wealth of the Indias wou’d not induce me to live in a Musquitoe country” (227). Two days later, 
“I am so stung with the Musquitos that I look as if I was in the hight of the small pox…I am in a 
continual fever with the effects of their venom” (228). Exceedingly distressed by the mosquitoes 
and so extensively bitten that she looked as if she had smallpox, Trist asserts that all the wealth 
in the world could not persuade her to live in “Musquitoe country.” Of course, this was exactly 
her journey’s intent: to make a home in Natchez, Mississippi, which would suffer from arbopod 
viruses like yellow fever and malaria through the twentieth century.38 Trist cannot distance 
herself or manipulate her perspective as the sublime required, because she encounters an 
environment that encounters her. The mosquito bites unsettle her intent to settle the land by 
settling her. 
 Moreover, Trist connects these mosquitoes to the illness that soon claims her. Though 
mosquitoes would not be identified as malarial vectors until the twentieth century, Trist claims 
that they provoke “a continual fever with the effects of their venom” (228). Given the land she 
passes through, it is probable that malaria was present. The inundated and humid banks of the 
Mississippi River in the summer would have been an ideal breeding ground for anopheline 
vectors, while extensive immigration (including Native American removal)—evidenced by the 
fact that her group cannot catch game close to the shore (217)—would have introduced the 
plasmodium parasite. Trist’s travelling companion, Polly, is unwell with a fever and headache in 
                                                      
38 See Humphreys, Malaria, chaps. 3-5 and Yellow Fever and the South, chap. 5 for how both 
diseases persisted in the deep south until nearly the mid-twentieth century. 
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late May (216-17), and Trist herself complains of “a continual fever” (228). 39 At the end of her 
trip, she describes being attacked by “a violent headach,” feeling so ill that her “heart sinks”: “I 
feel so weak that I can hardly keep my self a live” (232). Both Kolodny and Imbarrato suggest 
that news of her husband’s death, which she learned about just before arriving in Natchez, could 
have caused this distress.40 It is also possible, even probable, that Trist was suffering from 
malaria. Instead of making an impossible diagnosis, however, her fever and lassitude become 
meaningful in the context of her earlier environmental illness outside of Pittsburgh and her 
attention to how this new region, including the mosquitoes, affected her body and mind. Trist 
never uses the word seasoning, but her penetrating and oppressive environment refuses the 
certainty that the paradigm would eventually ensure. 
Ultimately, Trist’s frontier region is oppressive, because it is frighteningly reciprocal. It 
settles her as she attempts to settle it, refusing familiar frames like the sublime, the seasoning, 
and civilization. Trist’s distress culminates in an apocalyptic passage about the Mississippi 
River: 
My patience is allmost exausted. What with the Musquitos and head winds, I am allmost 
sick. The passage early in the Spring wou’d be pleasant, but at present there is nothing 
but trouble. I have various ideas about this river: --[I] sometimes conceit—I am got to the 
fag end of the world; or rather that it is the last of Gods creation and the Seventh day 
                                                      
39 Kolodny initially posited that Polly was Trist’s slave or servant in The Land Before Her, but 
she argues in her introduction to the text that Polly was probably “a younger relative or family 
friend who joined Trist to provide companionship and for her own [unknown] motives as well” 
(198). Importantly, Polly made Trist’s journey “possible as propriety decreed that middle-class 
white women did not travel alone to the frontier” (198). She is infrequently referred to in the 
journal. 
40 Kolodny, “Introduction,” 194, and The Land Before Her, 47; Imbarrato, “Ordinary Travel.” 
45. 
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came before it was quite finnish’d. At other times, I fancy there has been some great 
revolution in nature, and this great body of water has forced a passage were it was not 
intended and tore up all before it. (227) 
Here, Trist conjures three devastating scenarios to explain her malarial, windy, diluvial 
environment: the end of the natural world; an unfinished, un-providential natural world; or, a 
rebellious, self-designed natural world. Each of these possibilities bespeaks terror of an agential 
environment, unchecked by God or by her pen. Moreover, each of these descriptions of the 
Mississippi River suggests the impossibility of successful colonization. After all, if God couldn’t 
get it right, how could Trist? It is not, therefore, that Trist only hopes to see the natural world as 
a garden as Kolodny argues, nor that her “relationship with her environment is primarily a 
pragmatic one,” focused on food and travel as Imbarrato contends.41 Rather, between her 
experience outside of Pittsburgh, the fevers and headaches on the Mississippi, and this passage, 
the frontier environment rejects those ideological frames like the sublime, seasoning, and 
civilization that would enable her to settle herself and the land. Instead, the malarial region 
penetrates her body and her writing, provoking physical and psychological illness. 
 The seasoning paradigm held that humans would acclimate to their environment through 
a period of illness, and that with time and white, human civilization would eradicate such 
illnesses entirely. Trist’s frontier, however, was not so neat and orderly. Whereas the seasoning 
promised that a human actor would acclimate and eventually dominate a static land, Trist’s 
illnesses and writing reveal an active and penetrating environment that resisted the seasoning’s 
teleology. Though Western colonization was not yet considered inexorable in 1783 when Trist 
was writing, her experiences of the Western frontier’s active, penetrating, and reciprocal 
                                                      
41 Imbarrato, Declarations of Independency, 71. 
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environment marked an important uncertainty at the heart of the seasoning paradigm and the 
colonization it would eventually function to secure. Malaria knit region into her regional writing. 
 
Timothy Flint’s “Extraordinary” Seasoning: When the Environment Expels the Settler 
 Whereas Trist yearned for signs of Eastern civilization, Timothy Flint, following the 
same path through Pittsburgh and down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers thirty years later, 
witnessed proof of colonization’s inexorable progress at every turn. As he records in his 
Recollections of the Last Ten Years (1826), by 1815 Pittsburgh was not only “romantic and 
delightful,” but “so often described as to render uninteresting any new attempt of the kind.”42 
While Trist lamented the lack of “good Society” (213), Flint admitted that the city had already 
peaked; any description would be redundant, and the “wealth, business, and glory of this place 
are fast passing away, transferred to Cincinnati, to Louisville, and other places on the Ohio” (17). 
Trist’s boundless forests and inundated banks had transformed into large, thriving cities like 
Cincinnati and Natchez that very nearly rivaled the East.  
Though Flint would only temporarily settle in the Missouri territory, he fully intended to 
make a home in the West, repeatedly affirming his faith in Western expansion and romantic 
notions of early settlement and trailblazing frontiersmen—a mythos unavailable to Trist by virtue 
of her time and gender. Eventually Flint would settle in Cincinnati and even publish classic 
Western narratives, including a biography of Daniel Boone (1833). Yet his first foray on the 
frontier, documented in Recollections, fails to establish the linear, inexorable myth of Western 
progress.43 Flint’s seasoning is neither uniform nor guaranteed; deadly swamps, fevers, and 
                                                      
42 Flint, Recollections of the Last Ten Years, 17, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
43 In his postcolonial study of the Midwest, An America Colony, Watts argues that Flint’s writing 
resisted Eastern colonization of the West, “ventur[ing] an alternative and pluralized” United 
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mosquitoes evade his physical and literary control, puncturing the mythic West that animates his 
writing. Unlike Trist, Flint believed colonization and settlement was inexorable, but as his illness 
failed to progress to a guaranteed end—to the state of being seasoned—Recollections failed to 
chronicle, even if it still valued, a teleological Western imperialism. 
 Like many of his white, male compatriots, Flint both fetishizes early, rustic frontier 
settlement, and imagines colonization and civilization as inevitable and teleological.44 He 
delights in “the exploits of the old race of men,” their “undaunted heroism” and “more than 
mortal endurance” in their combat with Native Americans and nature, even as he tags them as 
“old” and outdated (161). That is, he fetishizes the earliest frontier settlers, what Watts calls “the 
leftovers of the Middle Ground, the ‘new-made Indians,’ the frontiersmen, settlers, and 
voyagers.”45 Yet he also fantasizes about future stages of colonial progress: 
In the midst of these primeval scenes, the patient and laborious father fixes his family. In 
a few weeks they have reared a comfortable cabin, and other out buildings. Pass this 
place in two years, and you will see extensive fields of corn and wheat…Pass it in ten 
years and the log buildings will have disappeared…The Arcadian aspect of humble and 
retired abundance and comfort, will have given place to a brick house… (53) 
Elicited by the “primeval” forest, this fantasy both “admit[s]” the “inexpressible charm in the 
pastoral simplicity of those [early] years” and imagines further Western progress as inexorable—
the “comfortable cabin” is slowly expanded to a large farm and eventually a “brick house” (53). 
                                                      
States rather than “‘a universal Yankee nation’” (139). While Flint’s later works, including the 
Western Monthly Review, may evince such pride in Western life, his much earlier Recollections, 
written on the margins of civilization in the Missouri Territory, evidences no such faith—let 
alone pride—in the frontier’s progress. 
44 See note 8. On how many Western writers advanced more nuanced, less “mythic” conceptions 
of expansion and “Manifest Destiny,” see David M. Wrobel, Global West, American Frontier. 
45 Watts, An American Colony, 124. 
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Thus, Flint charts the progress that Henry Nash Smith’s seminal study of the West codified—the 
wild, “half savage” frontiersman “[b]lazed trails that the hard-working farmers could follow”— 
aestheticizing and mythologizing Frederick Jackson Turner’s “perennial rebirth” of the Western 
frontier.46 In this negotiation of romantic past and inexorable future, Flint was not unique, 
particularly at a moment when that past was receding quickly in places like Cincinnati where he 
wrote. As he waited for the Ohio to thaw, his clearly imagined his own immigration as part of 
that inevitable march of Western expansion across the frontier. 
His tales of seasoning, however, undermine the inexorability of the pioneer’s progress by 
highlighting a powerful, active, and deadly environment. When Flint finally begins to traverse 
the Mississippi River, its flooded, brackish water, humid heat, and mosquitoes puncture his faith 
in Western expansion. Whereas the banks of the Ohio “are destined shortly to become almost a 
continued village” (39), the Mississippi bespeaks only danger and depression, as it did to Trist 
before him. He writes, “Cultivation becomes more unfrequent” (84); “The country begins to 
exhibit the sombre aspect of swamp and inundation,” and while the “perfect regularity” of the 
trees “excites a momentary feeling of pleasure…it soon becomes dreary to the eye, from its sad 
monotony, and from mental associations with it, of fever and ague, and musquitoes” (84). Flint 
cannot conjure the efficient farmer that cleared the woods and planted brick houses outside of 
Cincinnati; instead, the swamp only conjures fevers, agues, mosquitoes, and, thus, the “perpetual 
destitution of human habitations” (84). In Cincinnati, the march of trailblazers and farmers is 
inevitable and infinite, but on the Mississippi only the absence of civilization seems “perpetual.” 
 Swamps, therefore, figure as deadly locales. On the banks of the Mississippi, Flint 
records muddy water, thick tree roots, snakes, mosquitoes, algae, and Spanish moss rather than 
                                                      
46 Smith, Virgin Land, 53; Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 32. 
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people, houses, and farmland. The water “is covered with a thick coat of green matter,” where 
mosquitoes “swarm…in countless millions” (262). Water moccasins hide and hiss under the 
“funereal drapery” of Spanish moss, while only “the hum of musquitoes” breaks “the death-like 
silence” (262). Flint concludes, “There is not, that I know, an object in nature, which produces 
such a number of sepulchral images as the view of the cypress forests” and their swamps (262). 
As Conevery Bolton Valenčius argues, most nineteenth-century Americans believed swamps 
were “intrinsically unhealthy”: “the overabundance of water…was like the overabundance of 
humors…unbalanced and dangerous.”47 Moreover, as Monique Alleweart argues, swamps 
“confounded Anglo-European efforts to mine American landscapes to produce commodities, to 
further science, and to fulfill conventional aesthetic categories” like the sublime, and, thus, 
undermined white men’s ability to delineate and reify their subjectivities through “empiricism, 
reason, or aesthetic appreciation.”48 If the sublime functioned to affirm human sovereignty, as 
Sayre argues, then the swamp’s watery and feverish nature seemed to unsettle human bodies and 
subjectivities. Hence, Flint renders the landscape in exceedingly gothic terms. The fevers that the 
land conjures ultimately remind him that he is enmeshed in and potentially unmade by this 
“sepulchral” region. 
 Unsurprisingly, Flint and his family suffer repeatedly from bilious, remittent, and 
intermittent fevers. Fevers designated “bilious” were typically sustained and severe, like yellow 
fever, which Benjamin Rush would christen “malignant bilious” to differentiate from “the 
common bilious fever.”49 Both remittent and intermittent fevers waxed and waned, but 
                                                      
47 Valenčius, The Health of the Country, 146, 146-47. 
48 Allewaert, Ariel’s Ecology, 34, 36. 
49 Rush, Observations upon the Origin of the Malignant Bilious, or Yellow Fever in 
Philadelphia, 5. 
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“intermittent” typically classified those fevers that recurred regularly, after a particular length of 
time had elapsed, as in the classic symptom of malaria. A quotidian fever recurred daily, while 
tertian and quartan fevers recurred every third or fourth day. Still, none of these terms were 
entirely fixed at the time. Moreover, some malarial infections can present a sustained fever in a 
person’s first infection.50 For example, in A New Home, Who’ll Follow? Caroline Kirkland’s 
narrator, Mary Clavers, first suffers an intense fever before developing the more conventional 
symptoms of the “ague.” At any point, a bilious fever could transform into an intermittent and 
vice versa. As Flint’s family grows increasingly ill during their Western settlement, he employs 
all of these terms to describe their ailments. 
Though it is impossible to definitively diagnose Flint’s illness as malaria or not, he links 
his repeated bouts of fever to what we now know were malarial environments. On an excursion 
to the Illinois River from his farm outside of St. Louis, Missouri, Flint develops a “bilious fever” 
from “heat, bad food, and exposure”—not to mention “the air of the Illinois, charged at this 
sultry season with miasma,” that ague’s traditional scapegoat (131-32). Thoroughly “prostrated” 
for almost two months by “infantine weakness” (133), he hallucinates: he is “unable to 
recognize” his “friends,” but able to “repeat[] whole passages” of poetry in “different 
languages,” a feat he could not recreate after his illness (132). He hears “two flutes playing 
harmonies in the most exquisite and delightful airs,” and witnesses visual apparitions as well, 
seeing “an insufferable glare of light” around peoples’ heads, “like a dazzling glory” (133). 
Malaria’s high fever can produce confusion, but auditory and visual hallucinations are less 
common.51 Typhoid fever, however, could produce these symptoms and remains difficult to 
                                                      
50 Humphreys, Malaria, 28. See also Dorothy Crawford, Deadly Companions, 36. 
51 Crawford, Deadly Companions, 36. 
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differentiate from malaria.52 Similarly, cinchonism, an overdose of the Peruvian or Jesuit bark’s 
active ingredient quinine, could also produce tinnitus and minor hallucinations.53 Caroline 
Kirkland’s description of quinine’s effects—“a prismatic halo—an edging of rainbow”—
resembles the “glare of light” Flint sees around peoples’ heads.54 It is likely that Flint ingested 
the bitter bark as part of the “painful process” of healing; quinine was prescribed for all fevers, 
even though it only works against malaria. While it is probable that Flint suffered at least one 
malarial infection during the ten years that Recollections records, it is impossible and 
unnecessary to diagnose his case. 
 Instead, his indictment of the environment provides a better frame—seasoning—to 
analyze his illness. Even before Flint describes his symptoms, he identifies his disease as the 
seasoning, explaining, “Emigrants generally suffer some kind of sickness, which is called 
‘seasoning,’ implying that it is the summit of the gradual process of acclimation” (131). He 
defines seasoning as the final stage in the utterly normal process of environmental acclimation, 
noting that the locals are utterly unimpressed and unperturbed by it: “when a person has no more 
than simple fever and ague, he is hardly allowed to claim the immunities of sickness” (266). (In 
fact, long-standing settlers probably did contract less severe malarial infections through acquired 
resistance.55) The language of “the summit” suggested that the “gradual process” of seasoning 
would eventually net a finished product—the state of being “seasoned.” Undoubtedly, the 
paradigm of seasoning made the harrowing experience of a disease like malaria livable by 
                                                      
52 See note 2 and, especially, John Wain et al., “Typhoid Fever.”  
53 Sonia Shah, The Fever, 97. 
54 Kirkland, Forest Life, 14. 
55 See Humphreys, Malaria, chap. 1 and Alyssa Barry and Diana Hansen, “Naturally Acquired 
Immunity to Malaria.”  
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ensuring that the disease would end. Yet, as the language of “gradual progress” and inevitable 
ends implied, it also functioned to warrant the imperial project. 
 Flint’s seasoning, however, is neither routine nor finished. Despite claiming his disease 
was one that all immigrants “generally suffer,” he insists that his experience was 
“extraordinary,” marshalling the authority of his physicians who “agreed with all who saw me, 
that my case was so” (131). He even notes that he must record his symptoms because “very few 
live to record the issue of a sickness like mine” (31). Along with the adjective “extraordinary,” 
this assertion contradicts the relative ordinariness implied by the seasoning paradigm and 
teleology.  
Moreover, he and his family never actually reach seasoning’s “summit”; they remain 
fevered and chilled the remainder of their time in the West. In the fall of 1818, all but one of his 
family were “siezed…with the bilious fever” (217). Flint and his wife “both had fever and ague 
long after the regular fever had left us. I had seventy fits of the ague, laboring under this dreadful 
complaint the greater part of the year” (217). At another point, Flint escapes the fever that claims 
the rest of his family, but he nonetheless suffers from the “excessively sultry” climate, “the 
groans of my family, calls for medicine and drink, suffocation behind my [mosquito] curtain,” 
and “the agony of musquitoe stings as soon as I was exposed to the air” (271). Even after the 
family decides to quit their Western life, they fall victim to the ague on the banks of the 
Mississippi on their return journey (284-85). As Flint concludes, “I saw that I could not long 
survive in that region…and commence[d] a journey…for my native land” (374). Though we 
cannot know if Flint truly suffered from malaria, we do know that his illness belied seasoning’s 
guarantee.  
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Flint’s “extraordinary” seasoning insists that acclimation to the environment was not an 
easy, linear process with a guaranteed end—seasoned—but a reciprocal, ongoing relationship—
seasoning. After all, even acclimated insiders were never truly immune. Though they may have 
acquired some resistance, they could never be immune to malaria like they were to viral diseases 
like smallpox and yellow fever. Flint is never fully seasoned or acclimated to the land; instead, 
the fevers and chills expel him from it, undermining that myth of inexorable progress. If being 
seasoned was no longer guaranteed, then neither was frontier civilization. 
Flint fails to create a home on the frontier, but the frontier makes a home in him. When 
he and his family finally return to New England, he has changed so much that his friends must 
“suppress surpize and exclamation” at how “time and disease” had ravaged his “countenance” 
(381). Flint does not conquer the West like the heroic trailblazer he lionizes or even like the 
efficient farmer he considers inevitable. Instead, the West conquers him, penetrating, 
transforming, and ejecting him from the land. Though the paradigm of seasoning recognized that 
the human body and environment necessarily intra-acted, it also promised that this intra-action 
would net a hardier, more robust human by the end. Flint’s altered appearance, however, exposes 
the limits of this promise, demonstrating that seasoning was a messy, uncertain, reciprocal, and 
ongoing process that never necessarily led to a finished product, whether that product be 
“seasoned” or “civilization.” After all, civilization could only be ensured if white people 
remained there to produce it. 
 Both Trist and Flint encounter lands that encounter them, but Flint’s settlement was 
founded in a faith in civilization’s progress that was inaccessible to Trist because of time and 
gender. Flint eventually settled in the West, in Cincinnati, but by the late 1820s Cincinnati was 
no longer a backwoods outpost but a thriving city of over 16,000 people. The Ohio was outfitted 
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with all the accoutrement of civilization that Trist could have desired: “brick houses, ornamented 
court-yards, trellis-wrought summer-houses, fruit-gardens, and within, carpets, side-boards, and 
sofas” (378-79). Recollections, therefore, may close with Flint writing from his new and lasting 
home, but he wrote from a new seat of civilization rather than from the outskirts of the frontier. 
In other words, Flint settled in a land where civilization seemed fixed, where his seasoning 
experience could not undermine his faith in the frontier myth. Yet the malarial illnesses 
immortalized in Recollections refused to index and naturalize white colonists’ acclimation, 
acculturation, and colonization of the West, insisting that imperialism and expansion were not 
natural nor inexorable. Watts argues that it is Flint’s acculturation to the West that makes him a 
truly regional writer, but it is actually his unsuccessful acclimation—his malarial seasoning—
that makes his writing regional. 
 
Kirkland’s Fitful Seasoning: When the Environment Writes the Region 
Nearly half a century after Trist found herself penetrated and fevered by mosquitoes on 
the journey to her new home, Caroline Kirkland immigrated to Michigan, where she too realized 
that creating a frontier home could provide solid literary fodder. She published her first and most 
famous work, A New Home—Who’ll Follow? Or Glimpses of Western Life in 1839, quickly 
followed by Forest Life (1842) and Western Clearings (1845), a collection of previously 
published sketches and tales. Henry Nash Smith calls Kirkland a “traveler,” and Edward Watts a 
“tourist,” but Annette Kolodny reminds us that when Kirkland immigrated to the frontier, she 
“anticipated a permanent removal.”56 In fact, both of her first two works and many of the stories 
                                                      
56 Smith, Virgin Land, 225; Watts, An American Colony, 170; Kolodny, The Land Before Her, 
131. 
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collected in Western Clearings were all published while Kirkland was still settling Michigan.
 Kirkland did not find making a frontier home easy: mudholes, snakes, prying neighbors, 
gossip, and the ague conspired to make a genteel, Eastern home impossible. As such, critics have 
emphasized how Kirkland’s gender and class influenced her Western oeuvre. Sandra A. Zagarell 
argues that a female “ethic of interdependence” animates Kirkland’s Western writing, but others 
contend that her Eastern elitism undercuts such a universal protofeminism.57 At the very least, 
her writing is decidedly unromantic, labeled local color, regionalism, and even realism over the 
years. Despite centuries of analyzing her gender, region, and form, no critic has fully addressed 
what links these themes and stylistic choices—illness and healing. In particular, malaria, or the 
seasoning ague, knits Michiganders to their local environment and women to each other in 
improvised networks of care.  
Like Trist and Flint, Kirkland undergoes a reciprocal, ongoing, and unfinished seasoning. 
Although she only uses the word once in the texts discussed here, the seasoning paradigm 
resonates throughout her canon, indicating acclimation to Michigan’s environment as well as 
acculturation to frontier mores.58 While seasoning constructed illness as a rite of passage that 
sanctioned white Western immigration and colonization, as in Flint’s Recollections, Kirkland 
exposes the gap between the cultural paradigm and lived experiences of malaria. No one was 
every fully seasoned, and the seasoning could compound rather than relieve pain. The disease, 
therefore, engenders a “fitful” regionalism—a depiction of Michigan life and perspectives as 
                                                      
57 Zagarell, “Introduction,” xxxix. On her elitism, see, especially, Leverenz, Manhood and the 
American Renaissance, chap. 5. Still others suggest that Kirkland both praises and condemns 
Michigan’s lack of Eastern hierarchies. Kolodny, The Land Before Her, 131-58, Brigitte Georgi 
Findlay, The Frontiers of Women’s Writing, 27-37, and Halverson, Playing House in the 
American West, 13-26. 
58 Kirkland, Forest Life, 2.88, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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shifting and mercurial as the region’s characteristic disease. The ague, a physiologically and 
culturally regional phenomenon, shapes how Kirkland writes about her region, how she positions 
herself both within and without the community, especially the community of women. While 
many take Kirkland’s inconsistent approach to the West as evidence of her elitism (and moral 
failure), and others like Zagarell seem to romanticize Kirkland, her perspective is malarial, 
vacillating between and among these extremes. Malaria shapes Kirkland’s writing of the West, 
disrupting Eastern hierarchies of gender, class, and medical authority, even when Kirkland 
herself aimed to support them. 
 
The Seasoning Ague: When Lived Experience and Culture Misalign  
Although she only uses the word “seasoning” once, Kirkland routinely describes the ague 
across her canon, conflating the disease with the local environment. She draws attention to “the 
prodigious amount of wet prairie or ‘marsh,’” which produces “agues of the first quality” (FL 
1.166), deforestation (FL 1.45-53), and the danger of walks at dusk, an “imprudent indulgence” 
to which they “trace the agues which soon prostrated most of us.”59 Moreover, she bemoans, 
“mosquito-time” (FL 1.185), which left “white walls spotted with human blood, like the den of 
some horrible ogre” (FL 1.183). Swamps provided ideal breeding grounds for the malarial 
vector, while the anopheline mosquito preferred and lay eggs in the sunlit areas off felled trees, 
to bite at dusk, and rest on surfaces like walls to digest after feeding.60 While we cannot know if 
every reference to the ague was actually malaria, her descriptions suggest she was living in a 
malarial environment. 
                                                      
59 Kirkland, A New Home, 50, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
60 On these environmental conditions, see Packard, The Making of a Tropical Disease, 12-13, 61; 
McNeill, Mosquito Empires, 55; Valenčius, The Health of the Country, 30-31. 
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The paradigm of seasoning represented a cultural response to these particular, local, and 
biological conditions, but Kirkland’s canon reveals the wide chasm between culture and lived 
experience, between seasoning and the ague. In particular, she juxtaposes how locals perceived 
the ague with how newcomers experienced it. To the established Michiganders, Kirkland’s 
“indigenous” locals, the ague was common and inevitable, painful but never deadly, but to recent 
transplants the disease was physically and psychologically harrowing.61 The seasoning paradigm, 
which seemed to minimize the newcomers’ pain, only compounded their trauma. Locals like 
Silas Ashburn, a fictional character in Western Clearings, figure the ague as so routine as to be 
unavoidable: “every body knows if you’ve got to have the ague, why you’ve got to, and all the 
high land and dry land, and Queen Ann [quinine] in the world wouldn’t make no odds.”62 In 
Forest Life, the narrator similarly asserts, “In our neighbourhood…every body has, or has had, or 
expects to have the ague…indeed, ague begins to be looked upon as a condition of humanity” 
(1.88). To the locals, malarial illness was an inescapable fact of Michigan life and humanity 
itself. 
As such, the established Michiganders never fret over it. If the ague was common and 
unavoidable, it must not have been too dangerous. Ashburn contends, “‘If the agur could 
kill…we’d all ha’ been dead long ago’” (WC 1.70). In fact, Michigan’s vivax malaria was not 
especially deadly, and longtime Westerners like Ashburn would have acquired some resistance 
to malaria and thus would have had less painful and severe fits. The newcomers, however, had 
                                                      
61 Zagarell uses this term throughout her introduction to ANH. According to Halverson, Kirkland 
“posits the true struggle for territory as that between working”—what Zagarell calls 
“indigenous”—“and middle-class whites,” rather than actual native or indigenous people (21). 
As such, indigenous people are largely but not entirely missing in Kirkland’s oeuvre. See Floyd, 
Writing the Pioneer Woman, 110-11; Halverson, Playing House in the West, 20-22; and Dawn E. 
Keetley, “Unsettling the Frontier.” 
62 Kirkland, Western Clearings, 1.66, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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no such resistance.63 In both A New Home (61) and Forest Life (1.95), unimpressed neighbors 
react without “sympathy” to the newcomers’ agues: “‘[I]t is nothing but the ague!’ is very 
commonly all the consolation one gets” (FL 1.95). Ultimately, “All old people, who have 
weathered the storm tell us that these troubles are concomitants only of new settlements, and that 
we shall see them diminish year by year” (FL 1.81). To the locals who had acquired resistance, 
who had suffered the ague and survived, the disease was not only routine but inevitably 
surmountable. The ague’s disappearance was tied to the inevitability of Western immigration and 
colonization as “new settlements” implied. And, if the ague was already diminishing, then it 
could not be that terrible. Thus, the seasoning paradigm rendered the ague routine and 
survivable, not only responding to local immunology—acquired resistance—but also functioning 
culturally to mitigate the disease’s horror. The ague was made livable, because seasoning made it 
part of the local culture and identity. 
Yet Kirkland’s harrowing first-person descriptions of the ague contradict this seasoning 
logic. In A New Home, Mary Clavers, Kirkland’s semi-autobiographical narrator, recounts her 
family’s first bout of ague, describing “a severe head-ache, and racking pains in every bone,” in 
addition to a fever so “intense” that it “almost, although not quite, amounted to delirium” (60). 
With her characteristically acerbic humor, she pronounces, “I used to think I should certainly die 
in my ten or twelve hours’ fever—and Mr. Clavers confidently asserted, several times, that the 
upper half of his head was taking leave of the lower” (61). Caroline Gebhard argues that 
Kirkland uses humor to translate “the very real traumas she experienced” into acceptable 
writing.64 In this scene, Kirkland’s humor also negotiates the farcical gap between the lived 
                                                      
63 See note 55. 
64 Gebhard, “Comic Displacement,” 163. 
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experience of illness and the seasoning paradigm. Where she thinks she will promptly die, her 
neighbors “showed but little sympathy” (ANH 60). In Forest Life, the narrator even asserts, “One 
is sometimes (in the fever) almost desperate enough to wish to die just once to make people a 
little less unfeeling” (1.95). Though Kirkland clearly emphasizes how traumatic the ague’s 
material symptoms are, she also highlights how the seasoning paradigm compounds that trauma. 
As she writes, “The same amount of pain and suffering under any other name would excite 
abundant commiseration” (FL 1.95, emphasis mine). For Kirkland, the paradigm of seasoning 
not only farcically underestimated the material experience of the ague but also warranted her 
neighbors’ “unfeeling” attitudes. 
Despite the teleological pull of acclimation and acculturation, Kirkland remains 
suspicious of seasoning in her second book. Whereas she and her family function as the 
unacclimated outsiders in A New Home, she enlists the fictitious Sibthorpe family to fulfill a 
similar role in Forest Life.65 In a first-person epistle, Mr. Sibthorpe describes how the ague has 
consumed his very being: “I have no other thought. I can no longer say—‘My mind to me a 
kingdom is.’ I am deposed, and this vile blue-visaged fiend has usurped the throne” (2.170). The 
ague “call[s] up dreams…which terrify”: his wife “pale and ghastly,” his daughter “stiff—cold—
dead,” and “graves yawning, and vile shapes impatiently waiting for my last breath” (2.170). 
Although his neighbors would only designate his illness “a slight ague,” Mr. Sibthorpe’s great 
suffering undermines the seasoning paradigm just as Mary Clavers’s does (2.179). His 
experience is rendered even more harrowing and horrifying than Mrs. Clavers’s, who at least 
mitigates her suffering through humor. This missing humor suggests that though Kirkland may 
                                                      
65 Although Kirkland obviously uses a fictional persona to narrate ANH, it is less clear who is 
narrating FL. Given the fact that Kirkland’s identity had been revealed by FL’s publication 
(noted in the text’s preface), I describe Kirkland as the narrator of FL.  
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no longer be a naïve transplant, she is not yet an “unfeeling” or seasoned insider. She still 
sympathizes with the newcomer’s experience and thus still finds fault in the seasoning paradigm. 
In her third collection, Kirkland shifts her attention from immunologically naïve 
newcomers like Mrs. Clavers and the Sibthorpes to partially resistant natives like the Ashburn 
family. In particular, the short story “The Bee-Tree” demonstrates the impossibility of full 
immunity and complete seasoning.66 In this story, Silas Ashburn represents an earlier, poorer, 
and less-educated class of settlers, while his nemesis, Mr. Keene, represents the later, wealthier 
gentility, of which Kirkland herself was a part. She pits these classes against each other in a 
honey hunt: Ashburn tracks the bees to their hive and claims the honey in “the established mode” 
of the West, by marking it with his initials, but Mr. Keene takes the prize because the tree is on 
his property (1.71). Pitting these archetypal classes of white Westerners against each other, 
Kirkland and the story seem to crown Keene and his genteel, Eastern ideology the righteous 
winners of the honey and the West. 
In this vein, Kirkland characterizes the Ashburns as the West’s losers, using the ague as 
shorthand for their class’ moral flaws: ignorance and indigence. Ashburn ignorantly builds his 
home in a swamp, where “agues…have nearly made skeletons of himself and his family” (1.66). 
Yet, he won’t even admit his mistake: “his opinion is that it would not have a made a bit of 
difference if he had settled on the highest land in Michigan” (1.66). Thus, even when “there is 
perhaps no other case of disease in the neighbourhood,” the Ashburns “are frequently prostrated 
with agues” (1.68). Kirkland uses the ague to signal the family’s class and portend its demise; 
after all, the story ends with the family removing even further West.67 Yet she also, perhaps 
                                                      
66 “The Bee-Tree” was originally published in The Gift in 1840. 
67 As Timothy Sweet notes, genteel agrarians may not have actively murdered or removed poor 
whites as they did Native Americans, but they did imagine their demise—their habitual self-
 233 
inadvertently, demonstrates the impossibility of a complete malarial seasoning. Despite being 
“among the earliest settlers” in the area, and, therefore, among those who should be fully 
seasoned, the Ashburns continually suffer by the ague (1.61). As complete immunity to malaria 
is medically impossible, a completely successful seasoning would have also been impossible. 
While Kirkland certainly employs the ague to stigmatize the Ashburns and their entire class, she 
also inadvertently highlights how inadequate the seasoning frame was for explaining lived 
experience of malaria. 
Kirkland criticizes the gap between the seasoning paradigm and lived experience. On the 
one hand, she demonstrates how previous, repeated experiences of disease produce a particular 
culture. Longstanding locals did develop partial immunity and thus would have experienced less 
painful agues, generating the seasoning culture that considered the ague common, routine, and 
unimpressive. This culture, in turn, affected lived experience; the local lack of sympathy, 
warranted by seasoning, led to a less attentive and less feeling culture that exacerbated 
newcomers’ illnesses. On the other hand, Kirkland demonstrates how the seasoning paradigm 
failed to account for a spectrum of material experiences, including those of the newcomers and 
the locals like the Ashburns. In short, she emphasizes how lived experiences of the ague 
undermined the static and inflexible paradigm of seasoning.  
Of course, Kirkland did not understand immunity or acquired resistance. Nonetheless, she 
chronicles their effects in her descriptions of newcomers’ experiences and the Ashburn family’s 
unyielding agues. Malaria itself, its symptoms—cycling fevers, relapses, and impossible 
                                                      
removals ever further West—to be inevitable. American Georgics, 116-17. To this end, Kirkland 
may use the ague and its associations with swamplands to link poor whites to Native Americans. 
Susan Sleeper-Smith argues that indigenous Americans resisted removal by inhabiting 
Michigan’s swamplands. Indian Women and French Men, 141-42. 
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immunity—undermined the paradigm of seasoning. As malaria infected and transformed the 
human body, provoking fevers, chills, and eventually partial resistance, it also resisted and 
reshaped the seasoning paradigm and Kirkland’s writing of it. 
 
A Fitful Regionalism: When the Region in Regionalism is Malarial 
Although Kirkland’s Western works share affinities with many genres, regionalism 
seems to best capture her attention to the local environment and culture, as well as gender and 
class. Yet many critics frame Kirkland’s regionalism as a failure.68 Fetterley and Pryse consider 
her to be a limited precursor to a more perfect regionalism. She “engages in complex internal 
negotiations around her own biases and prejudices,” but “never relinquishes control over her 
narrative or its meaning,” attempting to “reconstruct” the West in her own Eastern image.69 
Similarly, Watts figures Kirkland as an imperial outsider, whose Eastern elitism discredits her 
from a truly Western identity and canon.70 Her writing is too prejudiced or too imperialist to 
actually be regional. 
If we adopt Snyder’s bioregional framework, however, Kirkland does not fail at 
regionalism nor at being Western; rather, her regionalism is deeply embedded in her region and 
is thus malarial. Whether Kirkland considers herself a Westerner or not, her record of malarial 
seasonings embed her writing in her region. Conjoining Snyder’s bioregionalism with literary 
regionalism’s emphasis on Eastern hierarchy, Kirkland’s regionalism can be considered fitful. 
                                                      
68 Josephine Donovan is an exception, but she does not extensively analyze Kirkland, who was 
outside of her New England focus. See New England Local Color Literature, introduction. 
69 Fetterley and Pryse, Writing out of Place, 77. 
70 Watts, An American Colony, chap. 8 
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She is not universally imperialist, as Watts diagnoses. Instead, her writing of the West is as 
mercurial as her region and its relapsing fevers and agues. 
Kirkland struggles to represent herself and her personal relationship to Michigan and 
frontier life. She is both a seasoned insider and an unacclimated outsider, illustrated by the 
generic shifts between A New Home and Forest Life. While Kirkland’s first book opts for 
“desultory sketches” from a semi-autobiographical narrator in a single village (ANH 3), her 
second collection travels throughout Michigan and employs fictional, plotted narratives through 
multiple perspectives.71 This shift, Brigitte Georgi-Findlay argues, signals how “the Eastern 
outsider had become the Western insider.”72 Yet, rather than providing a more “sympathetic” 
depiction of Michiganders, Kolodny asserts that Kirkland’s ambulatory perspective is detached, 
disengaging her from her “real-world neighbors.”73 Smith argues that these generic discrepancies 
demonstrate how Kirkland “struggled to find a satisfactory form” to represent an agricultural 
rather than an heroic West, but, like her physical body, her shifting genres and perspectives are 
tied to her malarial environment.74 
For example, Sibthorpe’s letter reveals that Kirkland is neither fully outside nor fully 
inside of the culture she writes about. Although she should be seasoned by her second book, her 
writing is not so teleological, because the ague is not teleological. Kirkland does not overcome 
the ague but instead displaces its trauma onto Mr. Sibthorpe and his graphic letter. On the one 
hand, she highlights an outsider’s experience of the ague, centering her compassion on the 
unseasoned Eastern transplant; she differentiates herself from the locals and their seasoning 
                                                      
71 See Kolodny, The Land Before Her, 149 and Smith, Virgin Land, 225-27 on this difference. 
72 Georgi-Findlay, The Frontiers of Women’s Writing, 20 
73 Knott, Imagining the Forest, 47; Kolodny, The Land Before Her, 149. 
74 Smith, Virgin Land, 226. 
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paradigm by depicting the disease’s horror and by reifying her gentility through sympathy. On 
the other hand, she displaces this insight onto a fictional male persona through “the epistolary 
mode of the previous century,” devices that distance her from the experience.75 There is no 
slippage between Mr. Sibthorpe and Kirkland as there is between Mrs. Clavers and Kirkland. 
She awkwardly severs herself from her classed ally, the genteel Sibthorpe, writing, “we could 
not but think his feelings very natural, although to us old settlers they appeared somewhat 
exaggerated” (FL 2.94). In this line, Kirkland wants it both ways: she wants to validate Mr. 
Sibthorpe’s experience as “natural” and thus maintain her own status as an uncontaminated, 
genteel Easterner, but she also aligns herself with the “old settlers,” acknowledging that she is 
more of a seasoned insider than both Sibthorpe and her reader. 
Kirkland is neither a born-again Wolverine nor an unadulterated Eastern imperialist. Nor 
is she somehow neatly between these two extremes. Rather, she and her writing are sometimes 
outside of the culture they observe and sometimes within, sometimes offering unseasoned 
condemnation and at other times singing seasoned praise. This is not because she is a secret 
imperialist or an Eastern proselytizer, but because she is deeply embedded in her malarial region. 
If the ague itself—its material symptoms—both warranted and undermined the seasoning 
paradigm, then it also inflects Kirkland’s material and literary West. Her regionalism is malarial; 
the ague ties her to a distinct bioregion, and its cycling fevers and relapses shape her 
inconsistent, fitful integration into her frontier community. 
 
Fitful Regionalism’s Frontier Women 
                                                      
75 Ibid. 
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Kirkland routinely exposes fantasies of the West, rejecting “the glowing pencil of fancy” 
that romantically colored the frontier (ANH 6). In particular, she emphasizes how frontier life 
unsettled gendered roles and expectations. Mrs. Clavers tracks a snake, severs it in half, and 
displays the snake’s tail end like a trophy, “exalt[ing] the coda to a high station on the logs at the 
corner of the house—for fear none of the scornful sex would credit our prowess” (ANH 59), 
while Mr. Clavers ineptly assumes the cooking, cleaning, and childrearing when his wife comes 
down with the ague, nearly falling into the fire. 
Yet nowhere is Kirkland’s inconsistent acclimation and acculturation to Michigan more 
evident than in her fitful relation to other Western women.  Women were vital to settling the 
West, to creating a life, home, and community. As Mrs. Clavers claims, “In this newly-formed 
world… men look upon each one, newly arrived, merely as an additional business automaton,” 
while women have “a feeling of hostess-ship toward the new comer” (ANH 64). Frontier women 
forged their new community by providing psychological and material support during illness. 
Kirkland’s malarial regionalism extends to all aspects of her writing, but it is especially notable 
in her representation of this female network of care. As she awkwardly positions herself within 
and without the community in Sibthorpe’s letter, her classed sensibility renders a similarly 
awkward integration into this community of women healers. Kirkland frequently aims to 
denigrate poor, Western women’s medical knowledge, but her writing nonetheless renders their 
experience and knowledge visible and vital. Moreover, her consistent policing of appropriate 
medical authority, in addition to her advocacy for quinine, ironically styles herself as a 
“petticoated professor of the healing art” (FL 1.84). As the ague shapes her regionalism, it 
similarly re-envisions women doctors and healers not as backwoods last-resorts, nor as 
secondary supplements to male doctors, but as vital products of and participants in Michigan life. 
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On the frontier, where doctors were scarce, costly, and distant, women fostered, 
maintained, and restored health. In A New Home, Mrs. Rivers and Mrs. Clavers assist the 
Titmouse family, all of whom were suffering from the ague. The women draw water, make tea, 
cook, and dispense quinine pills (114-18). Elsewhere, Mrs. Clavers rushes to help a boy bitten by 
a snake (17) and a former servant girl dying of a botched abortion (110-11). Mrs. Clavers herself 
is nursed by Mrs. Jennings and another unnamed woman during her first ague (60-62). Similarly, 
Mr. Keene’s niece, Clarissa, helps the Ashburns recover from their stubborn agues (WC 1.77-
79), while Mrs. Lettson sets Mr. Sibthorpe’s daughter’s wrist with a poultice of local flora (FL 
2.201-5). From cleaning and cooking to providing medicine and herbs, women knitted together a 
community by mending broken bodies and minds. 
Yet Kirkland does not romanticize this community nor her relationship to it. Classism 
pervades her female network of care. In particular, she envisions care as unidirectional, flowing 
from genteel women like Mrs. Clavers, Mrs. Rivers and Clarissa, Mr. Keene’s niece, to poor 
Westerners like the Titmouses and the Ashburns. The poor, ill locals allow Kirkland and other 
middle-class white women to enact what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls “benevolent 
maternalism”: the process by which white bourgeois women shored up their own classed and 
able-bodied social position and momentarily stepped beyond gendered constraints by furnishing 
medical care to the diseased or disabled poor. That is, women like Mrs. Clavers could use care 
for poor and ill others to “launch themselves into a more prestigious, more influential public role 
that captured some elements of liberal selfhood” that their gender typically rendered 
inaccessible.76 Mrs. Clavers and her ilk, therefore, use their cultural position as caregivers to 
                                                      
76 Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, 82. 
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reinforce their class status and to expand their gendered limits. Like “manifest domesticity,” 
benevolent maternalism allowed white women to enact their own brand of imperialism.  
To this end, Kirkland positions her genteel self as the bearer of medical enlightenment to 
a superstitious, backwoods populace. Significantly, she advocates for quinine, the “only true 
elixir against the ague” (FL 1.79). Locals, however, deploy “a violent prejudice” against it, 
preferring to let their agues “‘run’…the whole year round” than to imbibe the bitter nostrum (FL 
1.78). Though she admits that quinine can be dangerous (ANH 62) and costly (FL 1.78), she 
nonetheless envisions local resistance as unadulterated, characteristically-Western superstition. 
In a passage in Forest Life, she devotes herself to debunking both romantic myths of the West 
and Western superstition as well. As her carriage pulls away from her village and onto her 
journey throughout Michigan, she pulls out a notebook to begin writing: “about the 
edges…played a prismatic halo—an edging of rainbow; such (only more brilliant) as will 
sometimes be the effect of that bewitched condition of the eyes which is the consequence of 
over-dosing with quinine” (1.14-15). She finds this display too “dazzling” and consequently 
covers her eyes with a “veil” before again “look[ing] abroad in the sunshine” (1.15). At the 
beginning of Forest Life, this passage undoubtedly speaks to the “veil” of Eastern romanticism, 
but, in the context of her repeated praise of quinine, it also challenges Western superstition. In 
this way, Kirkland figures herself as a benevolent mother, dispensing medical knowledge to the 
“backwoods” rubes, validating her class status and pushing the limits of her gender. She also, 
probably inadvertently, positions herself as a medical authority. 
Of course, Western circumstances undermine benevolent maternalism, and illness 
frequently highlights the limits of genteel women’s aid. Though Mrs. Clavers and Mrs. Rivers 
provide the poor Titmouse family with food, drink, and quinine, they cannot milk the cow when 
 240 
asked. When she laments their “defective education,” Kirkland not only mocks what passes for 
“education” in the West but, more importantly, admits that they cannot fulfill their benevolent 
roles (ANH 118). They fail to “render[] so simple yet so necessary a service to the sick poor” 
(ANH 118). Similarly, when Mrs. Clavers asks Mrs. Newland how long her daughter had been 
ill, “expressing my surprise that I had heard nothing of it,” Mrs. Newland cries, “‘What, you’ve 
heard their lies too, have ye!’” (110). While Mrs. Clavers does not know that the young Newland 
has died of an abortion, she manages both to arrive too late to help and to insult Miss Newland’s 
memory and her mother, albeit unintentionally. She not only fails to provide succor but actually 
exacerbates the situation. Mrs. Clavers attempts to use care for the poor ill to reinforce her class 
privilege and expand her gendered limits, but her Western experiences erode her Eastern elitism, 
or, at least, her writing of it. 
Western illness resists benevolent maternalism by reversing its direction; in the West, 
care does not only flow from the middle-class to the poor but vice versa. When Mrs. Clavers 
develops her first ague, it is Mrs. Jennings who diagnoses and cares for her. Mrs. Jennings, 
however, washes her clothes “al fresco by the side of the creek” (49), drinks tea directly from the 
teapot’s spout, “saying ‘it tasted better so,’” and plunges her personal cutlery into every 
communal dish (51). In short, Mrs. Jennings is a female Silas Ashburn, the quintessential local 
with no notion of or patience for classed and gendered notions of decorum. Yet, as a local, Mrs. 
Jennings recognizes the ague’s symptoms even when Mrs. Clavers herself mistakes them for 
simple shock: “‘Why you’ve got th’ agur! Woman alive! Why I know the fever-agur as well as I 
know beans! It a’n’t nothin’ else!’” (60). Mrs. Jennings, the poor, uneducated, and crass 
Westerner, diagnoses Mrs. Clavers and nurses her. She only leaves when she is called away to 
provide for her own daughter. While Mrs. Clavers downplays Mrs. Jennings’ role, calling her 
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“Dame” and exoticizing and demeaning her dialect, Mrs. Clavers’s sarcastic assertion that “Mrs. 
Jennings consoled me” by reasserting her diagnosis “every ten minutes” nonetheless 
demonstrates that the Western woman remained by the Eastern woman’s side (60). Whereas 
providing care reifies class privilege, receiving care threatens it. That is, illness undermines 
benevolent maternalism’s classism and imperialism. Mrs. Clavers’s caustic humor only amplifies 
this unsettling point. 
Having already dramatically pressured and changed the individual body, the local 
paradigm of seasoning, and Kirkland’s regionalism, the ague here fractures benevolent 
maternalism. Its rhythmic fevers and relapses reverse the linear flow of care that benevolent 
maternalism requires It prevents Kirkland and other genteel white women from cementing their 
class status by preventing them from fully and uni-directionally furnishing aid. As the ague 
belies the seasoning’s teleology, it similarly belies benevolent maternalism’s inevitability. 
Middle-class women can and do fall ill themselves, while poor women assist, diagnose, and even 
heal them. In other words, those relapsing fevers and partial immunities upend the classed 
distinctions of gender that women like Mrs. Clavers strived to import to the West. When 
Kirkland and Mrs. Clavers advocate for quinine, they attempt to capture some of the authority 
that sexism withheld from them. Their benevolent maternalism aimed to bolster their class and 
vitality at the expense of their gender. It also aimed to enact a particularly domestic version of 
the imperialism men were deploying at a grander scale. The ague, however, proved not only that 
this logic was unsuitable and unsustainable in Michigan but also that medical authority was 
never uniquely male nor genteel. 
The ague, therefore, affirms medical insight outside of an Eastern elitist mainstream—
and, notably, outside of Kirkland’s intentions. Unsettled by Mrs. Jennings’s care, Mrs. Clavers 
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attempts to their inverted relationship; she accords her restoration to a male physician with a 
“first-rate education, who had walked European hospitals, and who had mother-wit in 
abundance” rather than to Mrs. Jennings (ANH 60). Although this doctor only echoes Mrs. 
Jennings’s diagnosis and attitude, asserting “an ague was as easily managed as a common cold” 
(62), it is the doctor who receives credit for mitigating “the severe attack of rheumatic 
fever…into a daily ague” (61). That is, when Mrs. Jennings upsets the classed hierarchy of 
benevolent maternalism, Mrs. Clavers corrects this reversal by deferring to conventional 
gendered hierarchies and professional medical authority. After all, what is the male doctor’s 
salvific cure?—finding a young, unnamed woman to nurse the Clavers family. As Kirkland 
attempted to use medical care and knowledge to cement a classed authority that circumvented 
her gender, in this scene she attempts to stabilize her class by forfeiting her gender and Western 
women’s medical knowledge. As Mrs. Jennings and the second, unnamed nurse reveal, however, 
the ague renders such a straightforward correction impossible. 
Even when Kirkland aims to denigrate medical women, the ague highlights their 
importance. On the one hand, Kirkland conflates the “petticoated professor of the healing art—a 
female physician” with backwoods superstition. She argues that Michiganders would rather a 
female doctor “prescribe the most deadly drugs” or “a dose of centipedes procured from beneath 
a fallen tree” than “employ an educated physician” (FL 1.84). If Kirkland’s venom was not 
obvious, she concludes, “Happily this order of practitioners is not numerous, and…may be 
expected rather to diminish than to increase” (FL 1.84). Just as Kirkland posits the eventual 
disappearance of the lower class of settlers and of malaria itself, she banishes female physicians 
to an ever-regressing past.  
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On the other hand, her fitful regionalism—her malarial writing—belies this teleology just 
as it belied seasoning’s teleology. Her texts are littered with female healers: Mrs. Jennings, the 
unnamed nurse, Mrs. Rivers, Mrs. Lettson, and Clarissa, among countless others. Most 
importantly, Kirkland’s policing of medical authority, not to mention her advocacy of quinine, 
styles herself as an appropriate conduit of medical knowledge. Undeniably, Kirkland resists the 
figure of the “petticoated” doctor, especially when it did not conform to her vision of classed, 
benevolent maternalism. Yet the ague renders such women nurses, caretakers, healers, and 
doctors vital and visible in the West and in her Western writing. Thus, the ague disturbs 
Kirkland’s paradigms for perceiving and ordering the West—seasoning, benevolent maternalism, 
manifest destiny and domesticity, and regionalism itself—by highlighting those alternative 
perspectives and agencies that contributed to the region’s material and social culture, including 
poor women, ill people, and perhaps even nonhumans like malaria. 
To Kirkland, being seasoned is being Western, and her representations and attitudes 
toward both are as inconsistent as the ague itself. Her writing is never fully Eastern, never fully 
Western; never only feminist, nor chauvinist; never completely elitist and imperialist, nor 
democratic. Ultimately, she produces a fitful regionalism, in which her perspectives and writings 
on the West oscillate like malaria itself, sometimes resisting a uniform, linear, and teleological 
seasoning and stereotypical representation, and sometimes bolstering Western expansion and 
Eastern imperialism. She critiques the myth of inexorable progress, mourning Michigan’s 
deforestation, yet she also asserts, “the felling of the tree has something of the sublime in it,” 
fetishizing the very same process (FL 51). Her fitful regionalism, therefore, revealed the 
seasoning’s central paradox: malarial illnesses belied the closure that the seasoning guaranteed, 




Seasoning illnesses like malaria did not stop Western expansion and colonization. In part, 
white Westerners’ faith in civilization had worked; the disease faded quickly in the Old 
Northwest where Flint and Kirkland settled, “where winters were hard, houses tight, cattle 
penned, and frontier conditions of shortest duration.”77 Yet such illnesses undermined the very 
paradigm used to frame, explain, and contain them. In an extended meditation on the ague in 
Forest Life, Kirkland describes how the disease resists straightforward intelligibility:  
Every body trusts this particular fit is to be positively the last visit of the foul fiend. If we 
can only get through to-day, if the shake does not dislocate the neck bone, or the fever set 
the house on fire, we feel sure that we have had it so long, or we have had it so hard, or 
we have been so little subject to it, that it is not likely to return. This is certainly the most 
violent shake, or the delirious fever; there is more perspiration or less head-ache, or in 
some respect this attack differs from all that preceded it, so that we feel confident there 
has been a change in the system, and any change must be for the better. And many times 
these prognostics at a venture prove true, as if by miracle. An ague will quite one as 
suddenly and as inexplicably as it came on, without the use of remedies, whether of diet 
or medicine, and one may feel nothing of it for a year, perhaps for a life. The 
consequences wear away, and we forget them. (81) 
No one knows for how long the chills will recur; no one knows if this fever will be the last; no 
one knows what might set off a relapse; no one knows how or why it suddenly disappears. The 
seasoning promised that disease was surmountable and civilization inevitable, but the ague-
                                                      
77 Cowdrey, This Land, This South, 85. 
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stricken incessantly searched for signs—the strength of a shake or the amount of sweat—of a 
closure that never seemed to materialize. The paradigm of seasoning attempted to minimize 
malarial illness’s intransigent materiality, but the disease resisted closure, intelligibility, and, 
thus, the rhetoric of Western imperialism, if not Western imperialism itself.  
While Trist, Flint, and Kirkland mobilize the seasoning paradigm to ensure their physical 
and cultural persistence, the illnesses themselves revealed a reciprocal, ongoing, unfinished, and 
uncertain process. The paradigm aimed to use the physical experience of illness to underwrite 
colonization, but no experience of illness is linear or universal, just as no experience of region is 





Conclusion: John Tanner’s Seasonal Paradigm 
 In 1790, John Tanner, a white, nine-year-old boy, was taken captive by a group of Native 
American men from his home at the mouth of the Miami River, below Cincinnati. Sold to an 
Odawa-Ojibwe woman, Net-no-kwa, Tanner would eventually become fully adopted and 
acculturated to Anishinaabe life. 1 He lived and hunted in the Old Northwest, ranging from 
Minnesota through Manitoba.2 Five years after the opening of the Erie Canal, which enabled the 
mass immigration of genteel Anglo-Easterners like Caroline Kirkland to the Old Northwest, 
Tanner published his life story, A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner 
(1830). While critics have debated the role of Tanner’s editor, Edwin James, John T. Fierst and 
Theodore Catton have argued that James preserved Tanner’s primary framework for 
remembering and understanding his life: seasons.3 As Fierst contends, Tanner organizes his 
                                                      
1 There is some debate on which nation originally captured Tanner. Tanner himself claims the 
Shawnee; Gordon M. Sayre agrees (“Abridging Between Two Worlds” 486). Theodore Catton, 
however, argues it was the Shawnee-Ottawa, while John T. Fierst and June Namias suggest the 
Saginaw-Ojibwe. See Catton, Rainy Lake House, 9; Fierst, “A Succession,” and Namias, White 
Captives, 78. I have chosen to leave the question of who first took Tanner captive unaddressed. 
What is more important is the culture he was adopted into and perceived the world through—
Anishinaabe, the related Algonquian nations of the Ojibwe, Odawa, and Potawatomi. 
Additionally, there is some debate on when Tanner was taken captive. Neil Loomis, the 1956 
edition’s editor, locates Tanner’s capture in 1789, using Tanner’s count of the seasons to locate 
him in Anglo-American time. Fierst and Catton, however, locate Tanner’s capture in 1790 
through a state deposition on his abduction. See Fierst, “A Succession,” n. pg., and Catton, Rainy 
Lake House, 346. 
2 Tanner moved within and without the United States with his Anishinaabe family. Additionally, 
though he was first captured in Ohio, he briefly lived with his biological family in Kentucky and 
Missouri. Importantly, Tanner’s sense of place did not align with the United States’ official 
geography nor with the Eastern transplant’s understanding of region. Mark Rifkin analyzes how 
indigenous Americans’ hunting patterns resisted colonial geography in Manifesting America, 
chap. 2. 
3 Some critics like Edward Watts argue that James was anti-Indian. See An American Colony, 
85-86. Others claim he was sympathetic and anti-removal: John T. Fierst, “A Succession”; Kyhl 
Lyndgaard, Captivity Literature and the Environment, chap. 3; Catton, Rainy Lake House, 347-
49. Importantly, James frames Tanner’s story with an introduction that criticizes fur trading 
companies for Native Americans’ unfixed, uncivilized life, but he also includes a linguistic 
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narrative through “observable changes in natural phenomena,” including winter weather, mature 
rice, and seasonal game.4 
 Tanner’s seasons offer an alternative to seasoning—to the way the paradigm framed 
illness, region, and colonization. Whereas the seasoning guaranteed closure and colonization— 
even when the illnesses themselves subverted this paradigm—Tanner’s seasons instead 
emphasized illness as an ongoing, unromantic intra-action of human and nonhuman. Seasons 
recognize that humans can never dominate the environment, because domination presumes a 
separation that illness itself belies.  
 In the middle of the narrative, Tanner contracts an illness that damages his hearing. 
Unable to hunt and provide for his family, he determines to kill himself. While he is 
unsuccessful, he claims, “this sickness I looked upon as the commencement of misfortune, which 
                                                      
apparatus, which Robert Lawrence Gunn has shown actively enabled racism and Western 
expansion. See Ethnology and Empire, chap. 1. James, however, was erased in the 1994 Penguin 
Books edition of the Narrative. For analysis, see Fierst, “A Succession,” and Sayre, “Abridging 
Between the Worlds,” 484-86. Finally, on Tanner’s use of seasons, see Fierst, “A Succession,” 
and Catton, Rainy Lake House, 345. 
4 Fierst, “A Succession,” n. pg. To Fierst and Sayre, these narrative factors warrant a reading of 
the Narrative as an Indian autobiography rather than a white captivity narrative. In his 
introduction to Native American Autobiography, Arnold Krupat differentiates between Indian 
autobiographies and autobiographies by Indians; the former “have been produced under the sign 
of history and (social) science,” while the latter “have been produced under the sign of religion, 
non-scientific cultural commentary, and art” (4). James’s editorial framework includes both 
political and linguistic commentary and thus straddled these two paradigms. At the very least, 
Tanner’s is not the traditional captivity narrative of Mary Rowlandson, more closely resembles 
Mary Jemison’s famous acculturation. Lyndgaard argues that Edwin James, Tanner’s editor, 
purposefully employed the captivity genre rather than “the restrictive mode of government 
compiler” to resist the federal government’s removal policies (76). Fierst, however, argues that 
the genre “denies the depth of John Tanner’s transculturation” (“A Succession” n.pg.). For more 
on the captivity narrative, see, for example, Kathryn Zabelle Derounian-Stodola and James 
Arthur Levernier, The Indian Captivity Narrative, and Namias, White Captives. I read Tanner’s 
work as something between or adjacent to captivity narrative and Indian autobiography, which 
complicates central ideas about these genres.  
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was to follow me through life.”5 Yet his misfortune had an even earlier origin than this particular 
illness: a beaver epidemic. On the hunt for food and furs at the beginning of winter, he discovers 
empty lodges where he anticipates multitudes of animals: 
At last I found that some kind of distemper was prevailing among these animals, which 
destroyed them in vast numbers. I found them dead and dying on the ice, and on the land; 
sometimes I found one that, having cut a tree half down, had died at its roots; sometimes 
one who had drawn a stick of timber halfway to his lodge, was lying dead by his burthen. 
Many of them which I opened were red and bloody about the heart…Since that year the 
beaver have never been so plentiful in the country of Red River and Hudson’s Bay. (104) 
Jody F. Decker suggests that the beavers may have been dying of tularemia, a zoonotic disease 
that resembles bubonic plague.6 Tanner skins the beavers for fur, but he refuses to eat them—a 
particularly dangerous loss at the beginning of winter. The beaver population was never “so 
plentiful” again (104). 
While this epidemic endangered his livelihood, it also endangered his life. He writes, “In 
the ensuing fall…I moved…to the Wild Rice. While we engaged in collecting and preparing the 
grain, many among us were seized with a violent sickness. It commenced with cough and 
hoarseness, and sometimes bleeding from the mouth or nose. In a short time many died, and 
none were able to hunt” (110). Decker argues that the group may have contracted tularemia from 
the decaying beavers, which could have infected the water that fed the rice fields (160). He soon 
develops “a dreadful pain” in his ears; “abscesses had formed and discharged,” damaging his 
hearing (111). Even if Tanner did not contract tularemia directly from the beavers, the adjective 
                                                      
5 Tanner, Narrative, 111, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
6 Decker, “Country Distemper,” 160, hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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“ensuing” and his emphasis on the location of the illness, in the rice paddies, suggests that 
Tanner envisions his family’s epidemic as directly related to the beaver epidemic. 
Tanner’s illness, including the beaver epidemic, emphasizes seasons, offering an 
alternative to the seasoning paradigm. He first locates the beaver epidemic in a particular 
moment of winter, when “the snow was no more than a foot deep” (104). Elk would not sink 
when they ran, making them harder to hunt; thus, beavers were a vital food source, which the 
epidemic endangered. In short, it was a starving time. Similarly, he locates his own illness in the 
“ensuing fall,” a traditional time to harvest rice and prepare for the following winter. Most 
fundamentally, Tanner’s emphasis on seasons acts as a calendar, following a particularly 
Anishinaabe concept of time. Yet, in the context of the intertwined epidemics, Tanner’s seasons 
also reflect and refract the regnant paradigm of seasoning. Whereas the seasoning anticipated and 
guaranteed closure—that illness, the intra-action of self and environment, would end—seasons 
emphasize an ongoing, enmeshed, and unromantic intra-action of human and nonhuman. The 
Romantics believed that the seasons wrote an eternal, inexorable script, but Tanner’s seasons, 
like Grainger’s poetic putrefaction, suggest that such a script did not necessarily serve human 
ends. Closure, domination, and sovereignty were not givens. Only an ongoing, mutable, and 
multivalent intra-action was inevitable. 
If seasons thus undermined the seasoning’s implicit promise of environmental 
domination, they also subverted Western colonization. In particular, Tanner contracts a malarial 
illness that undermines the relationship between colonization, civilization, and health. When 
Tanner finally decides to find his birth family, he reverses his white ancestors’ journey West, 
travelling East, away from the frontier and toward white settlement. On his way to the Ohio 
Valley, he is “seized with a fever and ague,” which was “extremely painful and distressing” 
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(242). When he finally encountered a biological nephew, they traveled to the Ohio. His “fever 
continued to return daily, and when the chill commenced, we were compelled to stop for some 
time, so that our progress was not rapid” (246-47). He remains sick at his relative’s home for a 
month. That is, Tanner develops a malarial seasoning illness not as he penetrates the Western 
frontier like Trist, Flint, and Kirkland, but rather as he journeys east, toward the “civilization” 
that these other writers believed would eradicate disease entirely. Moreover, during his return to 
the West, he decides, “I had found that it made me sick to sleep in a house, and on this journey I 
constantly refused to do so” (248). Tanner metonymically links his illness to the house and to all 
that the house symbolizes—the East, whiteness, and civilization. In turn, the environmental 
exposure that the others believed beget disease accomplishes the inverse; it restores him. 
Tanner’s illness, therefore, refuses to conflate disease with the frontier and health with 
civilization. In this way, he also refuses to let seasoning claim illness as a tool of colonization. 
 Ultimately, the seasonal paradigm—not an acclimation, acculturation, and colonization to 
the land but an ongoing intra-action—made Tanner’s complete restoration to white civilization 
impossible. Though he would live with white relatives in Kentucky for two years, he eventually 
returned to Anishinaabe life and died in the West. Still ill with fevers and chills, Tanner meets 
his brother outside of Detroit, but his brother does not recognize him: “he gave me a hasty look, 
and passed on” (251). Like Flint, Tanner is rendered unrecognizable by his environment. Unlike 
Flint, however, Tanner is unrecognizable because he is a seasonal rather than a seasoned man—a 
human who has been unmade and remade by intra-action, including his Anishinaabe 
acculturation. Tanner’s seasonality, therefore, more fully acknowledged the seasoning’s malarial 
lessons—that the human was always in relation to an environment that was also always in 
relation to humans. 
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Like Tanner and even Flint, physically transformed by the diseases they encountered, 
early American literature was transformed by the diseases that encountered it. Diseases wrote 
bodies, lives, cultures, history, and literature. Syphilis posited the limits of human knowledge 
and mastery in the genre most dedicated to such pursuits, the natural history, while smallpox 
revealed the artificial borders of the white body politic. In turn, yellow fever uncoupled agency 
from intentionality and efficacy and, thus, the novel from white humanity. Dysentery exposed 
sensibility’s hypocritical and unethical reliance on a limited definition of humanity. Finally, 
malaria resisted the closure that seasoning mobilized to colonize the real and literary West. Each 
of these chapters argues that particular diseases transformed human bodies in particular ways, 
subsequently transforming ideas about illness, humanity, and literature.  
By emphasizing disease’s material and literary agency, by conjoining the study of illness 
and disability with the study of the environment, this argument shows how disease challenges 
fundamental ideas about humanity, including sovereignty, autonomy, rationality, and 
intentionality. Yet this challenge is not entirely negative. Instead, it opens up a critical space for 
reimagining how humans relate to other humans and nonhumans, to how we experience, treat, 
and write about one of our most fundamental intra-actions—illness. In the age of the 
Anthropocene, and the global reckoning of human supremacy, it is absolutely vital that we 
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